Coercing weak regimes to stop supporting terrorism: how and when it can be done
In: Comparative strategy, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 245-260
ISSN: 0149-5933
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In: Comparative strategy, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 245-260
ISSN: 0149-5933
World Affairs Online
In: The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 47-64
ISSN: 2152-0852
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 345-373
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 345-374
ISSN: 0140-2390
In: International relations: the journal of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 221-241
ISSN: 0047-1178
World Affairs Online
In: Security studies, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 72-106
ISSN: 0963-6412
World Affairs Online
In: Security studies, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 72-106
ISSN: 1556-1852
In: Studies in conflict and terrorism, Band 30, Heft 6, S. 563-577
ISSN: 1521-0731
In: Studies in conflict & terrorism, Band 30, Heft 6, S. 563-577
ISSN: 1057-610X
World Affairs Online
In: Middle East quarterly, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 63-74
ISSN: 1073-9467
Between 1948 & 1993, Israel relied on a policy of strategic deterrence to ensure peace & security. If Israel was attacked from beyond its borders, it responded with disproportionate force. For example, on October 1, 1985, Israeli air force fighter planes bombed the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Tunisia, killing fifty-six Palestinian terrorists, in response to the PLO murder of three Israeli tourists in Cyprus. However, after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo accords in 1993, Israel adopted a policy of strategic restraint. But rather than bring peace, the shift to a policy of restraint furthered insecurity. On July 12, 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert returned Israel to a policy of strategic deterrence when he ordered massive retaliation against Lebanon for a Hezbollah cross-border attack & kidnapping earlier that day. While many Israeli analysts & politicians criticize the Israeli military performance in Lebanon, the return to a policy of deterrence was necessary for Israel's long-term peace & security. Adapted from the source document.
In: Middle East quarterly, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 63-74
ISSN: 1073-9467
In: Notfall & Rettungsmedizin: Organ von: Deutsche Interdisziplinäre Vereinigung für Intensiv- und Notfallmedizin, Band 7, Heft 6, S. 391-398
ISSN: 1436-0578
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 137
ISSN: 0090-5917
"This book examines the struggle to control land in Africa through the lens of land titling in Zambia and Senegal. Contrary to standard wisdom portraying titling as an inevitable product of economic development, this book traces its distinctly political logic, showing that local actors empowered by informality act to preserve customary property rights - even when land values and demand are high. The book's analysis centers on customary institutions and their leaders, customary authorities or "chiefs," and how the strength of customary institutions and a citizen's position within them shape land tenure outcomes. Examining sub-national patterns within two very different countries, it reveals a common pattern in which variations in the ability of local institutions to retain power, not state capacity, determine state building outcomes. Based on extensive fieldwork, this book contributes new insight into our understandings of the political determinants of property rights and the persistence of institutional legacies"--
World Affairs Online