Suchergebnisse

The author starts out by delineating the existing system of unilateral arms control measures which is observed by Norway. He distinguishes between unilateral formal measures on the one hand and semi-formal measures on the other. To the former belong the policy on foreign bases and nuclear weapons while the latter include the restrictions applying to allied military exercises and the presence of allied aircraft in Norwegian air space and naval vessels in Norwegian territorial waters. The present era of political reconstruction in Europe may generate force reduction and force adjustment regulations as part of the security infrastructure of the post-cold war Europe. Thus the Norwegian constraints would have to be viewed in a novel context and their possible multilateralization considered. Against the background of a delineation of the relationship of forces in the Northern Cap area the author suggests various activity regulation measures aimed at depoliticizing military force in the area (restrictions on manoeuvres, new stationing of forces, notification of manoeuvres). The naval situation in the Norwegian Sea illustrates the interrelationship between the regional security situation and the superpower balance. The outcome of SALT will affect the situation, but the author also suggests various arrangements involving ceilings on naval activity in the Norwegian Sea.

The author starts out by delineating the existing system of unilateral arms control measures which is observed by Norway. He distinguishes between unilateral formal measures on the one hand and semi-formal measures on the other. To the former belong the policy on foreign bases and nuclear weapons while the latter include the restrictions applying to allied military exercises and the presence of allied aircraft in Norwegian air space and naval vessels in Norwegian territorial waters. The present era of political reconstruction in Europe may generate force reduction and force ad justment regulations as part of the security infrastructure of the post-cold war Europe. Thus the Norwegian constraints would have to be viewed in a novel context and their possible multilateralization considered. Against the background of a delineation of the relationship of forces in the Northern Cap area the author suggests various activity regulation measures aimed at depoliticizing military force in the area (restric tions on manoeuvres, new stationing of forces, notification of manoeuvres). The naval situation in the Norwegian Sea illustrates the interrelationship between the regional security situation and the superpower balance. The outcome of SALT will affect the situation, but the author also suggests various arrangements involving ceilings on naval activity in the Norwegian Sea.

The author distinguishes between Soviet objectives of system preservation and system extension. Soviet policies vis-à-vis the Nordic area have been conceived primarily in the context of system preservation. Thus the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of no experiments and accepts the status quo as tolerable. The preferred Soviet model is that of a neutralist and fragmented Nordic system. The Soviet naval expansion has resulted in the forward deployment of the Northern and Baltic fleets to the Greenland — Iceland — Faeroe Islands gap. There are several structural instabilities associated with a Soviet naval strategy of forward deployment. It also affects the efficacy and credibility of US reinforcements to Norway. The North European security zone is likely to remain of considerable significance to the management of the Central Balance while oil drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf introduces a new element of uncertainty. In their negotiations with the EC the Nordic states appear to be preserving the regional equilibrium and the Soviet Union has made no serious objections.

The author distinguishes between Soviet objectives of system preservation and system extension. Soviet policies vis-à-vis the Nordic area have been conceived primarily in the context of system preservation. Thus the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of no experiments and accepts the status quo as tolerable. The preferred Soviet model is that of a neutralist and fragmented Nordic system. The Soviet naval expansion has resulted in the forward deployment of the Northern and Baltic fleets to the Greenland — Iceland — Faeroe Islands gap. There are several structural instabilities associated with a Soviet naval strategy of forward deployment. It also affects the efficacy and credibility of US reinforcements to Norway. The North European security zone'is likely to remain of considerable significance to the management of the Central Balance while oil drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf introduces a new element of uncertainty. In their negotiations with the EC the Nordic states appear to be preserving the regional equilibrium and the Soviet Union has made no serious objections.