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The vote for Brexit is not an isolated event, but part of a wave of populist, anti-elite revolts: a new 'anti-system' politics Western democracies are experiencing, shaking the existing consensus around economic integration, free markets and liberal values. This wave takes a variety of forms, but has in common a robust, even violent, rejection of the mainstream political elites and their values, and a demand for governments to act on the sources of social and economic distress and inequality. This article views Brexit as a part of this new anti-system politics, a reaction to the decline in ideological competition in democracies and the increasing impotence of politicians to address the upheavals wrought by global free market capitalism. This reaction has become particularly acute after the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which affected Britain disproportionately, and the failure of austerity policies to revive growth, crystallising the ineffectiveness of existing policies to deal with economic stagnation and cultural change. This policy failure is compounded by a perceived refusal of politicians to engage with the broader public and a lack of real choice between the mainstream political parties. The article will present evidence that a failed policy consensus, a rise in inequality and a decline in the representativeness of political elites, rather than a resurgence of intolerance or xenophobia, are the principal causes of the Brexit vote.

Italy may reluctantly accept being 'saved by Europe' once again. But…[if] the country turns back to populism, there will be dramatic consequences for the governance of the European economy.

This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's `nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book The Formation of National Party Systems. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.

This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the 'mass party' model of funding towards 'elite party' and 'cartel party' models. Party finance is conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four 'post-mass party' financial strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how these four financial models perform in terms of 'liberal' and 'populist' theories of democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the 'democratic' ideal, while the state-financed ('cartel') model is a reasonable pragmatic response to the decline in party membership.

Commentary on Philip Jones & John Hudson's (2001) use of a transactions cost economic approach to investigating political motivations within British political parties is provided. Although Jones & Hudson's contention that a party attempts to maintain its political identity to preserve voting partisanship, their contention that political parties emerge from groups' attempt to restrict voters costs of searching for information is questioned. In addition, their assertion that political parties' recognition of a consistent political identity motivates parties' desire to emphasize political integrity is challenged. Jones & Hudson's subsequent claim -- that political parties will engage in cooperative behavior since it produces optimal results for the collective -- is deemed representative of the failures of functionalist perspectives. It is concluded that rational choice perspectives must reconsider the relationship between collective political action & democracy. 21 References. J. W. Parker

Primary elections and membership ballots are becoming more common as a means of selecting candidates in European parties. This article assesses the likely implications of these changes for party cohesion by examining the American experience of primaries and contrasting US candidate selection with the membership ballots and primaries recently adopted by parties in the UK and Spain. It is argued that, in the absence of state regulation of candidate selection in European parties, these changes are unlikely to undermine party organizations as primaries have in the US. Instead, the European experience suggests that party leaders have been able to retain ultimate control over candidate selection, and that the democratization of the process has been more formal than real.