Suchergebnisse

1.Introduction -- 2.Literature Review and Theoretical Framework -- 3.The EU-China Solar Panel Dispute -- 4.The EU Investigation into Mobile Telecommunications Networks from China -- 5.The Rise of China in Africa and the Response of the EU: the EU-China-Africa Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation Initiative -- 6.Conclusion.

This article explores and explains the internal and external institutionalization of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries via a case study of the New Development Bank. It contributes to the existing literature on the BRICS and the New Development Bank by identifying internal and external factors of institutionalization and by presenting the most recent developments in the field. The internal and external channels of cooperation complement the traditional one based on hosting annual joint BRICS summits. In 2014, these five countries institutionalized their cooperation with an agreement to establish this Bank. The recently established various New Development Bank regional offices play an essential role in its internal and external institutionalization. The New Development Bank is still very much in development. Nonetheless, the internal and external institutionalization approaches provide useful conceptual lenses to understand BRICS cooperation via the New Development Bank better.

During the 2010s, a number of new multilateral development banks (MDBs) were established, including the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) New Development Bank (NDB) and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In 2010, China had proposed establishing a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) development bank. However, progress made toward establishing an SCO development bank has been minimal. This article identifies key factors influencing whether efforts to establish a new MDB are successes or failures by studying the failed attempt to establish an SCO development bank and contrasting it with the successful foundations of the NDB and the AIIB. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the drivers, the difficulties, and the challenges of these new MDB initiatives. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

Cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) has increased since the first BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) meeting in 2006. We have witnessed the establishment of various BRICS institutions, including the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Because of its politico-economic weight, China exerts great weight on the BRICS exceeding that of its partners. Additionally, Beijing has pursued its own initiatives including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with for instance the BRI having created frictions with other BRICS members including India. This article examines how and why China and the BRICS are reshaping global economic governance, and to what degree the BRICS and BRICS institutions represent anything new. More importantly, it analyzes China's use of the BRICS to reshape global economic governance, and the potential for its independent initiatives to undermine the BRICS' impact on global economic governance. It shows that the dynamics of the BRICS limit their potential of reshaping global economic governance. What is critical is the domestic political economy and interests of China, India and the other BRICS countries that all hold different positions and preferences in the international system. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

"The BRICS Countries and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

Over the past decade the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other emerging power alliances (such as BASIC [Brazil, South Africa, India and China] and IBSA [India, Brazil, South Africa]), as well as multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the global south, have become increasingly important players on the world stage. None of the variations on Asian regionalism and emerging power alliances is in itself very influential. Taken together, however, they are not inconsequential for the European Union (EU) and its position on multilateralism. Their views on multilateralism differ from the EU's vision with regard to contents and methodology. Problematic for the EU is that their views not only structure the relations between the emerging powers themselves, but that these powers also increasingly try to promote them as the basic principles for structuring international relations and regimes on a global level. Adapted from the source document.