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Do disadvantaged ethnic groups favor violent over nonviolent conflict tactics? To understand when and why civil war breaks out, we need to study violent and nonviolent forms of conflict together, using analytical tools that can account for the choice between them. Yet, most large-N analyses of the causes of civil war do not account for nonviolent conflict, and vice versa. Because the mechanisms held to link horizontal inequalities to civil war closely resemble those used to explain largely nonviolent social movements, this article studies group disadvantages, political violence and nonviolent resistance together. To reduce concerns about selection bias in horizontal inequality research, it extends the analysis to socially as well as politically relevant groups around the world. A consensus is emerging that politically disadvantaged ethnic groups shun nonviolent tactics, because they lack ties to people close to the regime and its institutions. This article challenges the consensus, by showing that political group disadvantages predict nonviolent as well as violent forms of conflict. Groups' economic status helps explain tactical choices. Among economically advantaged groups, political disadvantages increase the risk of nonviolent conflict. Among the economically disadvantaged, they facilitate violence. This pattern is strongest in situations where no policies are in place to remedy group disadvantages, in authoritarian and less economically open societies, and in analyses that account for conflicts of low intensity, to capture onsets early. The results point to the importance of economic and other forms of leverage, which have been largely overlooked in the econometric literature.

Do disadvantaged ethnic groups favor violent over nonviolent conflict tactics? To understand when and why civil war breaks out, we need to study violent and nonviolent forms of conflict together, using analytical tools that can account for the choice between them. Yet, most large-N analyses of the causes of civil war do not account for nonviolent conflict, and vice versa. Because the mechanisms held to link horizontal inequalities to civil war closely resemble those used to explain largely nonviolent social movements, this article studies group disadvantages, political violence and nonviolent resistance together. To reduce concerns about selection bias in horizontal inequality research, it extends the analysis to socially as well as politically relevant groups around the world. A consensus is emerging that politically disadvantaged ethnic groups shun nonviolent tactics, because they lack ties to people close to the regime and its institutions. This article challenges the consensus, by showing that political group disadvantages predict nonviolent as well as violent forms of conflict. Groups' economic status helps explain tactical choices. Among economically advantaged groups, political disadvantages increase the risk of nonviolent conflict. Among the economically disadvantaged, they facilitate violence. This pattern is strongest in situations where no policies are in place to remedy group disadvantages, in authoritarian and less economically open societies, and in analyses that account for conflicts of low intensity, to capture onsets early. The results point to the importance of economic and other forms of leverage, which have been largely overlooked in the econometric literature.

Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups' opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data (N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.

Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups' opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data ( N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.

Do people from disadvantaged ethnic groups favor political violence over non-violent tactics? Studies of horizontal (between-group) inequality often concentrate on civil war. This article drills below the macro level and looks beyond civil war, to investigate individual participation in various types of conflict. Different types and combinations of ethnic disadvantage favor participation in different kinds of conflict, because of different opportunity structures. Political exclusion motivates leadership, which facilitates organized movements. Economic disadvantages restrict economic leverage, making non-violent tactics less likely to succeed. The article maps these components of groups' opportunity structure onto different constellations of inequality. It uses Afrobarometer survey data ( N = 29,727) to show that economic disadvantages increase participation in political violence short of civil war. When they coincide with political exclusion, they also make people steer actively away from demonstrations. The evidence is less conclusive for political disadvantages alone, but points toward increased participation in demonstrations.

Do different types of inequality spur violence with different targets? This article explores whom violent movements choose to target when they take to arms, by comparing civil conflicts, which target the state, to communal conflicts, which target other ethnic groups. Different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. Political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. The different expectations stem from two important differences between political and economic horizontal inequalities: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991–2009) provides support for both propositions.

Do different types of inequality spur violence with different targets? This article explores whom violent movements choose to target when they take to arms, by comparing civil conflicts, which target the state, to communal conflicts, which target other ethnic groups. Different types of ethnic group disadvantage relate to conflict through different mechanisms. Political exclusion is expected to promote the choice to target the central government rather than other ethnic groups, while economic disadvantages should increase the risk of both civil and communal conflicts. The different expectations stem from two important differences between political and economic horizontal inequalities: only the government has the authority to change the political distribution, while there can be many avenues to economic redistribution; and blame is more straightforwardly assigned to the government for political than for economic disadvantages. Statistical analysis of 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa (1991–2009) provides support for both propositions.

This study aims to uncover how horizontal inequality affects support for violent and nonviolent resistance among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. National survey data are introduced to operationalize the mechanisms proposed in the horizontal inequality literature on the individual level. Results point to the operation of political and economic horizontal inequality mechanisms in the Palestinian case. Higher perceived status of civil and political rights is associated with a lower probability of supporting violent over nonviolent resistance. Individuals are also more likely to support violent over nonviolent resistance the larger the difference in household expenditure and consumer durable ownership between their own region and the closest Israeli subdistrict. Corresponding differences in educational attainment have no corresponding effect. The results demonstrate how economic and political horizontal inequality can increase the risk that an individual becomes part of the mobilizational potential of violent social movements. This can lead to participation in a wide range of supportive actions that increase the viability of such movements, ranging from material support to direct participation in violence. The level of public support for violent resistance in key constituencies could also influence public opinion sensitive actors like Hamas in their choice between violent and nonviolent resistance strategies.

Hva driver palestinsk støtte til vold, ikkevold og kompromiss? Analyse av data fra Vestbredden og Gaza antyder at holdningene påvirkes av frustrasjonen som følger av økonomisk og politisk deprivasjon, men også av mer rasjonelle avveininger av voldens kostnader og effektivitet.

What explains support for violence against the state? The surge in survey-based studies in (former) conflict areas has improved our understanding of the determinants of armed conflict. Yet, the potential interaction between grievances and political opportunity structure has received little attention in microlevel studies. Integrating common arguments from the civil war literature with the political behavior tradition, this article argues that perceived political efficacy, a central component of the political opportunity structure, moderates the association between individual and group grievance and people's support for political violence. It represents a first individual-level test of the argument that perceived political opportunity structure and grievances combine to explain internal armed conflict. Using original survey data from Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland (2016), we find robust empirical evidence that support for violence increases with perceived grievance and decreases with political efficacy; and some evidence of an interaction between the two.

What explains support for violence against the state? The surge in survey-based studies in (former) conflict areas has improved our understanding of the determinants of armed conflict. Yet, the potential interaction between grievances and political opportunity structure has received little attention in microlevel studies. Integrating common arguments from the civil war literature with the political behavior tradition, this article argues that perceived political efficacy, a central component of the political opportunity structure, moderates the association between individual and group grievance and people's support for political violence. It represents a first individual-level test of the argument that perceived political opportunity structure and grievances combine to explain internal armed conflict. Using original survey data from Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland (2016), we find robust empirical evidence that support for violence increases with perceived grievance and decreases with political efficacy; and some evidence of an interaction between the two.

What explains support for violence against the state? The surge in survey-based studies in (former) conflict areas has improved our understanding of the determinants of armed conflict. Yet, the potential interaction between grievances and political opportunity structure has received little attention in microlevel studies. Integrating common arguments from the civil war literature with the political behavior tradition, this article argues that perceived political efficacy, a central component of the political opportunity structure, moderates the association between individual and group grievance and people's support for political violence. It represents a first individual-level test of the argument that perceived political opportunity structure and grievances combine to explain internal armed conflict. Using original survey data from Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland (2016), we find robust empirical evidence that support for violence increases with perceived grievance and decreases with political efficacy; and some evidence of an interaction between the two. ; publishedVersion ; This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.