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Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Introduction -- Section I. Law, Sloka, and Sources -- 1. Traditional Law. Sloka in Pepakem -- 2. Sloka in Javanese Titles -- Section II. Sloka Phenomena in Vignettes -- 3. Sloka -- 4. Aksara -- 5. Sinalokan -- 6. Prakara -- 7. Vignettes and Practice -- Section III. Character, Apparent Demise, and Context -- 8. Character -- 9. Context -- Section IV. End Material -- Appendix I. The Problematic Pepakem Tjerbon -- Appendix II. Classic Sloka -- Appendix III. Titles 'Left Out' -- Appendix IV. Diverse Components -- Abbreviations -- Sources Consulted -- Index

Cover; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Colonialism, Procedural Law, and the Cirebon-Priangan Region; Procedural Law; Cirebon; Priangan Lands; Sources; Case Record; Organization and Time Span; Section I. Preludes 1681-1706/08; Chapter 2. Javanese Legal Competence; Padu and Pradata in the Earliest Cirebon Texts; Relevant Sources; Undifferentiated Padu and Pradata Competence; Distinctively Padu; Distinctively Pradata; Padu Affairs Handled by the Jaksa Pipitu; Padu-The Economic Dimension; Pradata Court of Princes and Jaksa; Pradata-The Sovereignty Dimension; 1681-1690-Continuity with an Exception

The paper compares the broad outlines of decentralization taking place in India, dating from the last decade of the past century, with that of Indonesia in the first decades of the present one. When appropriate, material from China will be included in the essay. Of the usual subjects of political, administrative, and physical decentralization, the center of focus is on the generally acknowledged least successful in terms of reform, i.e. the civil administration. What the approach lacks in specific details concerning administrative decentralization in the respective republics, it makes up for in the emphasis on the key characteristics of each. Moreover, as public administration tends to reflect the individual countries' prevailing norms, such an approach tends to be influenced by a new range of literature and researchers whose views challenge accepted wisdom and inspire new lines of thinking on the subject. Justification for the approach comes from expectations that cross fertilization can inspire ideas for a 'new paradigm and conceptual framework', ultimately leading to corrective action. The predominance of corruption/dysfunctional administrative behavior is explained by the fact that it draws upon an on-going project dealing with corruption in India and Indonesia, a joint venture of the Humanistic and Economics Faculties at Lund University. Represented by among others the author and Prof. Neelambar Hatti, the project has its origins in an earlier Lund-Parahyangan University project on Public Administration (1999-2006). The paper opens by listing several of the more important contrasts between Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese decentralization. These include governmental structure, respective colonial heritage, and the focus of decentralization efforts. A short summary of the process of decentralization drawing upon the work of the Lund corruption project follows. The heart of the paper is the question of whether administrative decentralization furthers, hinders, or is neutral with regard to bureaucratic reform in theory and practice. Weighing up successes and failures leads to consideration of continued, if not higher, levels of corruption/dysfunctional behavior at all levels. Possible improvements are postulated, not surprisingly originating from the application of principles derived from New Public Management (NPM), with a couple of new wrinkles from India. These and other types of reform depend on general public engagement, which is conspicuous by its absence in Indonesia, especially in comparison with India's recent mass demonstrations, hunger-strikes, and high-level public condemnation of (mega) public corruption. Key words:Administrative decentralization, bureaucratic reform, comparative public administration, corruption, India, Indonesia

The paper compares the broad outlines of decentralization taking place in India, dating from the last decade of the past century, with that of Indonesia in the first decades of the present one. It focuses on the generally acknowledged least successful of reforms, namely that of public administration. Public administration tends to reflect the respective country's prevailing norms. The paper opens with the more important contrasts between India and Indonesia with reference to governmental structure, respective colonial heritage, and focus of decentralization efforts. The crux of the paper is whether administrative decentralization furthers, hinders, or is neutral with regard to bureaucratic reform. Assessment of successes and failures leads to discussion of continued, if not higher, levels, of corruption/dysfunctional behaviour at all levels in the civil service. After disposing of misconceptions of the Weberian bureaucratic system inherited from the colonial past, possible improvements are postulated. Not surprisingly these originate from application of New Public Management (NPM), with a couple of new wrinkles. Such reform depends upon general public engagement. In comparison with India's spontaneous mass demonstrations, hunger-strikes, and highlevel public condemnation of mega public corruption, this is conspicuous by its absence in Indonesia, where concentration has been on an anti-corruption court supplemented by experiments with a fledging evaluation system to monitor local progress on decentralization.

An actor perspective within a moralistic approach to corruption in india and Southeast Asia contrasts to a (Weberian) institutional one. This emphasizes local values which help explain apparent lack of social constraints to everyday corrupt practices as bribery. In Karnataka the approach indicates that status and power within one's own community gained by amassing wealth however acquired overrides morality; overstepping moral taboos can easily be rectified through an appropriate ritual. In post-coup Thailand morality is defined by emulation of King Bhumibul Aduilyadej. At present it is almost the sole criterion for political power, rejection of which is seen as immoral and hence punishable. Like Thailand, Indonesia lacks cultural possibilities of converting wealth to status and power. Those who cannot become a part of the bribetakers must endure as bribe payers. The remedy to corruption is purely institutional, i.e., an anti-corruption commission with wide ranging powers but with little noticeable effect.

Using examples from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, this book considers what scholarship has defined as a village within the rapid changes taking place in rural Southeast Asia.

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