Restoring the Historical Rule of Lenity as a Canon
In: 95 NYU L. Rev. 918 (2020)
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In: 95 NYU L. Rev. 918 (2020)
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In: Michigan Law Review, Band 118, Heft 1181
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In: 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 791 (2019)
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In: University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, Band 87, Heft 79
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In: Journal of Legal Education, Band 66, Heft 2
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The Speedy Trial Act (STA) of 1974 occupies a peculiar place in the criminal justice system. Very few pieces of legislation can lay claim to protecting both the rights of criminal defendants and the public's significant interest in timely justice, while reducing the cost of judicial administration. The STA formerly accomplished these lofty aims by reducing pretrial delays. But for the past two decades legal scholars have ignored the STA, and both prosecutors and defense attorneys have subverted the STA's goals by routinely moving for continuances. And although the Act categorically applies in every federal criminal case, it has been effectively marginalized by federal district and circuit courts. The reason this happens is simple: no actor in the criminal justice system has an incentive to follow it. Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike rely on delays in the system; and overburdened district courts, which have opposed the STA since its inception, have failed to enforce it as written. Appellate courts, too, prefer to thwart the STA's requirements rather than reverse a conviction obtained by otherwise constitutional means. The institutional inertia that pulls courts away from the STA's commands has led to a predictable result: an increase in pretrial delays, the very ill that Congress intended to cure when it passed the Act. This Article highlights and examines the ways in which federal courts undermine the STA and details a number of open circuit court conflicts involving the Act. The Article then proposes a comprehensive, but non-Congressional, fix that prescribes how every actor in the criminal justice system can comply with the Act as Congress intended. See the response by Brooks Holland, https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlro/vol90/iss1/3/">The Two Sided Speedy Trial Problem.
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In: 43 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. iii (2014)
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Working paper
In: Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review (CR-CL), Band 46
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In: Kentucky Bench & Bar, Band 3
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In: Law and Society Review, Band 49, Heft 4
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) When disputes of fact arise regarding whether speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment, should those factual issues be resolved by a trier of fact (the rule in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits), or by the court as a matter of constitutional law (the rule in the Fourth Circuit)? (2) When a government employee engages in speech on a subject of public concern, and a court applying Pickering balances the First Amendment interest against any contrary interests of the employer, should the extent of that First Amendment interest be "lessened" -as the Fourth Circuit holds - if the speaker directed his or her statements to one person rather than the "larger public," was motivated by some " personal concern" in speaking about that subject, or was "not providing a particularly informed opinion"? (3) Can a defendant establish qualified immunity under Garcetti v. Ceballos, by showing that he or she could reasonably have believed that the action of the plaintiff was in his "capacity" as an employee (the rule in the Fourth Circuit), or only by showing he or she could reasonably have believed that the plaintiff spoke "pursuant to his professional responsibilities" (the rule in the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits)?
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) When disputes of fact arise regarding whether speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment, should those factual issues be resolved by a trier of fact (the rule in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits), or by the court as a matter of constitutional law (the rule in the Fourth Circuit)? (2) When a government employee engages in speech on a subject of public concern, and a court applying Pickering balances the First Amendment interest against any contrary interests of the employer, should the extent of that First Amendment interest be "lessened" -as the Fourth Circuit holds - if the speaker directed his or her statements to one person rather than the "larger public," was motivated by some " personal concern" in speaking about that subject, or was "not providing a particularly informed opinion"? (3) Can a defendant establish qualified immunity under Garcetti v. Ceballos, by showing that he or she could reasonably have believed that the action of the plaintiff was in his "capacity" as an employee (the rule in the Fourth Circuit), or only by showing he or she could reasonably have believed that the plaintiff spoke "pursuant to his professional responsibilities" (the rule in the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits)?
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