Suchergebnisse

"This paper presents a frequency-domain technique for estimating distributed lag coefficients (the impulse-response function) when observations are randomly missed. The technique treats stationary processes with randomly missed observations as amplitude-modulated processes and estimates the transfer function accordingly. Estimates of the lag coefficients are obtained by taking the inverse transform of the estimated transfer function. Results with artificially created data show that the technique performs well even when the probability of an observation being missed is one-half and in some cases when the probability is as low as one-fifth. The approximate asymptotic variance of the estimator is also calculated in the paper"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site

A theory is presented that rationalizes voting in terms of the marginal utility a citizen derives from contributing a small amount of effort in the political process when the cost of voting is small. Citizens abstain when the marginal cost of voting exceeds the marginal perceived benefit. A simple choice rule for voting in a two-candidate election is derived from this theory, which depends both on the voter's preferences for the candidates & on his subjective belief about the election outcome. It is assumed that the voter's utility increases if he votes for a winner & decreases if he votes for a loser. This assumption is no less plausible than the assumption that voters believe they can be pivotal. Modified HA.

Rational parties and retrospective voters / David A. Siegel -- A spatial theory approach to the study of political spaces / Melvin J. Hinich -- Proximity versus directional models of voting : different concepts but one theory / Susumu Shikano -- Markets and politics : the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election / Brian Roberts -- Endogenous time preferences, social networks and complexity / Peter C. Ordeshook -- A formal analysis of patronage politics / Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola -- Campaign contributions and political favors in a spatial model with probabilistic voting / Sigifredo M. Laengle -- Electoral systems, postelection bargaining and special interest politics in parliamentary systems : The case of agricultural protection -- The EU negotiations as a reform strategy : Turkey's problem ahead / Fatih Ozatay -- Introduction / Melvin Hinich. - The nine papers in this volume are a diverse set of quality contributions to the field in economics that is called political economy. It is important to understand that social scientists hold different interpretations of the term political economy. Most mainstream economists expect a paper in the field to use the same models as are used in neoclassical economics, be it micro or macro. The field of political economy is seen by most economists to be exclusively the purview of their field. However, the political system of a country determines the nature of its economics system. The economy feeds back to the political system but the rules of the game are determined by the political system.The study of politics is the hardest task in the social sciences. The political system defines the scope of the economics system while taking resources from the economy in order to run campaigns and produce the types of compromises that are required of a stable political system that allows economic agents to make sensible investments. The interaction between the highly inter-dependant yet very different fields of politics and economics forms the basis of this volume. It contains a collection of key papers on the topic of analytical political economy. The papers authored by some of the foremost experts in the field. It is part of the ISETE series