Self-enforcing property rights: three essays on the microeconomic foundations of institutions
In: Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 131
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In: Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 131
In: Classroom Companion: Economics
In: Springer eBook Collection
First Principles -- Gains from Trade -- Markets and Institutions - Introduction -- Supply and Demand -- Normative Economics -- Externalities -- Decisions and Consumber Behavior -- Costs -- A Second Look -- Firm Behavior in Monopolistic Markets -- Principles of Game Theories -- Firm Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets -- Elasticity.
In: Lehrbuch
In: Springer texts in business and economics
This is the companion workbook for the textbook Principles of Microeconomics. Each chapter features a wide variety of exercises, ranging from basic multiple-choice questions to challenging mathematical problems and case study scenarios. The textbook pursues an integrative approach to modern microeconomics by critically reflecting on the main findings of economics from a philosophical standpoint and comparing them to approaches found in the social sciences. It adopts an institutional perspective to analyze the potential and limitations of different market types, and highlights implications for the design of the legal system and business practices throughout. In addition to traditional rational-choice models, important findings from behavioral economics and psychology are also presented.--
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4104
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4184
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3893
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In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 359-402
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (Games and Economic Behavior, 1990, 2, pp. 29–46) by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non‐monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent. We propose a taxonomy of the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by Eaton (Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, 37, pp. 805–29). We determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous‐move Nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its Pareto efficiency.
In: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 359-402
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 175, Heft 4, S. 617-640
ISSN: 1614-0559
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