This volume brings together important articles from the Cambridge historian A. G. Hopkins and reflect the enlargement and evolution of historical studies during the last half century. The essays cover four of the principal historiographical developments of the period: the extraordinary revolution that has led to the writing of non-Western indigenous history; the revitalization of new types of imperial history; the now ubiquitous engagement with global history, including a reinterpretation of American Empire, and the current revival of economic history after several decades of neglect.
Globalisation is now a fashionable topic of historical research. Books and articles routinely use the term, though often in a loose manner that has yet to realise the full potential of the subject. The question arises as to whether globalisation, as currently applied by historians, is sufficiently robust to resist inevitable changes in historiographical fashion. The fact that globalisation is a process and not a single theory opens the way, not only to over-general applications of the term, but also to rich research possibilities derived in particular from other social sciences. One such prospect, which ought to be at the centre of all historians' interests, is how to categorise the evolution of the process. This question, which has yet to stimulate the lively debate it needs, is explored here by identifying three successive phases or sequences between the eighteenth century and the present, and joining them to the history of the empires that were their principal agents. These phases, termed proto-globalisation, modern globalisation, and postcolonial globalisation provide the context for reviewing the history of the West, including the United States, and in principle of the wider world too.
AbstractThis article offers one view of the evolving historiography that shapes, or might shape, specialist research on regions and periods covered by the conference. It argues that recent trends have given fresh impetus to an old subject, empires, and presented possibilities for studying a new one, globalization. It explores the reasons for the "material turn" and the "totalizing return" in historical studies, and illustrates the stages through which these developments have passed by citing examples from the author's own varied fortunes in exploring both subjects. The article concludes by suggesting how some of the main themes discussed at the conference might be connected to the new historiography.Cette contribution propose une vue d'ensemble sur l'historiographie qui s'est développée ces dernières années. Il se peut qu'elle influence la recherche spécialisée relative aux régions et aux périodes qui ont passées la revue pendant la conférence. L'étude en suggère que des tendances récentes ont données un nouvel élan à un vieux sujet de recherche—celui des empires—en soulevant des interrogations sur un nouveau sujet, la globalisation. Cette contribution explore la 'tournure matérielle' et le retour 'au panorama' qu'ont pris la recherche historique, fondés sur des exemples tirés des publications de l'auteur. Ces exemples exemplifient les étapes qu'a subies l'historiographie et en signalent les fortunes variées. Pour conclure l'auteur suggère comment les thèmes proéminents de la conférence peuvent être liés à l'historiographie moderne.
We are left with the problem of finding an exit that will not create even more chaos in the Middle East and can still be presented as something other than a defeat.
This article responds to McAloon's contribution to this journal criticising the argument advanced by P.J. Cain and myself in British Imperialism. McAloon's research on Canterbury and Otago merits serious attention, but it is argued here that he is mistaken in claiming that it disproves the case we made for applying our concept of gentlemanly capitalism to New Zealand. Both the structure of 'settler capitalism' and the social characteristics of the settlers themselves provide a good fit with our interpretation. Nevertheless, McAloon deserves credit for putting this subject on the agenda, and it is to be hoped that other historians of New Zealand (and also of Australia) will now reconsider the relationship between the 'rules of the game' established by the imperial centre and the degrees of dependence experienced by the constituent parts of the empire.
The paths taken by historians and political scientists intersect less frequently than their subject matter might indicate. Both sets of scholars, for example, have a mutual interest in the formation and evolution of the modern state. However, while this interest has made the 'Westphalian system' the common currency of exchanges among political scientists, few historians refer to the concept, and some would not recognize it—even at close range and in full sunlight. Practitioners of the two disciplines often pass like ships in the night because they are unaware of another large presence on a parallel course. In an age of intense specialization we readily become separated, like Alfred Marshall's noncompeting wage groups, from a common body of information. A more formally acceptable justification for discrete enquiries into similar problems lies in the claim that the disciplines have different purposes. The distinction is not, as is still so often said, that historians are interested in the unique and social scientists in the general; it is rather that the analytical issues forming the generalizations that necessarily accompany statements about large issues are of a different order. Political scientists assign significance to the Westphalian system mainly because they wish to generalize about the principles governing the international regime of sovereign states after 1648. Historians, on the other hand, are less interested in testing the merits of realism and its rivals than in charting changing relativities in international relations. Accordingly, they are more likely to set the Westphalian settlement in the context of already evolving state systems and of subsequent changes of equal or greater moment, such as the upheavals caused by the French and American revolutions.
Andrew Thompson's review of the long-running debate on informal empire will be welcomed both by specialists, who need to be reminded from time to time that many trees do sometimes make a forest, and by teachers, who need help in guiding their students through both. The comments that follow are therefore offered in a constructive spirit that is wholly in accord with Thompson's purpose in trying to take hold of a notoriously slippery concept. My aim in citing his work is to identify the batch of established arguments that his essay faithfully represents. The intention is to move the debate forward: the temptation to readvertise familiar positions will be avoided as far as is possible; the risk of drowning the argument in an excess of detail is removed by limitations of space.