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The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions. ; The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions.

In the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the treatment of new entrants has proven to be one of the most contentious issues. This paper analyses the impact of allocation to new entrants in the energy sector, and identifies options for improved regulation in this field. The point of departure for the discussion is a comparative analysis of the allocation in phase I and phase II of the EU ETS to two hypothetical energy installations should they be located in different EU Member States. The study focuses on the Nordic countries due to their integrated energy market. The quantitative analysis was complemented with interviews with policy makers and industry representatives. The results suggest that current allocation rules can significantly distort competition. The annual value of the allocation is comparable to the fixed investment costs for a new installation and is not insignificant compared to expected revenues from sales of electricity from the installation. The study finds that the preferred option would be that Nordic countries should not allocate free allowances to new entrants in the energy sector. This should be combined with adjusted rules on allocation to existing installations and closures in order to avoid putting new installations at a disadvantage. A second less preferred choice would involve harmonised benchmarks across the Nordic countries ; In the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the treatment of new entrants has proven to be one of the most contentious issues. This paper analyses the impact of allocation to new entrants in the energy sector, and identifies options for improved regulation in this field. The point of departure for the discussion is a comparative analysis of the allocation in phase I and phase II of the EU ETS to two hypothetical energy installations should they be located in different EU Member States. The study focuses on the Nordic countries due to their integrated energy market. The quantitative analysis was complemented with interviews with policy makers and industry representatives. The results suggest that current allocation rules can significantly distort competition. The annual value of the allocation is comparable to the fixed investment costs for a new installation and is not insignificant compared to expected revenues from sales of electricity from the installation. The study finds that the preferred option would be that Nordic countries should not allocate free allowances to new entrants in the energy sector. This should be combined with adjusted rules on allocation to existing installations and closures in order to avoid putting new installations at a disadvantage. A second less preferred choice would involve harmonised benchmarks across the Nordic countries

The study finds that current allocation rules does have an impact on investment decisions, and can significantly distort competition if they remain unchanged. As a first best solution, the authors recommend that the Nordic countries do not allocate free allowances to new entrants in the energy sector. Instead operators would have to buy allowances, either from the government or on the open market. This should be combined with adjusted rules on allocation to existing installations in order to avoid putting new installations at a disadvantage compared to existing installations. Finally, the authors recommend that the Nordic countries investigate what options are available to provide greater certainty in the allocation, for instance through allocating allowances for longer periods into the future ; The study finds that current allocation rules does have an impact on investment decisions, and can significantly distort competition if they remain unchanged. As a first best solution, the authors recommend that the Nordic countries do not allocate free allowances to new entrants in the energy sector. Instead operators would have to buy allowances, either from the government or on the open market. This should be combined with adjusted rules on allocation to existing installations in order to avoid putting new installations at a disadvantage compared to existing installations. Finally, the authors recommend that the Nordic countries investigate what options are available to provide greater certainty in the allocation, for instance through allocating allowances for longer periods into the future

Background: Common mental disorders affect about one-third of the European working-age population and are one of the leading causes of sick leave in Sweden and other OECD countries. Besides the individual suffering, the costs for society are high. This paper describes the design of a study to evaluate a work-related, problem-solving intervention provided at primary health care centers for employees on sick leave due to common mental disorders. Methods: The study has a two-armed cluster randomized design in which the participating rehabilitation coordinators are randomized into delivering the intervention or providing care-as-usual. Employees on sick leave due to common mental disorders will be recruited by an independent research assistant. The intervention aims to improve the employees return-to-work process by identifying problems perceived as hindering return-to-work and finding solutions. The rehabilitation coordinator facilitates a participatory approach, in which the employee and the employer together identify obstacles and solutions in relation to the work situation. The primary outcome is total number of sick leave days during the 18-month follow-up after inclusion. A long-term follow-up at 36 months is planned. Secondary outcomes are short-term sick leave (min. 2 weeks and max. 12 weeks), psychological symptoms, work ability, presenteeism and health related quality of life assessed at baseline, 6 and 12-month follow-up. Intervention fidelity, reach, dose delivered and dose received will be examined in a process evaluation. An economic evaluation will put health-related quality of life and sick leave in relation to costs from the perspectives of society and health care services. A parallel ethical evaluation will focus on the interventions consequences for patient autonomy, privacy, equality, fairness and professional ethos and integrity. Discussion: The study is a pragmatic trial which will include analyses of the interventions effectiveness, and a process evaluation in primary health care settings. Methodological strengths and challenges are discussed, such as the risk of selection bias, contamination and detection bias. If the intervention shows promising results for return-to-work, the prospects are good for implementing the intervention in routine primary health care. ; Funding Agencies|Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare [2016-07415, 2018-01252]

Currently biofuels have strong political support, both in the EU and Sweden. The EU has, for example, set a target for the use of renewable fuels in the transportation sector stating that all EU member states should use 10% renewable fuels for transport by 2020. Fulfilling this ambition will lead to an enormous market for biofuels during the coming decade. To avoid increasing production of biofuels based on agriculture crops that require considerable use of arable area, focus is now to move towards more advanced second generation (2G) biofuels that can be produced from biomass feedstocks associated with a more efficient land use. Climate benefits and greenhouse gas (GHG) balances are aspects often discussed in conjunction with sustainability and biofuels. The total GHG emissions associated with production and usage of biofuels depend on the entire fuel production chain, mainly the agriculture or forestry feedstock systems and the manufacturing process. To compare different biofuel production pathways it is essential to conduct an environmental assessment using the well-to-tank (WTT) analysis methodology. In Sweden the conditions for biomass production are favourable and we have promising second generation biofuels technologies that are currently in the demonstration phase. In this study we have chosen to focus on cellulose based ethanol, methane from gasification of solid wood as well as DME from gasification of black liquor, with the purpose of identifying research and development potentials that may result in improvements in the WTT emission values. The main objective of this study is thus to identify research and development challenges for Swedish biofuel actors based on literature studies as well as discussions with the the researchers themselves. We have also discussed improvement potentials for the agriculture and forestry part of the WTT chain. The aim of this study is to, in the context of WTT analyses, (i) increase knowledge about the complexity of biofuel production, (ii) identify and discuss improvement potentials, regarding energy efficiency and GHG emissions, for three biofuel production cases, as well as (iii) identify and discuss improvement potentials regarding biomass supply, including agriculture/forestry. The scope of the study is limited to discussing the technologies, system aspects and climate impacts associated with the production stage. Aspects such as the influence on biodiversity and other environmental and social parameters fall beyond the scope of this study. We find that improvement potentials for emissions reductions within the agriculture/forestry part of the WTT chain include changing the use of diesel to low-CO2-emitting fuels, changing to more fuel-efficient tractors, more efficient cultivation and manufacture of fertilizers (commercial nitrogen fertilizer can be produced in plants which have nitrous oxide gas cleaning) as well as improved fertilization strategies (more precise nitrogen application during the cropping season). Furthermore, the cultivation of annual feedstock crops could be avoided on land rich in carbon, such as peat soils and new agriculture systems could be introduced that lower the demand for ploughing and harrowing. Other options for improving the WTT emission values includes introducing new types of crops, such as wheat with higher content of starch or willow with a higher content of cellulose. From the case study on lignocellulosic ethanol we find that 2G ethanol, with co-production of biogas, electricity, heat and/or wood pellet, has a promising role to play in the development of sustainable biofuel production systems. Depending on available raw materials, heat sinks, demand for biogas as vehicle fuel and existing 1G ethanol plants suitable for integration, 2G ethanol production systems may be designed differently to optimize the economic conditions and maximize profitability. However, the complexity connected to the development of the most optimal production systems require improved knowledge and involvement of several actors from different competence areas, such as chemical and biochemical engineering, process design and integration and energy and environmental systems analysis, which may be a potential barrier. Three important results from the lignocellulosic ethanol study are: (i) the production systems could be far more complex and intelligently designed than previous studies show, (ii) the potential improvements consist of a large number of combinations of process integration options wich partly depends on specific local conditions, (iii) the environmental performance of individual systems may vary significantly due to systems design and local conditons. From the case study on gasification of solid biomass for the production of biomethane we find that one of the main advantages of this technology is its high efficiency in respect to converting biomass into fuels for transport. For future research we see a need for improvements within the gas up-grading section, including gas cleaning and gas conditioning, to obtain a more efficient process. A major challenge is to remove the tar before the methanation reaction. Three important results from the biomethane study are: (i) it is important not to crack the methane already produced in the syngas, which indicates a need for improved catalysts for selective tar cracking, (ii) there is a need for new gas separation techniques to facilitate the use of air oxidation agent instead of oxygen in the gasifier, and (iii) there is a need for testing the integrated process under realistic conditions, both at atmospheric and pressurized conditions. From the case study on black liquor gasification for the production of DME we find that the process has many advantages compared to other biofuel production options, such as the fact that black liquor is already partially processed and exists in a pumpable, liquid form, and that the process is pressurised and tightly integrated with the pulp mill, which enhances fuel production efficiency. However, to achieve commercial status, some challenges still remain, such as demonstrating that materials and plant equipment meet the high availability required when scaling up to industrial size in the pulp mill, and also proving that the plant can operate according to calculated heat and material balances. Three important results from the DME study are: (i) that modern chemical pulp mills, having a potential surplus of energy, could become important suppliers of renewable fuels for transport, (ii) there is a need to demonstrate that renewable DME/methanol will be proven to function in large scale, and (iii) there is still potential for technology improvements and enhanced energy integration. Although quantitative improvement potentials are given in the three biofuel production cases, it is not obvious how these potentials would affect WTT values, since the biofuel production processes are complex and changing one parameter impacts other parameters. The improvement potentials are therefore discussed qualitatively. From the entire study we have come to agree on the following common conclusions: (i) research and development in Sweden within the three studied 2G biofuel production technologies is extensive, (ii) in general, the processes, within the three cases, work well at pilot and demonstration scale and are now in a phase to be proven in large scale, (iii) there is still room for improvement although some processes have been known for decades, (iv) the biofuel production processes are complex and site specific and process improvements need to be seen and judged from a broad systems perspective (both within the production plant as well as in the entire well-to-tank perspective), and (v) the three studied biofuel production systems are complementary technologies. Futher, the process of conducting this study is worth mentioning as a result itself, i.e. that many different actors within the field have proven their ability and willingness to contribute to a common report, and that the cooperation climate was very positive and bodes well for possible future collaboration within the framework of the f3 center. Finally, judging from the political ambitions it is clear that the demand for renewable fuels will significantly increase during the coming decade. This will most likely result in opportunities for a range of biofuel options. The studied biofuel options all represent 2G biofuels and they can all be part of the solution to meet the increased renewable fuel demand.