Suchergebnisse

Decision makers must balance between two classes of economic activities: production and conflict. Analogous to the familiar technology of production and exchange is the technology of conflict and struggle, applicable not only to military combat but also in domains such as redistributive politics, strikes and lockouts, litigation, and crime. The conflict success function (CSF) takes as inputs the fighting efforts on the two sides and generates as outputs the respective degrees of success achieved. A crucial determinant of the outcome is the decisiveness parameter, which scales the degree to which force preponderance translates into differential success. Because success feeds on success, in the long run a hegemonic outcome is likely unless the decisiveness parameter is relatively low. The CSF can be adjusted to distinguish between offense and defense, allow for geography and organization, or even display how intangible considerations such as truth or morality can promote success.

In power struggles, the strong might be expected to grow ever stronger and the weak weaker still. But in actuality, poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative to richer or larger ones. This is the paradox of power. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. Only when the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of achieved income. Among other things, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor.