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AbstractThis article examines the relationship between legislative malapportionment, redistribution, and regional economic development. One of the primary justifications for legislative malapportionment—the disparity between the share of legislative seats and the share of the national population—is interregional income equalization by means of favorable allocations of resources to rural areas through overrepresentation. By analyzing the case of Brazil using instrumental variables, this study evaluates the theoretical argument and the empirical validity of the presumed mechanism linking unequal representation to regional development and national economic convergence. It argues that in contexts of undeveloped democracies, rather than convergence, disproportionate resource transfers via overrepresentation hinder the development of beneficiary regions. The empirical analyses of Brazilian states indicate that while overrepresented jurisdictions do receive disproportionate shares of resources from the federal government, disproportionate resource transfers, and dependence on resource transfers attributable to overrepresentation hamper the development potential of those regions.

Este artigo contribui para o nosso entendimento da relação entreos sistemas eleitorais e improbidade legislativa ao examinar a questão dovoto individual, da magnitude do distrito eleitoral e da accountability póseleitoral.Estudos que enfatizam a responsabilidade individual do eleitorargumentam que sistemas eleitorais de voto direto, individual, promovemo bom desempenho por parte dos políticos eleitos e restringem sua máconduta ao permitirem que os eleitores identifiquem, monitorem eresponsabilizem os políticos em quem votaram. Outra vertente da literaturaafirma que distritos eleitorais de ampla magnitude asseguram adisponibilidade de bons políticos e competição eleitoral, o que reduziria aprevaricação. À primeira vista, sistemas de voto individual com distritoseleitorais relativamente maiores, como o de representação proporcionalcom lista aberta, parecem combinar os melhores atributos dos sistemaseleitorais, os quais estudos anteriores mostraram diminuir a prevaricação.O estudo presente desenvolve a proposição que, devido aos altos custosde informação para os eleitores que têm à sua disposição muitoscandidatos, sistemas de voto direto com muitos membros por distritoeleitoral acabam por enfraquecer, ao invés de fortalecer a accountability doscandidatos eleitos. Assim, a combinação de voto individual e distritoseleitorais de alta magnitude pode paradoxalmente encorajar a entrada demaus políticos, facilitando a eleição destes e falhando em detê-los em suas más condutas uma vez que tenham assumido seus cargos.Examinando dados sobre prevaricação no Congresso do Brasil, este estudoconclui que os deputados, que são eleitos através de uma lista relativamentegrande em sistema de lista aberta e representação proporcional, são maispropensos a receber notificações judiciais de acusações contra eles quesenadores, eleitos pela regra da pluralidade.

This article examines policy consequences of electoral cycles and exchange rate regime choices in Brazil. The literature on opportunistic political business cycles maintains that governments adopt expansionary economic policies before elections to mobilize voters' support. However, research findings in Latin America based on the theory has been inconclusive. I argue that the lack of conclusive evidence in Latin America stems from measurement errors common in the use of cross-national aggregate data. Using Brazil's monthly data from 1985 to 2006, this article shows that there are electorally induced fiscal cycles under fixed and crawling peg exchange rate regimes and electorally induced monetary cycles under floating exchange rates only when the nation's central bank is not independent. Indeed, accounting for Brazil's unique economic contingencies and longitudinal variations in the de facto central bank independence, its public policy behavior remarkably resembles that of the more affluent, economically stable OECD countries. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes legislative performance in a nascent presidential bicameral democracy, taking Brazil as a case. The author argues that the timing and outcomes of legislative production are functions of bicameral incongruence, types of bicameralism, sequence of examination, and legislative bargaining. These hypotheses are tested using a new legislative data set from Brazil that covers over 3,000 bills submitted to the National Congress since 1988. Event history analyses of these bills show that presidential bicameral (coalitional) majorities, presidential elections, initiation by the lower house, and bills proposing provisional changes raise the chances of a bill's approval. The results also indicate that the effects of many of these variables are time dependent. In contrast, bicameral incongruence, symmetric bicameralism, and legislative elections either raise the risks of a bill's rejection or delay the timing of its approval. Economic crises increase legislative activities in general in both approving and rejecting bills.

This article aims to identify the factors that influence the selection of ministers in Brazil, considering the number of portfolios and their importance and saliency. We identify the regional influence on such selection, controlling for ministers' personal characteristics and trajectories, including political aspects, expertise, and proximity, and loyalty to the president. We use an original dataset that covers the entire period known as the New Republic. ; Este artículo busca identificar los factores que influyen la selección de ministros en Brasil, considerando la importancia y protagonismo de cada uno de los ministerios. Buscamos identificar la influencia de los aspectos regionales en esta selección, controlando las características y trayectorias personales de los ministros, ya sea en lo que respecta a aspectos políticos y técnicos o a la proximidad y lealtad al presidente de la República. Para ello, utilizamos una base de datos inédita, que cubre todo el período de la Nueva República. ; Este artigo procura identificar os fatores que influenciam a escolha dos ministros no Brasil, considerando a importância/saliência de cada um dos ministérios. Buscamos conhecer a influência dos aspectos regionais sobre tal escolha, controlando as características e trajetórias pessoais dos ministros, seja no que diz respeito aos aspectos políticos e técnicos, seja com relação à proximidade e à lealdade ao presidente da República. Para isso, utilizamos um banco de dados inédito, que abrange todo o período da Nova República.

In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operationalized by the percentage of monthly roll call votes related to procedural requirements that delay decisions on legislative proposals. We find that the proportionality in the distribution of ministerial posts reduces obstruction in minority coalitions. In larger coalitions, this type of incentive has little effect in reducing obstructionist moves. Smaller, more cohesive, and better managed governing coalitions are more capable than oversized coalitions of diminishing problems for decision making in the Chamber of Deputies./n ; En este artículo se explica cómo la gestión de la coalición de gobierno y los atributos de la dinámica del conflicto entre e intra-coaliciones, tanto del gobierno como de la oposición, afectan a la incidencia de movimientos de obstrucción en la Cámara de los Diputados brasileña entre 1991 y 2010. Los movimientos de obstrucción son operacionalizados a través del porcentaje de votaciones nominales mensuales relativas a requerimientos procedimentales que de alguna forma retrasan la decisión sobre una propuesta legislativa. Se encuentra que la proporcionalidad en la distribución de cargos en los ministerios es eficiente a la hora de reducir la obstrucción en coaliciones menores. En coaliciones mayores, este tipo de incentivo tiene poco efecto para reducir movimientos obstruccionistas. Coaliciones de gobierno menores, más unidas y mejor administradas, son más eficientes que alianzas hinchadas para aminorar los problemas de toma de decisión en la Cámara de los Diputados./n ; Dans cet article, ils s'agit d'expliquer comment la gestion de la coalition du gouvernement et les attributs de la dynamique du conflit entre et intra-coalitions, aussi bien du gouvernement comme de l'opposition, affectent l'incidence des mouvements d'obstruction dans la Chambre des députés brésilienne entre 1991 et 2010. Les mouvements d'obstruction sont opérationnalisés à travers le pourcentage de votes nominaux mensuels relatifs aux exigences des procédures qui, en quelque sorte, retardent la décision sur la proposition législative. On s'aperçoit que la proportionnalité dans la distribution des postes dans les ministères est efficace quant il s'agit de réduire l'obstruction dans des coalitions plus petites. Dans des plus grandes coalitions, ce type d'incitation a peu d'effet pour réduire les mouvements obstructionnistes. Des coalitions de gouvernement plus grandes, plus unies et mieux administrées, sont plus efficaces que des alliances stériles pour réduire les problèmes de prise de décision de la Chambre des députés.