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Abstract
Based on artefactual field experiments, we investigate whether finance professionals differ from a sample of the working population in terms of industry-relevant preferences and personality traits. When adjusting for socioeconomic characteristics, we find only few and less marked differences: finance professionals are less risk averse, less trustworthy, show higher levels of psychopathy and are more competitive than participants from the general population. In an additional survey, experts with hiring experience consider industry selection, self-selection and imprinting by industry norms as explanatory for the observed subject pool differences.

AbstractWe investigate the impact of cognitive skills and economic preferences on fund managers' professional decisions by running a battery of experiments with them. First, we find that fund managers' risk tolerance positively correlates with fund risk when accounting for fund benchmark, fund category and other controls. Second, we show that fund managers' ambiguity tolerance positively correlates with the funds' tracking error from the benchmark. Finally, we report that cognitive skills do not explain fund performance in terms of excess returns. However, we do find that fund managers with high cognitive reflection abilities compose funds at lower risk.

By running a battery of incentivized and non-incentivized experiments with fund managers from four countries in the European Union, we investigate the impact of fund managers' cognitive skills and economic preferences on the dynamics of the mutual funds they manage. First, we find that fund managers' risk tolerance positively correlates with fund risk when accounting for fund benchmark, fund category, and other controls. Second, we show that fund managers' ambiguity tolerance positively correlates with the funds' tracking error from the benchmark. Finally, we report that cognitive skills do not explain fund performance in terms of excess returns. However, we do find that fund managers with high cognitive reflection abilities generate these returns at lower risk.

Think tanks and political leaders have raised concerns about the implications that the Covid-19 response and reconstruction might have on other social objectives that were setting the international agenda before the Covid-19 pandemic. We present evidence for eight consecutive weeks during April–May 2020 for Austria, testing the extent to which Covid-19 concerns substitute other social concerns such as the climate crisis or the protection of vulnerable sectors of the society. We measure behavior in a simple donation task where participants receive €3 that they can distribute between themselves and a list of charitable organizations, which vary between treatments. We consider initially a list of eight charities, including a broad set of social concerns. Results show that introducing the WHO Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund significantly reduces the sum of donations to the original eight charities. This derives from two effects: First, introducing the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund does not significantly change aggregate donations. Second, results point to a high support to the WHO Covid-19 Fund. Overall, our results indicate that donations to diverse social concerns are partially substituted by donations to the Covid-19 fund; yet, this substitution does not fully replace all other social concerns. Results are robust to a 10-fold increase in endowment, with decisions made over €30. ; Version of record

Think tanks and political leaders have raised concerns about the implications that the Covid-19 response and reconstruction might have on other social objectives that were setting the international agenda before the Covid-19 pandemic. We present experimental evidence for eight consecutive weeks during April-May 2020 for Austria, testing the extent to which Covid-19 concerns might substitute other social concerns such as the climate crisis or the protection of vulnerable sectors of the society. We measure behavior in a simple donation task where participants receive Euro 3 that they can distribute between themselves and different charities. While participants in one treatment have the opportunity to donate, if any, to eight different charities including a rich set of social concerns (Baseline), participants in a second treatment can choose to donate, if any, to the same charities and, in addition, to the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund for the World Health Organization (Covid-19). In a third treatment, participants can only decide on distributing the Euro 3 between themselves and the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund (Covid-19 Only). Our results show that introducing the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund does not significantly change aggregate donations (donations represent 76.3% of endowment in Baseline and 70.2% in Covid-19, t(584) = 1.938, p = 0.053, n = 585). But, given positive donations to the Covid19 Solidarity Response Fund, this entails significantly lower donations to the other eight charities (76.3% in Baseline and 60.8% in Covid-19, t(584) = 5.868, p < 0.001, n = 585). Moreover, our results point to a high support to the WHO Covid-19 Fund: In the treatment where the WHO Covid-19 Fund is the only available recipient, participants donate about 50% of their endowment (Covid-19 Only), while in the treatment where it is one out of nine recipients, donations are still 9.5% of endowment (Covid-19) . Overall, our results indicate that donations to diverse social concerns are partially substituted by donations to the Covid-19 fund; yet, this substitution is far from replacing all other social concerns.