Suchergebnisse

Background Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) requires governments to take proactive measures to protect health policy from the vested interests of the tobacco industry. Parties to the FCTC are required to submit periodic reports to the Convention Secretariat on the efforts undertaken to implement it. Previous analyses of national compliance with the FCTC suggest that Article 5.3 implementation is piecemeal and insufficient in many contexts, with governments relying on general transparency and other existing policies for the purpose of Article 5.3 implementation. No in-depth study of Article 5.3 compliance within the European Union (EU) – a signatory to the Convention – has been undertaken. This study seeks to assess the extent of Article 5.3 compliance in European Union institutions, through an analysis of the mechanisms in place in the European Commission and European Parliament. It analyses EU documents relevant to Article 5.3 compliance, as well as semi-structured interviews with policy actors in the EU institutions and the field of tobacco control. Results As with many national governments, Article 5.3 compliance within EU institutions is partial and incomplete. Much of the compliance activity cited in EU reports is derived from general codes of conduct for EU staff and the Juncker Commission's transparency agenda. Interview respondents reveal widespread lack of knowledge about the existence of the FCTC and Article 5.3 amongst key policy actors across the institutions. Within the Commission policies vary greatly between Directorates General, and issues surrounding the conceptualisation of the role of Members of the European Parliament affect implementation in that context. While there is growing awareness of the issue in both the Commission and the Parliament, in large part as a result of the experience of lobbying over the Tobacco Products Directive, there remains considerable resistance in both institutions to further substantive action to ...

Social Policy Review provides readers invested in welfare issues with critical analyses of progress and change in areas of interest during the past year. This year the Review uses the 60th anniversary of key legislation founding the welfare state in the UK to provide a comprehensive overview of policy developments in the UK and internationally

Social Policy Review provides readers invested in welfare issues with critical analyses of progress and change in areas of interest during the past year. This year the Review uses the 60th anniversary of key legislation founding the welfare state in the UK to provide a comprehensive overview of policy developments in the UK and internationally.

'Social Policy Review' provides students, academics and all those interested in welfare issues with critical anayyses of progress and change in areas of major interest during the past year.

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures. However, the extent to which States Parties have implemented the Convention varies considerably. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, is intended to insulate policy-making from the tobacco industry's political influence, and aims to address barriers to strong implementation of the Convention associated with tobacco industry political activity. This paper quantitatively assesses implementation of Article 5.3's Guidelines for Implementation, evaluates the strength of Parties' efforts to implement specific recommendations, and explores how different approaches to implementation expose the policy process to continuing industry influence. Methods We cross-referenced a broad range of documentary data (including FCTC Party reports and World Bank data on the governance of conflicts of interest in public administration) against Article 5.3 implementation guidelines (n=24) for 155 Parties, and performed an in-depth thematic analysis to examine the strength of implementation for specific recommendations. Results Across all Parties, 16% of guideline recommendations reviewed have been implemented. Eighty-three percent of Parties that have taken some action under Article 5.3 have introduced less than a third of the guidelines. Most compliance with the guidelines is achieved through pre-existing policy instruments introduced independently of the FCTC, which rarely cover all relevant policy actors and fall short of the guideline recommendations. Measures introduced in response to the FCTC are typically restricted to health ministries and not explicit about third parties acting on behalf of the industry. Parties systematically overlook recommendations that facilitate industry monitoring. Conclusion Highly selective and incomplete implementation of specific guideline recommendations facilitates extensive ongoing opportunities for industry policy influence. Stronger commitment to implementation is required to ensure consistently strong compliance with the FCTC internationally.

Relationship‐contingent self‐esteem (RCSE) refers to when feelings of self‐worth are derived from romantic relationships. RCSE influences views of the self and the functioning of romantic relationships. The relationship between RCSE and mate retention behaviors was examined across three studies. Study 1 examined whether self‐esteem level and RCSE predicted mate retention behaviors. Studies 2 and 3 examined whether self‐esteem level and RCSE predicted mate retention behaviors following manipulations of threat to the relationship. Individuals with high RCSE were more likely to engage in benefit‐provisioning mate retention behaviors, particularly following certain threats. RCSE was also associated with cost‐inflicting mate retention behaviors, but these associations were inconsistent.