Suchergebnisse

BACKGROUND: Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) requires Parties to the agreement to take proactive measures to protect health policy from the vested interests of the tobacco industry. Parties to the FCTC are required to submit periodic reports to the Convention Secretariat on the efforts undertaken to implement it. Previous analyses of national compliance with the FCTC suggest that Article 5.3 implementation is piecemeal and insufficient in many contexts, with governments relying on general transparency and other existing policies for the purpose of Article 5.3 implementation. No in-depth study of Article 5.3 compliance within the European Union (EU) - a signatory to the Convention - has been undertaken. This study seeks to assess the extent of Article 5.3 compliance in European Union institutions, through an analysis of the mechanisms in place in the European Commission and European Parliament. It analyses EU documents relevant to Article 5.3 compliance, as well as semi-structured interviews with policy actors in the EU institutions and the field of tobacco control. RESULTS: As with many national governments, Article 5.3 compliance within EU institutions is partial and incomplete. Much of the compliance activity cited in EU reports is derived from general codes of conduct for EU staff and the Juncker Commission's transparency agenda. Interview respondents reveal widespread lack of knowledge about the existence of the FCTC and Article 5.3 amongst key policy actors across the institutions. Within the Commission policies vary greatly between Directorates General, and issues surrounding the conceptualisation of the role of Members of the European Parliament affect implementation in that context. While there is growing awareness of the issue in both the Commission and the Parliament, in large part as a result of the experience of lobbying over the Tobacco Products Directive, there remains considerable resistance in both institutions to further substantive action to implement Article 5.3. CONCLUSIONS: We recommend that a binding and comprehensive policy and code of conduct, specifically designed for the implementation of Article 5.3 and based on the World Health Organization's guidelines, be created to cover the activities of all employees of all EU institutions. Crucially, such guidelines would need to deal explicitly with third parties acting for the tobacco industry.

European Union (EU) law is based upon a liberalising imperative, the goal of which is to construct a single market between member states. Yet, the EU is no ordinary trade pact, incorporating as it does a range of supranational political institutions and common policies in a range of areas beyond simple market building. Scholars have nevertheless noted a distinction between 'positive' integration (the formulation of common policies applying to all member states) and 'negative' integration (the removal of national-level regulations acting as barriers to market integration). In the context of debates about the implications of trade law and corporate activity for health, this article poses three related questions. First, to what extent does EU law afford corporations opportunities to challenge national-level health regulations? Second, to what extent do EU legal and political processes provide opportunities for positive pro-health supranational regulation, including that which might offset the effects of negative liberalising integration? Third, how do EU market-building processes differ from those of more narrowly drawn trade agreements and organisations in their implications for health? We analyse and compare two recent sets of health-related legal proceedings under EU law, the first of which challenges legislation passed by the Scottish Government to introduce minimum unit pricing for alcohol, and the second of which addresses the legality of specific aspects of the EU's 2014 Tobacco Products Directive. We find, first, that EU law offers ample opportunities for corporations to challenge national health regulations; second, that there is significant scope for pro-health supranational regulations, but that these must be couched in the language of facilitating the single market, and are dependent on the political commitment of key policy actors; and, third, that this (albeit limited) scope for pro-health supranational regulation distinguishes EU legal and political processes from those of other trade agreements and organisations.

Despite a growing literature on corporations as political actors, relatively little is known about how alcohol industry actors attempt to influence public policy. In the context of contemporary debates about the minimum pricing of alcoholic beverages, and drawing on semi-structured interviews with a range of key informants, this article investigates the means by which alcohol industry actors gain access to policy makers and the strategies used to influence policy. It finds that the strategies of alcohol industry actors are focused on long-term relationship building with policy makers, involving the provision and interpretation of information and the promotion of various forms of self-regulation.

Debates on devolution in the UK have been concerned both with the extent to which this has led to policy divergence and with whether devolved institutions have facilitated a more open policy style, which allows easier access to policy makers for a greater range of actors. Further questions have been raised about the extent to which devolution has strengthened territorial boundaries, making it difficult for interest groups to circumvent devolved institutions. Drawing on a series of interviews with a range of policy actors, we investigate the impact of the minority Scottish National Party (SNP) government in Scotland between 2007 and 2011 on alcohol policy and the alcohol policy community, with specific reference to debates about the introduction of minimum unit pricing (MUP). We show that the Scottish policy style did allow extensive access to policy makers, but that the election of the SNP government disrupted the formerly prevailing equilibrium within the Scottish alcohol policy community. The industry was unable to escape the implications of a change in Scottish law for its interests, but industry arguments that MUP is contrary to European Union law indicate that there is still some scope for venue shopping.

Debates on devolution in the UK have been concerned both with the extent to which this has led to policy divergence and with whether devolved institutions have facilitated a more open policy style, which allows easier access to policy makers for a greater range of actors. Further questions have been raised about the extent to which devolution has strengthened territorial boundaries, making it difficult for interest groups to circumvent devolved institutions. Drawing on a series of interviews with a range of policy actors, we investigate the impact of the minority Scottish National Party (SNP) government in Scotland between 2007 and 2011 on alcohol policy and the alcohol policy community, with specific reference to debates about the introduction of minimum unit pricing (MUP). We show that the Scottish policy style did allow extensive access to policy makers, but that the election of the SNP government disrupted the formerly prevailing equilibrium within the Scottish alcohol policy community. The industry was unable to escape the implications of a change in Scottish law for its interests, but industry arguments that MUP is contrary to European Union law indicate that there is still some scope for venue shopping.

Drawing on published tobacco document research and related sources, this article applies Farnsworth and Holden's conceptual framework for the analysis of corporate power and corporate involvement in social policy (2006) to the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). An assessment is made of TTCs' structural power, the impact upon their structural position of tobacco control (TC) policies, and their use of agency power. The analysis suggests that, as a result of the growth of TC policies from the 1950s onwards, TTCs have had to rely on political agency to pursue their interests and attempt to reassert their structural position. The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the liberalisation of East Asian economies presented new structural opportunities for TTCs in the 1980s and 1990s, but the development of globally coordinated TC policies facilitated by the World Health Organisation's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control has the potential to constrain these.

This themed section arose partly as a response to the debate, which has been taking place within the academic social policy community recently, about the nature and future of social policy as an area of study. It includes contributions from those working within Politics departments, both in Britain and abroad, as well as from those working within more specific Social Policy contexts. There are many reasons why the Political Economy approach to social policy is particularly appropriate today. Three important reasons are the increasing importance of processes of 'globalisation', the ever more explicit linking of economic and social policies by governments, and the entry of new actors such as for-profit corporations into the domain of social policy.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Policy transfer in the context of multi-level governance -- Chapter 3: The EU Tobacco Products Directive -- Chapter 4: The member-state level: standardised packaging in Ireland and beyond -- Chapter 5: Policy transfer and transnational NGO networks -- Chapter 6: Discussion and conclusion

This edition of Social Policy Review presents an extensive analysis of the coalition government's social policies and is essential reading for social policy academics and students and for anyone who is interested in the implications of government policy.