This article attempts to provide a breakthrough which I call mode of production theory. This theory will be employed to analyze the contemporary phenomenon of radical Islamism. The mode of production theory is meant to bridge the two clashing theoretical paradigms in social sciences and humanities, i.e., Weberian and Marxian. Despite its bridging nature, the paper argues that the two cannot be merged within one single thread. This is because each paradigm has its own epistemological basis which is irreconcilable to one another. Mostly adapted from Marx's theory, the current theory of the mode of production covers five interrelated aspects, namely social, political, economic, cultural, and symbolic structures. If Marx's mode of production theory heavily relies on a material and economic basis, the theory used in this paper accommodates cultural and symbolic structures that are Weberian in nature. Although the two paradigms can operate together, the strength of structure (Marxian) overpowers the strength of culture (Weberian). This paper further argues that such cultural-based aspects as ideology, norms, and values play as mobilizing factors under a big schematic dominant structure in the rise and development of the radical Islamist groups.
This paper analyzes how the issue of multicultural citizenship and civil religion has been practiced and debated in Indonesia from political perspective. The writer argues that multicultural citizenship is closely associated with civil religion, in the sense that the latter is the way to objectify and strengthen the earlier. The problem is that the more civil religion is routinized and objectified in daily life, the less the sense of the sacred is. As soon as religion has widely been practiced by members of the society, it soon becomes secular, losing its religious sense since it entangles with local culture. Therefore, objectifying and mainstreaming civic religion must be accompanied by keeping its religious arguments in order to give the civil religion sense of the sacred. As a multicultural country, Indonesia has long acknowledged multicultural citizenship. Sociologically speaking, each Indonesian citizen can live side by side regardless his/her socio-religious background without any discrimination. Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) clearly states that everyone is equal before the law. Nevertheless, Indonesia's multicultural citizenship soon becomes at stake, especially when political and economic factors interfere into the public sphere.
Many overlooked the fact that politico-economic factors played an important role behind the 2011 and 2012 Sunni-Shi'ah conflict in Sampang Madura. Some, however, argue that the Sunni-Shi'ah conflict was merely driven by theological factors. The major roots of the conflict thus were therefore the internal dimensions of religious beliefs as contained in its doctrines. As a result, the conflict can only be explained in terms of religious and theological framework. This assumption is commonly shared by the majority of Madurese Muslims by arguing that the island of Madura cannot host the believers of non-Sunni. In the aftermath of the conflict, the community of Shi'ah has been forced to seek refuge outside of the land of Madura. By doing so, many observers and the Madurese Muslims tends to have treated political and economic factors as peripheral that exacerbated the escalation of conflict. This article, however, argues vice-versa that it is not theology, but politics and economy, which mainly steered the conflict. Theology played a role in exacerbating the escalation of conflict. During the conflict, religious and theological arguments were deployed as a mobilizing force in order to justify the conflict. Furthermore, the existence of Shi'ah community in Sampang is regarded by the mainstream Sunni community as a threat to their long domination over the socio-political structure in that region. The paper, thus, perceives the conflict as the way the local elites maintain the established mode of production. This paper is qualitative research that employs political-economy as its main approach in analyzing the data. [Para pengamat banyak tidak melihat aktor politik dan ekonomi di balik konflik Sunni dan Syiah 2011 dan 2012 di Sampang Madura. Para peneliti bahkan beranggapan bahwa konflik Sunni-Syiah itu dilatari oleh faktor teologis. Ini artinya bahwa tiap kelompok memegang sistem kepercayaan yang berbeda. Akar utama dari konflik itu pada persoalan agama dan doktrinnya yang menyebabkan konflik. Walhasil, konflik hanya bisa dijelaskan dari kerangka keagamaan dan teologis. Asumsi ini banyak dipegang oleh mayoritas Muslim Madura dengan berasalan bahwa orang Madura tidak menerima selain Sunni, termasuk Syiah. Setelah konflik, masyarakat Syiah dipaksa untuk mengungsi ke luar pulau Madura. Dengan begitu, banyak pengamat dan juga masyarakat Muslim Madura melihat faktor politis dan ekonomi hanya pinggiran yang memperparah konflik. Artikel ini beranggapan sebaliknya, bahwa politis dan ekonomi merupakan faktor utama. Teologi hanya memperparah saja. Pada saat konflik, faktor teologis dan agamis digunakan sebagai kekuatan untuk mobilisasi dan menjustifikasinya. Selanjutnya, keberadaan komunitas Syiah di Sampang dianggap sebagai ancaman bagi dominasi Sunni pada struktur sosio politis daerah itu. Artikel ini menganggap bahwa konflik hanyalah sebagai sarana elit lokal untuk mempertahankan dominasi sistem ekonomi. Makalah ini pada dasarnya merupakan penelitian kualitatif yang melihat faktor politis ekonomis sebagai pendekatan dan analisis data].
Abstrak: Artikel ini menganalisis kemunculan radikalisme Islam di Indonesia pasca-Orde Baru dalam kaitannya dengan politik demokrasi serta implikasinya terhadap kebijakan negara atas radikalisme. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan politik-hukum, artikel ini berargumen bahwa kelompok radikal harus diperlakukan secara hati-hati dalam kerangka prinsip-prinsip demokrasi karena demokrasi harus menggaransi kebebasan berpendapat untuk semua. Dalam konteks ini, keberadaan radikalisme Islam tidak bisa dikekang atas alasan ideologis yang diwujudkan dalam bentuk kebijakan negara yang represif-antagonistik atas kelompok radikal. Kebijakan semacam ini dapat membawa pendulum ke arah kontra produktif bagi demokrasi itu sendiri karena kelompok radikal justru dapat memanfaatkan momentum tersebut untuk mengon- solidasikan dan mendiseminasikan ideologi radikalisme di kalangan masyarakat luas. Artikel ini merekomendasikan Undang-undang(UU) baru dan/atau addendum baru dalam rangka mengisi ruang kosong yang tidak disentuh oleh kedua UU tentang pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme sebelumnya.Abstract: Religious Radicalism and the Politics of Democracy in Post New-Order Indonesia.This paper attempts at scrutinizing the emergence of Islamic radicalism in the post-New Order Indonesia and its mutual relationship with democratic politics as well as its implications to the state policy towards radicalism. This paper argues that the radical groups must be treated with deserve care in the framework of democratic principles on the ground that democracy must guarantee the idea of freedom of expression for all. In this context, the existence of Islamic radicalism cannot be curbed on an ideological basis manifested through an antagonist state policy towards radical groups. Such a policy, nevertheless, can swing the pendulum to a less productive to democracy itself. It may result in the consolidation and dissemination of radical ideology among the Muslim society within the framework of democracy. This paper recommends that a new act be necessary in order to fill the legal gap left by the two Acts on the counterterrorism policy.Keywords: radikalisme Islam, demokrasi, Pancasila, UUD 1945
This paper seeks to analyze how the program of deradicalization in Indonesia is approached, understood and treated by radical Islamists. This paper argues that the deradicalization program in this country has invited controversies, criticisms and even backlash from radical Islamists on the grounds that it goes against the principles of human rights because of state's intervention into religious life of its citizens. In addition, it is carried out by violent method which mostly ends with killing the accused terrorists along with the arrest and ambush by security officers. In order to analyze the focus of the study, this paper employs socio-political approach. This paper finds that more thorough approach needs to be employed by the state within the framework of human rights. Therefore, the ideology of radical Islamism and terrorism must be dealt with from two sides; at the upstream and the downstream levels. At the upstream level, the program of deradicalization must be carried out within the framework of interdepartmental and ministerial partnership. This program should invite as many institutions as possible to be involved and reach as wide audience as possible. At the downstream level, the program of deradicalization must abide to human rights principles. The security approach taken by the government should not end with killing or dehumanizing terrorists. By doing so, the national program of deradicalization can appeal as wide sympathy possible and will not harvest backlash from the Islamists.[Artikel ini mendiskusikan bagaimana program deradikalisasi di Indonesia dipahami, dimengerti, dan disikapi oleh kalangan Islamis. Tulisan ini berasumsi bahwa program deradikalisasi yang dilakukan memincu kontroversi, kritik, bahkan memicu juga aksi balasan yang dilancarkan kalangan Islamis radikal. Beberapa kalangan menilai program tersebut melanggar prinsip hak asasi manusia karena merepresentasikan bentuk intervensi negara terhadap kehidupan beragama masyarakatnya. Lebih dari itu, beberapa program dilaksanakan dengan melakukan tindak kekerasan dan kerap berakhir dengan penangkapan, penganiayaan, bahkan pembunuhan tersangka teroris. Dalam menganalisis tema tulisan, pendekatan sosialpolitik digunakan. Artikel ini kemudian menemukan bahwa pendekatan yang berangkat dari nilai-nilai hak asasi manusia perlu dipertegas. Karena itu, ideologi islamis-radikal and terorisme harus dilihat melalui dua sisi secara bersama. Pada level atas, program deradikalisasi dilakukan dengan kerjasama antar lembaga dan kementerian terkait. Dengan begitu, program deradikalisasi diwujudkan dengan mengajak sebanyak-banyaknya lembaga untuk terlibat serta memperluas target audien. Pada level bawah, program deradikalisasi harus mematuhi prinsip hak asasi manusia. Pendekatan keamanan yang dominan dilakukan tidak harus berakhir dengan membunuh atau dengan melanggar hak asasi manusia yang juga melekat pada diri Islamis dan teroris. Dengan model seperti ini, program nasional deradikalisasi mampu memperoleh dukungan dan simpati masyarakat luas dan dapat meredam aksi balasan kalangan Islamis.]
This article seeks to analyze how one group, that is, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS), is attempting to clean up politics from within the political party system. This article argues that the existence of PKS has given a new but unique political nuance to the political party system in post-New Order Indonesia. The seemingly sudden rise of PKS has taken many by surprise, and it is for this that the party has become the topic of much discourse amongst scholars of Indonesia.DOI:10.15408/sdi.v14i1.555
Islamism and democracy in Indonesia : piety and pragmatism -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Islam and democracy re-examining the intricate relationship -- 3 Islam and discourses on democracy in Indonesia definition, historical account, and Muslims' approaches to democracy -- 4 Islamism in post-new order Indonesia explaining the contexts -- 5 Theology of resistance on the utopian Islamist rejection of democracy -- 6 Towards a home-grown democracy? on the Meliorist Islamist acceptance of democracy -- 7 Intersection and rupture piety, pragmatism, and power contests among the Islamists -- 8 Conclusion findings and theoretical reflection -- Appendix 1: full text of the Madinah charter (622 c.e.) -- Appendix 2: Yogyakarta charter -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the author.
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Kiai is the Javanese term of ulama in the traditional Muslim community. It generally refers to a person who has a deep understanding of Islam and leads the institution of traditional Islamic education called pondok pesantren or Islamic boarding school. Indeed, the strength of a Kiai is based on his leadership at the pesantren that has functioned as a space for cultural-social reproduction. While the attention of many researchers focused on the shifting of Islamic authority in the digital age, not much of them paid special attention to the survival of Kiai's authority. This study aims to examine the role of pesantren in preserving the authority of the Kiai in the digital age. This study employed qualitative method and utilized the cultural reproduction theory of Pierre Bourdieu. This study found that Kiai's authority continues to survive because pesantren functioned as a space for transmitting cultural values, including the recognition of Kiai's high position. As a social and cultural reproduction space, pesantren becomes a field that forms habitus through the transmission of its cultural values which is naturally formed in the daily practices of the santri.