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This dissertation explores the puzzle that international environmental regulations seem to develop dynamically despite the close involvement of business actors in their making. First, the dissertation asks to what extent international regulations are designed to really exert control over corporate environmental conduct. I conceptualize the notion of regulatory stringency, develop a novel stringency index, and use it to gather data on the regulation of environmental impacts of maritime shipping and offshore oil and gas production. The descriptive statistical data analysis finds that numerous regulations go beyond window-dressing as they require improvements in environmental performance and aim at eliciting compliance with these requirements. Among several patterns of regulatory variance, the analysis shows that international organizations with strong business participation produce relatively high shares of stringent regulation. Second, the dissertation asks how and to what extent business and its environmental practices can influence or shape contentious decisions in international regulatory design. I develop the theory of argumentative coproduction which posits that corporate environmental practices can tip the scales when regulators argue over technology. Building on psychological assumptions about consistency-seeking decision-makers, I argue that progressive environmental practices of first-mover companies provide powerful evidence for the feasibility of more stringent regulation. My theory differs from models which highlight ideas of activists and scientists or interests and power resources of materially dominant corporations and states as drivers of regulation. The explanatory power of the different models is probed in two qualitative case studies of shipping regulation by the International Maritime Organization. The case studies find that the empirical observations are most congruent with argumentative coproduction. In the regulation of nutrient inputs from passenger ships in the Baltic Sea, arguments for demanding standards prevailed thanks to the development and uptake of new sewage treatment technology by a few first-mover firms. In the regulation of fuel use in Arctic shipping, the voluntary transition to cleaner fuels by ever more companies facilitated the development of a ban of heavy fuel oil. The findings suggest that international environmental regulations develop dynamically not despite but because of business involvement in negotiations. The dissertation concludes that green first-mover businesses are constructive partners in international environmental politics and should therefore be involved more systematically into regulatory processes.

Can non-EU member states influence the EU's energy policy? The Europeanization of energy policy in third countries is often described as a one-directional process in which these countries essentially adopt the EU energy acquis. Our article questions this dominant view by exploring whether and how third countries can influence the formulation and implementation of EU energy policy. We argue that relative differences in third country influence depend on their access to relevant venues and actors of EU policy-making as well as their structural power resources. We develop a typology linking these two factors to the outsider, follower, challenger, or shaper roles that third countries assume in EU energy governance. We empirically probe our argument in three case studies representing different models of EU–third country cooperation. Our cases include a group of nine Southeast and East European countries (Energy Community), Switzerland (bilateral arrangements), and Norway (European Economic Area). The analysis shows that it is access and structural power which together define the extent to which third countries are able to influence the formulation of EU energy policy and customize its implementation to their domestic needs. We find that while the Energy Community members are followers in EU energy governance, Switzerland and Norway are shapers. Strikingly, the influence of these two non-EU members may occasionally even surpass that of smaller EU member states. This highlights that third countries are not merely downloading EU energy regulation but sometimes also succeed in uploading their own preferences. Our contribution has implications for the post-Brexit EU–UK energy relations and qualifies claims about EU regulatory hegemony in the wider region.

Can non-EU member states influence the EU's energy policy? The Europeanization of energy policy in third countries is often described as a one-directional process in which these countries essentially adopt the EU energy acquis. Our article questions this dominant view by exploring whether and how third countries can influence the formulation and implementation of EU energy policy. We argue that relative differences in third country influence depend on their access to relevant venues and actors of EU policy-making as well as their structural power resources. We develop a typology linking these two factors to the outsider, follower, challenger, or shaper roles that third countries assume in EU energy governance. We empirically probe our argument in three case studies representing different models of EU–third country cooperation. Our cases include a group of nine Southeast and East European countries (Energy Community), Switzerland (bilateral arrangements), and Norway (European Economic Area). The analysis shows that it is access and structural power which together define the extent to which third countries are able to influence the formulation of EU energy policy and customize its implementation to their domestic needs. We find that while the Energy Community members are followers in EU energy governance, Switzerland and Norway are shapers. Strikingly, the influence of these two non-EU members may occasionally even surpass that of smaller EU member states. This highlights that third countries are not merely downloading EU energy regulation but sometimes also succeed in uploading their own preferences. Our contribution has implications for the post-Brexit EU–UK energy relations and qualifies claims about EU regulatory hegemony in the wider region.

Can non-EU member states influence the EU's energy policy? The Europeanization of energy policy in third countries is often described as a one-directional process in which these countries essentially adopt the EU energy acquis . Our article questions this dominant view by exploring whether and how third countries can influence the formulation and implementation of EU energy policy. We argue that relative differences in third country influence depend on their access to relevant venues and actors of EU policy-making as well as their structural power resources. We develop a typology linking these two factors to the outsider, follower, challenger, or shaper roles that third countries assume in EU energy governance. We empirically probe our argument in three case studies representing different models of EU–third country cooperation. Our cases include a group of nine Southeast and East European countries (Energy Community), Switzerland (bilateral arrangements), and Norway (European Economic Area). The analysis shows that it is access and structural power which together define the extent to which third countries are able to influence the formulation of EU energy policy and customize its implementation to their domestic needs. We find that while the Energy Community members are followers in EU energy governance, Switzerland and Norway are shapers. Strikingly, the influence of these two non-EU members may occasionally even surpass that of smaller EU member states. This highlights that third countries are not merely downloading EU energy regulation but sometimes also succeed in uploading their own preferences. Our contribution has implications for the post-Brexit EU–UK energy relations and qualifies claims about EU regulatory hegemony in the wider region.

Energiepolitische Regelungskompetenzen sind in der Schweiz auf den Bund, die Kantone, und die Gemeinden verteilt. Eine angemessene Aufgabenteilung zwischen diesen Staatsebenen kann den Übergang zu einem nachhaltigeren Energiesystem unterstützen. Wir untersuchen, inwiefern die gegenwärtige Mehrebenenpolitik diese Voraussetzung für zentrale Themen der Strom-, Mobilitäts- und Wärmepolitik bereits erfüllt und wo Verbesserungspotenzial besteht. Unsere Forschung legt nahe, dass zahlreiche energiepolitische Fragen einer verstärkten Koordination zwischen Bund, Kantonen und Gemeinden bedürfen. Koordinationsforen können helfen, systematischere Unterstützungsstrategien zu entwickeln sowie Zielkonflikte zwischen und innerhalb von Ebenen zu bearbeiten. Zudem sollte der Bund seine Funktion als Wegweiser bei energie- und klimapolitischen Zielsetzungen weiter ausbauen. Die Kantone sollten ihre Rechtsrahmen künftig noch konsequenter harmonisieren. Und die Gemeinden sollten systematisch bei Massnahmen eingebunden werden, wo sie umsetzend tätig werden oder wo lokale Vorbehalte bestehen.