Suchergebnisse

International investment agreements have provoked intense criticism in the policy debate during recent years. Particularly contentious has been their "ISDS" mechanisms, which enable investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines whether host countries would be better off with state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), as often alleged, assuming that SSDS cause political/diplomatic litigation costs that are not present with ISDS. Two separate reasons why host countries might benefit from SSDS are identified, but neither provides a convincing argument for host countries to move to SSDS. The paper concludes that host countries should reduce the stringency of their agreements, rather than introduce imperfections in the dispute settlement systems to reduce their bite.

The basic legal instrument in the WTO Agreement regulating domestic environmental policies is the GATT National Treatment (NT) provision. The practical ambit of this clause is largely determined by the allocation of the burden of proof (BoP) in NT disputes. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of this burden for trade liberalization and for the environment, in a situation where imports may cause environmental damage. The paper finds that there may be a tension between NT and environmental concerns, but that this is not likely to arise in the context of severe threats to the environment. In any event, relieving regulating countries of the BoP will have fundamentally unclear implications for the environment.

The National Treatment (NT) clause is the first-line defense in the GATT (and in most other trade agreements) against opportunistic exploitation of the inevitable incompleteness of the agreement. This paper examines the role of NT as it applies to internal taxation under the GATT. It is shown that despite severely restricting the freedom to set internal taxes, NT may improve government welfare, but it will not completely solve the incomplete contract problem it is meant to remedy. Furthermore, it requires a high degree of economic sophistication on behalf of trade negotiators in order for this beneficial effect to materialize.