Suchergebnisse

In this paper we explore the cross‐country variation in the output impact of the global financial crisis in 2008–9. We use the extensive dataset of Rose and Spiegel but control for the problems of model uncertainty and outliers by using a variety of Bayesian model averaging techniques. We find first that cross‐country differences in crisis intensity can be explained by macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Second, ignoring model uncertainty can lead to incorrect inferences. Third, international trade linkages do matter.

Fun and Useful -- Welcome! -- Dead Men's Wrong Ideas? -- Pioneers and Contenders -- Wealth and Power: Mercantilism -- The Physiocrats and Law of Nature -- Classical School -- Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand of the Market Mechanism -- Thomas Malthus and Effectual Demand -- David Ricardo and Differential Rent -- John Stuart Mill and the Peak Time of the Classic School -- The Rise of Socialism -- Antagonists to the Classic School -- Karl Marx and the Collapse of Capitalism -- Marginal Analysis -- The Marginal School in France -- The Marginal School in Germany, Austria, and the U.K -- Application and Extension of the Marginal School -- Alfred Marshall and the Foundation of the Neo-Classical School -- Theories of Imperfect Competition -- Contemporary Trends -- The Boom of Mathematical Economics -- The Institutional School -- Keynes and Keynesian Economics -- Early Austrian School -- The Rise of the Chicago School -- Epilogue: Economic Ideas in Retrospect -- Further Readings.

This book provides a concise history of economic thought for readers of all ages. While some basic economics knowledge would be helpful, it is not required. The book sets out to achieve three aims: to be interesting, entertaining, and thought-provoking. While the authors may appear opinionated in certain instances, this is intentionally done in order to alert readers to form their own views. History of ideas does not make the us smarter nor richer, but it can reduce our ignorance and the "banality of evil", a term Hannah Arendt referred to people who lack self-reflection, "He did his duty...; he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law."

Scholars have found a positive relationship between the magnitude of currency depreciation and the extent of recovery from the Great Depression for Europe and Latin America. The relationship between currency depreciation and economic activity during the Great Depression for Asian economies has not yet been explored. This paper examines this topic using data from 13 Asian economies: China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. We find that Asian economies responded in a similar way to currency depreciation during the Great Depression as did European and Latin American countries.

This study analyzes drops in East Asian investment and their determinants after the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. We first employ a random level‐shift autoregressive model to quantify the shift in investment ratios of four Asian economies hit by the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. We trace the major historical shifts in the levels of investment ratios and we find that the cumulated downward shifts in investment ratios during 1997–1998 for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand are 6, 5, 14, and 14 percentage points, respectively. The investment ratios of most countries experienced several rebounds between 1999 and 2001, but the rebounds were too small to bring investment ratios back to their pre‐1990 levels. Having identified the episodes of investment shifts, the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and several robust tests are employed to investigate the determinants of those level shifts in investment ratios. We find that real per capita gross domestic product growth and banking crises are the two most important factors contributing to shifts in the investment levels of these four crisis‐hit Asian economies. The results are useful in understanding the causes and remedies of global imbalances. (JEL C11, E22, F32, O53)

This research examines whether an alternative exchange rate policy could have mitigated Germany's recession from April 1930 to May 1932, when Heinrich Brüning was Reichskanzler of the Weimar Republic. Using an open-economy dynamic model as our analytical framework, we examine the arguments against adopting the devaluation policy. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that a widely held belief—that floating the Reichsmark would have led to high inflation—is unwarranted. Despite Germany's high foreign debt, floating the Reichsmark would have led tolessof a decline in both real GDP and employment for the country during the Great Depression.