Annual Editor Report
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 1a-5
ISSN: 1558-8025
6 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 1a-5
ISSN: 1558-8025
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 1a-5
ISSN: 1558-8025
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 1-8
ISSN: 1558-8025
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 103-119
ISSN: 1558-8025
ABSTRACT
This study examines the influence of in-group identity between supervisors and subordinates and the clarity of the bonus determination criteria on supervisors' discretionary adjustments of subordinates' bonus compensation through the lens of social identity theory. Using field data from a multinational manufacturing company's subsidiary in China, we find that in-group sales agents receive higher bonus awards and that this effect is more pronounced when there is high clarity of the bonus determination criteria. Additional analysis shows that these effects hold for higher-tenured sales agents and in regions characterized by lower sales agent turnover. Finally, we find that higher bonus awards are positively (negatively) associated with in-group sales agents' future performance when there is low (high) clarity of the bonus determination criteria. Our findings hold potential implications for management practices in corporations operating in countries that have strong relationship-based cultures.
Data Availability: Data used in this study are provided by a proprietary source.
In: Journal of International Accounting Research, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 23-56
ISSN: 1558-8025
ABSTRACT
Governments in transitional economies have long been concerned with whether privatization of state-owned enterprises can improve firm performance and, if so, through which mechanisms this can be achieved. Using 135 publicly listed firms that China privatized via control transfer from 1998 to 2005 as a sample, we investigate whether newly privatized firms enhance incentives of top management and employees and, consequently, whether post-privatization firm performance is improved. Our findings reveal several post-privatization effects: (1) a much lower level of large shareholder expropriation, (2) higher and more performance-sensitive executive compensation, and (3) lower levels of management perk consumption and employment, which increase more slowly when sales grow and decrease more quickly when sales shrink. These enhancements in incentives help explain post-privatization firm performance improvement.
JEL Classifications: G34; M48.
In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 31, Heft 2, S. 163-186
ISSN: 1573-0476