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'Criminal Fraud and Election Disinformation' is about the state's approach to fraud and distortion of the truth in politics, especially during election campaigns. Deliberate mischaracterisation of political opponents and their policies has always been a part of politics; however, lying, dishonesty, and distortion of the facts remain morally wrong and have the potential to obstruct important political interests. For example, a false or misleading claim publicised about an election candidate may lead someone to lose an election that they might otherwise have won. So, does - and should - the law seek to provide protection from the risk of this happening, by directly prohibiting the making of false or misleading political claims, or by obliging internet platforms to censor such content?

Democracy cannot function if the public loses faith in politicians, and that faith will be lost if politicians abuse their power with impunity. This work analyses the criminal offence of misconduct in office, and explains how it should be used, along with other measures, to hold politicians to account for abuse of their position.

Philip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of freedom—republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on another's forbearance (what Pettit calls 'formal' freedom). Pettit believes that the principal justification for the traditional focus of the criminal law is that it constitutes a bulwark against domination. I will, in part, be considering the merits of this claim. Is the importance of the orthodox realm of the criminal law solely or mainly explained by the wish to protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not. Across the board, the criminal law rightly protects us equally from threats to what Pettit calls 'effective,' as opposed to formal, republican freedom. I will develop my critique of Pettit's account of criminal law, in part to raise questions about the role of 'domination' in political theory, and about whether it poses a significant challenge to liberal accounts of criminal law.

When should the criminal law intervene to deter and punish the promulgation of falsehoods that are intended to influence political – electoral or referendum - campaigns? I will scrutinise the protection that UK criminal law provides for the interests of candidates, referendum campaigners and voters, from the (potential) effects of damaging falsehoods. I suggest that neither the protection of candidates' or campaigners' reputations, nor the promotion of the public good of collective decision-making by voters based on accurate and adequate information, in themselves provide sufficient reasons for criminal law intervention. Falsehoods must normally be intended to threaten, undermine or prevent effective participation in the political process before the intervention of the criminal law is justified.