Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The global arms control regime that began with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) appears to be collapsing rapidly, with many agreements now abandoned or barely enforced. This article analyzes some of the challenges to new negotiations on arms control based on developments in negotiation theory over the past 60 years. It focuses on the management of multilateral rather than bilateral negotiations, the need to focus on absolute rather than relative gains, the use of problem-solving techniques rather than traditional bargaining, the management of domestic opposition to arms control, the need for national leaders to become active proponents of new negotiations, and the need to focus on norms of cooperative security rather than engaging in arms races. It concludes that a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to save and rebuild the arms control regime is the adoption of more constructive approaches to negotiation on these vital issues.

This article analyzes President Donald Trump's diversion of US foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine from its traditional path, often to serve his personal and political interests rather than US national interests. His personal ties with Russia's President Putin and his suspicions about Ukraine's leaders have undermined his support for Ukraine in resisting Russian actions in Crimea and the Donbas. Although Trump's policies have been constrained by Congress and Government foreign policy professionals, his acquittal by the Senate in his impeachment trial and his dismissal or marginalization of experts, especially in the State Department, are increasingly freeing him from these constraints.

AbstractThis special issue of International Negotiation includes a range of studies and essays on the analysis of negotiation of contemporary conflicts that reflects the influence of I. William Zartman and his leadership of the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He introduced some of the most significant and enduring concepts that have guided theory building and empirical analysis of negotiations for at least the past four decades. In this issue, eight of his colleagues and former students have contributed their research ‐ applying many of Zartman's concepts and frameworks.

This article examines the relative advantages & disadvantages of quantitative & qualitative research methods for the analysis of the process & outcome of international negotiations. It does this by tracing the author's personal evolution as a researcher in the field, indicating how shifting paradigms & changing research questions have created a need for diverse methodologies, each tailored to the specific questions under investigation. It is concluded that large-scale systematic analyses of international negotiations can best be carried out by large interdisciplinary research teams. This will require negotiation scholars to negotiate with one another to develop collaborative research strategies & measurement instruments. If we are to be successful in large-scale, systematic studies of international negotiations, we must emulate our colleagues in fields such as the natural sciences where large teams with substantial resources collaborate over extended periods of time to produce meaningful findings. 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

"Die OSZE hat sich nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges schneller als andere regionale Organisationen an die neue Sicherheitslage in Eurasien angepaßt und sowohl bei der Konfliktverhütung und -bewältigung als auch beim Aufbau neuer Sicherheitsstrukturen eine wichtige Rolle übernommen. Mit ihren Langzeitmissionen und anderen Aktivitäten hat sie in ca. 18 Krisengebieten des post-kommunistischen Eurasien zur Konfliktbewältigung beigetragen. Die Ressourcen und Kapazitäten der Organisation haben sich jedoch nicht proportional zu den gewachsenen Anforderungen erhöht. Die Mitgliedstaaten müssen der OSZE noch mehr Unterstützung zukommen lassen, damit diese sich mit größerer Effektivität um die Konflikte in Europa kümmern kann, ohne gleichzeitig einen gewaltigen und damit potentiell ineffektiven Verwaltungsapparat zu errichten. Der Beitrag schlägt eine Reihe von Maßnahmen vor, welche die OSZE in die Lage versetzen könnten, professionell auf die zahlreichen Konflikte und Krisen zu reagieren, die im ersten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts zu erwarten sind." (Autorenreferat)

The development of negotiation theory over recent decades has been organized around two major paradigms: bargaining and problem solving. For the bargaining paradigm, indicators of flexibility include concession rates, initiation of new proposals, and other soft behaviors. For the problem-solving perspective, flexibility is usually indicated by a search for better, mutually beneficial solutions to problems that satisfy the needs, identities, and interests of all parties. Empirical research generally reveals that bargaining behaviors are used more frequently in international negotiations than is problem solving. This may be explained by the dominance of the realist paradigm of international relations, within which most diplomats are socialized. Since diplomats generally construct their image of negotiations in terms of bargaining, it is hardly surprising that these behaviors should be prevalent in actual negotiations. In addition, empirical research methods utilized to study negotiations tend to emphasize bargaining variables, and more subtle problem-solving behaviors are more difficult to detect. The empirical prevalence of bargaining, however, does not imply that it is the best method to induce flexibility in international negotiations. On the contrary, most research tends to reveal that problem solving produces greater flexibility and more frequent, efficient, equitable, and durable agreements than bargaining does.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEGOTIATION THEORY OVER RECENT DECADES HAS BEEN ORGANIZED AROUND TWO MAJOR PARADIGMS: BARGAINING AND PROBLEM SOLVING. FOR THE BARGAINING PARADIGM, INDICATORS OF FLEXIBILITY INCLUDE CONCESSION RATES, INITIATION OF NEW PROPOSALS, AND OTHER SOFT BEHAVIORS. FOR THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE, FLEXIBILITY IS USUALLY INDICATED BY A SEARCH FOR BETTER, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THAT SATISFY THE NEEDS, IDENTITIES, AND INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GENERALLY REVEALS THAT BARGAINING BEHAVIORS ARE USED MORE FREQUENTLY IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS THAN IN PROBLEM SOLVING. THIS MAY BE EXPLAINED BY THE DOMINANCE OF THE REALIST PARADIGM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WITHIN WHICH MOST DIPLOMATS ARE SOCIALIZED. SINCE DIPLOMATS GENERALLY CONSTRUCT THEIR IMAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN TERMS OF BARGAINING, IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THESE BEHAVIORS SHOULD BE PREVALENT IN ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS UTILIZED TO STUDY NEGOTIATIONS TEND TO EMPHASIZE BARGAINING VARIABLES, AND MORE SUBTLE PROBLEM-SOLVING BEHAVIORS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO DETECT. THE EMPIRICAL PREVALENCE OF BARGAINING, HOWEVER, DOES NOT IMPLY THAT IT IS THE BEST METHOD TO INDUCE FLEXIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, MOST RESEARCH TENDS TO REVEAL THAT PROBLEM SOLVING PRODUCES GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND MORE FREQUENT, EFFICIENT, EQUITABLE, AND DURABLE AGREEMENTS THAN BARGAINING DOES.