The Evolution from Integrated Missions to 'Peace Keepers on Steroids'
In: Global responsibility to protect: GR2P, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 246-263
ISSN: 1875-984X
In the two decades that followed the traumatic events in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the paradigms of both international aid and international military action have profoundly changed. By 2008, strong political missions combined with robust peacekeeping operations, under the new doctrine of 'Integrated Missions', had become the norm for un involvement in conflict. This article will argue, illustrated by three examples in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali, that these international military interventions, whether in the form of a un integrated mission, R2P or non-authorised allied initiatives like Iraq and Afghanistan, have a negative effect on access for humanitarian aid. This affects all aid agencies, as armed groups have neither the time nor inclination to note subtle differences between organisations within this international enterprise. The evolution to ever more proactive peacekeeping operations, reaching its culmination in 2013 in drc and to a lesser extend in Mali, has a direct effect on the impartial delivery of aid to all sides of a conflict. Whether or not the integrated model and offensive peacekeeping will have better outcomes for the longer term stability and security of populations trapped in conflict, is not addressed or challenged. But there is a price to pay for this approach: access for humanitarian aid will suffer.