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Several studies provide evidence of group-centric policy attitudes, that is, citizens evaluating policies based on linkages with visible social groups. The existing literature generally points to the role of media imagery, rhetoric and prominent political sponsors in driving group-centric attitudes. This article theorizes and tests an alternative source: exposure to rising local ethnic diversity. Focusing on the issue of crime, it first develops a theoretical account of how casual observation in the local context can give rise to ethnic stereotypes. Then, using two large, nationally representative datasets on citizen group and policy attitudes linked with registry data on local ethnic diversity, each spanning 20 years, it shows that crime attitudes become more strongly linked with immigration attitudes as local ethnic diversity rises. The results suggest that the typically emphasized 'top-down' influence on group-centric attitudes by elite actors is complemented by 'bottom-up' local processes of experiential learning about group–policy linkages.

Political actors are often assigned roles requiring them to enforce rules without giving in-groups special treatment. But are such institutional roles likely to be successful? Here, I exploit a special case of exogenously assigned intergroup relations: debates in the Danish Parliament, in which Parliament chairmen drawn from parliamentary parties enforce speaking time. Analyzing 5,756 speeches scraped from online transcripts, I provide evidence that speech lengths are biased in favor of the presiding chairman's party. On average, speakers of the same party as the presiding chairman give 5 percent longer speeches and are 5 percent more likely to exceed the speaking time limit. The paper contributes to the extant literature by demonstrating political intergroup bias in a natural setting, suggesting that group loyalties can supersede institutional obligations even in a "least likely" context of clear rules, complete observability, and a tradition of parliamentary cooperation.

Cross-border welfare rights for citizens of European Union member states are intensely contested, yet there is limited research into voter opposition to such rights, sometimes denoted 'welfare chauvinism'. We highlight an overlooked aspect in scholarly work: the role of stereotypes about beneficiaries of cross-border welfare. We present results from an original large-scale survey experiment (N=2525) among Swedish voters, randomizing exposure to cues about recipients' country of origin and family size. Consistent with a model emphasizing the role of stereotypes, respondents react to cues about recipient identity. These effects are strongest among respondents high in ethnic prejudice and economic conservatism. The findings imply that stereotypes about who benefits from cross-border welfare rights condition public support for those rights.

In recent decades, so-called universal welfare states have experienced considerable immigration from non-Western countries and, accordingly, rising levels of ethnic diversity. On that basis, scholars have debated how ethnic diversity affects public opinion in recipient societies. The debate is to a significant extent shaped by studies of American public opinion, where public opinion on some issues is widely considered 'racialized', i.e. in part based on attitudes toward racial outgroups. The dissertation examines whether by the same token, political attitudes in universal welfare states can become 'ethnicized', i.e. in part based on attitudes toward ethnic outgroups. The existing literature has tended to focus on the issue of welfare, where the expectation is that ethnic diversity will diminish public support. I outline a theoretical framework which explains why political attitudes can be ethnicized, but also why it is more likely for some issues (such as European integration or crime) than others (such as welfare). The dissertation includes four stand-alone articles illustrating the influence of group identities in political cognition. Compared to the existing literature, they suggest that ethnicization is at once more limited (in that it is unlikely for the most widely discussed issue, welfare) and more pervasive (in that it can arise from local contexts as well as from media). Ethnicization of attitudes is one way in which immigration can influence political life, even when the political agenda ostensibly revolves around something else.

AbstractIn many countries, right-wing populist parties have gained electoral support by attracting voters from mainstream left parties. This has prompted public and scholarly debate about whether mainstream left parties can regain political power by taking a more restrictive position on immigration, a so-called accommodation strategy. However, selection bias confounds observational estimates of the effectiveness of this strategy. This letter reports the results of a survey experiment conducted among Danish voters during a unique political situation in which the mainstream left party's position on immigration is ambiguous, enabling experimental manipulation of voters' perceptions of the party's position. The authors show that, consistent with spatial models of politics, accommodation attracts anti-immigration voters and repels pro-immigration voters. Because repelled voters defect to other left parties, while attracted voters come from right parties, accommodation increases overall support for parties that support a mainstream left government. The results demonstrate that in some contexts, accommodation can improve the political prospects of the mainstream left.

Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

The insurrection at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, was the most dramatic contemporary manifestation of deep political polarization in the United States. Recent research shows that violent protests shape political behavior and attachments, but several questions remain unanswered. Using day-level panel data from a large sample of US social media users to track changes in the identities expressed in their Twitter biographies, we show that the Capitol insurrection caused a large-scale decrease in outward expressions of identification with the Republican Party and Donald Trump, with no indication of reidentification in the weeks that followed. This finding suggests that there are limits to party loyalty: a violent attack on democratic institutions sets boundaries on partisanship, even among avowed partisans. Furthermore, the finding that political violence can deflect copartisans carries the potential positive democratic implication that those who encourage or associate themselves with such violence pay a political cost.

Populist parties, particularly from the right of the political spectrum, have sharply increased their electoral support in recent years, creating great media and scholarly interest. Existing work examining the economic underpinnings of populist support has focused on labor market shocks and the presence or absence of government compensation. In this paper we suggest that the housing market may have been as important as the labor market in defining who switched to populist voting and where they were located. We build on existing work that connects house prices to 'first dimension politics' of redistribution and classic left-right political identification to argue that house prices might also shape preferences on the 'second dimension' of politics: support for populist nationalism versus liberal cosmopolitanism. Using both novel precinctand individual-level data from Denmark, we show that negative shocks to house prices over the election cycle are strongly associated with shifts to support for the Danish People's Party, a pattern that has amplified over recent elections. We then turn to corroborate this relationship using local housing data in Sweden, Norway, and Finland.

Abstract
We investigate the usefulness of the dice game paradigm to public administration as a standardized way of measuring (dis)honesty among individuals, groups, and societies. Measures of dishonesty are key for the field's progress in understanding individual, organizational, and societal differences in unethical behavior and corruption. We first describe the dice game paradigm and its advantages and then discuss a range of considerations for how to implement it. Next, we highlight the potential of the dice game paradigm across two diverse studies: prospective public employees in Denmark (n = 441) and prospective public employees in 10 different countries with very different levels of corruption (n = 1,091). In the first study, we show how individual-level behavioral dishonesty is very strongly negatively correlated with public service motivation. In the second study, we find that widely used country-level indicators of corruption are strongly correlated with the average behavioral dishonesty among prospective public employees. The results illustrate the importance of the validated dice game paradigm to shed light on core questions that link micro- and macro-level dynamics of dishonesty and corruption in the public sector.

Recent studies of economic voting have focused on the role of the local economy, but with inconclusive results. We argue that while local economic conditions affect incumbent support on average, the importance of the local economy varies by citizens' interactions with it. More recent and frequent encounters with aspects of the local economy make those aspects more salient and, in turn, feature more prominently in evaluations of the incumbent government. We label this process "context priming." We provide evidence for these propositions by studying local housing markets. Linking granularly detailed data on housing prices from Danish public registries to both precinct-level election returns and an individual-level panel survey, we find that when individuals interact with the housing market, their support for the incumbent government is more responsive to changes in local housing prices. The study thus provides a framework for understanding when citizens respond politically to the local economy.

The text of Larsen et al. (2019) contains the following errors: On page 507: "The latter corresponds to electoral support for governing parties increasing by roughly 1.6 percentage points in a precinct where housing prices increase by two standard deviations." It should be 1.7 rather than 1.6. On page 512: "In substantive terms, the model estimates imply that an increase in housing prices of two standard deviations increases the probability of voting for the incumbent by between 11 and 18 percentage points." It should be eight rather than 11.