Suchergebnisse

Discusses new public management theory and civil service employment; public business sector, business models, political reengineering, and interpretation of "Trobriand cricket" in business environment; New Zealand and Great Britain. Trobriand cricket concept is taken from the famous ethnographic film documenting the way the game of cricket has taken different forms since first introducted in the Trobriand islands.

The grid-group cultural theory of Mary Douglas (eg, 1975) is used to produce a basic categorization of polar approaches to control over public administration & management & to illuminate the self-disequilibrating dynamics of public administration control systems. The four polar types are based on contrived randomness, competition, mutuality, & review. The self-disequilibrating processes work through a combination of mutual repulsion among the polar types & the inherent limitations of each type, which tend to produce more serious side-effects & reverse effects the more emphasis is placed on any one type. Six hybrid types of control are discussed as simple pairwise combinations of the four polar types, but such hybrids are also likely to be unstable. The approach used here appears at least as good on three criteria as any other current available classification of controls over public administration, & it offers a distinctive agenda for examining control design & outcomes. 3 Tables, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF REWARDS TO POLITICIANS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT. IT RECEIVES LITTLE THEORETICAL ATTENTION IN ACADEMIC POLITICAL SCIENCE TODAY. THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CORE RENT-SEEKING MODEL CAN EXPLAIN OBSERVED PATTERNS OF POLITICAL REWARDS. IT CONSIDERS THE CORE MODEL AGAINST TWO MODIFIED MODELS, USING DATA FROM AUSTRALIA AND THE UK AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS DRAWN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. THE CORE-RENT-SEEKING RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL APPEARS TO HAVE POOR EXPLANATORY POWER. A FAMILIAR OVERDETERMINATION PROBLEM ARISES IN TESTING THE EXPLANATORY CLAIMS OF MODIFIED MODELS.

Discusses the extent to which the core rent-seeking model can explain observed patterns of political rewards. Considers the core model against modified models, using data from Australia and the UK and a limited number of observations drawn from other countries. The core-rent-seeking rational choice model appears to have poor explanatory power. (Abstract amended)

The rise of 'new public management' (NPM) over the past 15 years is one of the most striking international trends in public administration. Argues the NPM has been criticised in terms of conflicts between 'equity' and 'efficiency' values, but needs to be examined in terms of administrative value conflicts. (SJK)

WHEN CAMERALISTIC IDEAS BECAME A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORTHODOXY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE, THEY HAD NO SINGLE STRAIN. BUT THEY DID HAVE SOME UNDERLYING FEATURES IN COMMON, INCLUDING: A DISTINCTLY "TOP-DOWN" ORIENTATION; A SHARED VEIW THAT THRIFT WAS THE QUEEN OF VIRTUES IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: A PREDILECTION FOR PARTICULAR FORMS OF ORGANIZATION; AN ASCENDANCY BUILT LESS ON THE THE PRODUCTION OF IRREFRAGIBLE PROOFS FROM "HARD DATA" THAN ON MAXIMS FOLLOWED BY REASONS AND PERSUASIVE EXAMPLES. MOST OF THESE FEATURES ARE SHARED BY TODAY'S EQUIVALENT TO CAMERALISM, THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MOVEMENT (NPM). THE RISE OF NPM PRESENTS AT LEAST THREE PUZZLES THAT ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS ARTICLE. FIRST IS HOW TO EXPLAIN THE COMMONALITIES: SECOND IS HOW TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCES THIRD IS HOW TO EVALUATE THE ROBUSTNESS AND COHERENCE OF NPH DOCTRINES.