Suchergebnisse

Ta'ziya, "consolation", has become the Shi technical term for the liturgical mourning and commemoration of the martyred Imams, particularly the ritual lamentation for the death of Husayn, celebrated formerly often in the form of passion plays in which the heart is the drama of Kerbela, but in which in addition the whole of human history is viewed sub specie Kerbelae. Nowadays the celebration is first and foremost in the form of processions (in our Western mass media called "demonstrations"), enga ing huge masses of people in emotion-evokingbehaviour, also including processions to the cemetery. For the contents of the classical Shi'i passion plays and their performance, and for the theological interpretation of the sacrifice of Husayn and the other martyrs, we refer the reader to the available literature on the subject. The Ta`ziya of Husayn falls in the month of Muharram, with its culmination on the 10th day (ruz-i katl, "the day of the murder"), the Ashara' festival, and is followed up by the mourning ceremony on the 40th day (naziarba' in) from the 'Ashura' (20th day of Safar). It is important to note the immense impact of the Ta'ziya on the emotions of the participant masses, emotions aroused by several means. We have here the suggestive sentimentality of the speeches held by the Mullas, dwelling on the tribulations and sufferings of Husayn and his family and followers, on the cruelty and baseness of his enemies, and on the courage of the 72 noble-hearted martyrs of Kerbela. In the processions, the emotions are aroused by the rhythmical repetition of formulae expressing mourning for the martyrs and hatred of their murderers. Many of the participants are dressed in shrouds, many wear chains, ropes and scourges, and the lamentations are accompanied by self-flagellation of the naked backs. People beat their breasts, some have put earth on their heads. Women weep, bewailing the pains of Husayn and the 72.

There is a ritual orientation in the world. In this context we may speak of a Centre, the Origo in the religious orientation in the world. This concept is an essential feature of Islam. To be valid the prayers must be performed facing the kibla, which is the Ka`ba in Mecca. The kibla determines the orientation of the mosques, and thus indirectly, town plans through the Muslim world. Mecca is also the goal of the Pilgrimage.The difference between an object as a religious symbol and a neutral and profane object is the ritual behaviour: it attracts rituals and observances which are justified and explained by religious belief. In what way is the Ka`ba (and Mecca) as the Centre of the Muslim world a symbol? What is the value of the symbol today? What is the religious function of the Symbol of the Centre in Islam in the 1970's? The Symbol of the Centre in Islam is, on the one hand, the tangible object, the City and the temple, and on the other the ritual behaviour concerned with the Centre, i.e. tawaf, kibla etc. The Ka' ba' s role as an object of devotion is indicated by the fact that pictures of the temple actually serve as "devotional icons", in homes and in mosques. We can even see a tendency for a stylized image of the Kaba to replace the crescent as the symbol of Islam, i.e. the Symbol of the Centre tends to become the symbol of the religion as a whole. The symbol is efficacious, it has psychological effects, it provokes and expresses emotions, spiritual experiences, feelings of fellowship, of duties towards God and fellow-believers; not only do these emotions visualize fundamental principles in Islam, but by the experience of the Symbol these ideas are integrated in the personality of the individual, with social and political consequences for his actions. The fact that the Centre is invariably remembered as the kibla, the direction of the daily ritual behaviour, creates a profound awareness of membership of a community transcending ethnic, national and political boundaries. The pilgrimage to Mecca plays a major role in the co-operation between Muslim countries in the fields of religion, economics and politics. The Ka'ba, and Mecca, is the Centre of Islam's "topographical religiosity".

The modern state of Saudi Arabia constitutes an example of the gradual institutionalization of an enthusiastic and militant movement, the first significant reform movement, Wahhabism, not only in its foundation but also in its development during the 1960's and 70's. In his religious education the late King Faisal was the pupil of his maternal grandfather, himself a descendant of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. The domestic and foreign policy of the profoundly pious King Faisal was an application of his religious principles. We may note that the doctrines of Wahhabism are an important factor in the development of the complexity which is modern Islam. The Libyan Arab Republic (L.A.R.) and its leader since the revolution of September 1st 1969, Mu'ammar al-Kadhdhafi function in this paper as an example of a reinterpretation of Islam and an explicit attempt to make this form of Islam the basis of a political ideology, the "Third International Theory". L.A.R. claims to be the model state, the Utopia, of the practical application of this ideology, in its institutions and in its political actions.

Ta'ziya, "consolation", has become the Shi technical term for the liturgical mourning and commemoration of the martyred Imams, particularly the ritual lamentation for the death of Husayn, celebrated formerly often in the form of passion plays in which the heart is the drama of Kerbela, but in which in addition the whole of human history is viewed sub specie Kerbelae. Nowadays the celebration is first and foremost in the form of processions (in our Western mass media called "demonstrations"), enga ing huge masses of people in emotion-evokingbehaviour, also including processions to the cemetery. For the contents of the classical Shi'i passion plays and their performance, and for the theological interpretation of the sacrifice of Husayn and the other martyrs, we refer the reader to the available literature on the subject. The Ta`ziya of Husayn falls in the month of Muharram, with its culmination on the 10th day (ruz-i katl, "the day of the murder"), the Ashara' festival, and is followed up by the mourning ceremony on the 40th day (naziarba' in) from the 'Ashura' (20th day of Safar). It is important to note the immense impact of the Ta'ziya on the emotions of the participant masses, emotions aroused by several means. We have here the suggestive sentimentality of the speeches held by the Mullas, dwelling on the tribulations and sufferings of Husayn and his family and followers, on the cruelty and baseness of his enemies, and on the courage of the 72 noble-hearted martyrs of Kerbela. In the processions, the emotions are aroused by the rhythmical repetition of formulae expressing mourning for the martyrs and hatred of their murderers. Many of the participants are dressed in shrouds, many wear chains, ropes and scourges, and the lamentations are accompanied by self-flagellation of the naked backs. People beat their breasts, some have put earth on their heads. Women weep, bewailing the pains of Husayn and the 72.

There is a ritual orientation in the world. In this context we may speak of a Centre, the Origo in the religious orientation in the world. This concept is an essential feature of Islam. To be valid the prayers must be performed facing the kibla, which is the Ka`ba in Mecca. The kibla determines the orientation of the mosques, and thus indirectly, town plans through the Muslim world. Mecca is also the goal of the Pilgrimage.The difference between an object as a religious symbol and a neutral and profane object is the ritual behaviour: it attracts rituals and observances which are justified and explained by religious belief. In what way is the Ka`ba (and Mecca) as the Centre of the Muslim world a symbol? What is the value of the symbol today? What is the religious function of the Symbol of the Centre in Islam in the 1970's? The Symbol of the Centre in Islam is, on the one hand, the tangible object, the City and the temple, and on the other the ritual behaviour concerned with the Centre, i.e. tawaf, kibla etc. The Ka' ba' s role as an object of devotion is indicated by the fact that pictures of the temple actually serve as "devotional icons", in homes and in mosques. We can even see a tendency for a stylized image of the Kaba to replace the crescent as the symbol of Islam, i.e. the Symbol of the Centre tends to become the symbol of the religion as a whole. The symbol is efficacious, it has psychological effects, it provokes and expresses emotions, spiritual experiences, feelings of fellowship, of duties towards God and fellow-believers; not only do these emotions visualize fundamental principles in Islam, but by the experience of the Symbol these ideas are integrated in the personality of the individual, with social and political consequences for his actions. The fact that the Centre is invariably remembered as the kibla, the direction of the daily ritual behaviour, creates a profound awareness of membership of a community transcending ethnic, national and political boundaries. The pilgrimage to Mecca plays a major role in the co-operation between Muslim countries in the fields of religion, economics and politics. The Ka'ba, and Mecca, is the Centre of Islam's "topographical religiosity".

The modern state of Saudi Arabia constitutes an example of the gradual institutionalization of an enthusiastic and militant movement, the first significant reform movement, Wahhabism, not only in its foundation but also in its development during the 1960's and 70's. In his religious education the late King Faisal was the pupil of his maternal grandfather, himself a descendant of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. The domestic and foreign policy of the profoundly pious King Faisal was an application of his religious principles. We may note that the doctrines of Wahhabism are an important factor in the development of the complexity which is modern Islam. The Libyan Arab Republic (L.A.R.) and its leader since the revolution of September 1st 1969, Mu'ammar al-Kadhdhafi function in this paper as an example of a reinterpretation of Islam and an explicit attempt to make this form of Islam the basis of a political ideology, the "Third International Theory". L.A.R. claims to be the model state, the Utopia, of the practical application of this ideology, in its institutions and in its political actions.

Hjärpe, Jan: Introduction: boundaries and belonging. - S. 7-11. (...) Todorov, Nicolai: The Ottoman and the Balkans. The urban-rural dimension. - S. 112-126. (...)

In later years an abundance of collected volumes on various aspects of "Islam" have appeared. T his "Islam" has been used as the element in common for a wide range of phenomena in a vast area. In this upsurge of interest it has not always been made sufficiently clear whether "Islam" really supplies the most suitable frame of reference for the phenomena described. Islam is obviously one religion, but could it meaningfully be treated as one culture, one social order, one political philosophy? Is the Islamic community, the umma, a more coherent entity than, say, Christendom? The present work is a case in point. It is based on fourteen papers read at an international symposium held in 1984 at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. Although the volume allegedly treats "Islam: State and Society," it is in fact divided in three p arts: "On Contemporary Islamic Studies,"" Authority and the State," and "Secularization: Nation-State and Modernization." from JSTOR http://www.jstor.org (Dec. 10, 2012)