"With contributions from leading scholars in the field, Rebels in Groups brings together the latest research on dissent, deviance, difference and defiance. Many of the most famous figures in psychology - Asch, Milgram and Zimbardo and others - have emphasized the pressures to conform and obey which are present in groups, and focused on the positive value that groups place on loyalty and uniformity. From this perspective, dissent, deviance, difference and defiance have been regarded as detrimental forces within groups: reflections of a lack of group loyalty, a sign of disengagement or delinquent behaviour. Contrary to traditional views, this book presents an approach which considers rebellion to be a normal, functional and healthy aspect of group life. Rebels in Groups presents the latest thinking on these issues by examining a broad range of groups - such as political groups, task groups, and teams in organisations - and by considering diverse fields of psychology, including social, organizational, and developmental psychology. In the process, it shows how new approaches to the study of dissent, deviance, difference and defiance have refined our theorizing in this area and shed a more nuanced light upon the role of rebels in groups"--Provided by publisher
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AbstractFor over 50 years, scientists have sounded alarms that the burning of fossil fuels is causing changes to the Earth's climate, and that failure to take action on climate change will have devastating consequences. Despite this urgency, CO2 emissions (and global temperatures) continue to climb. Progress on mitigating climate change is slowed by the stubborn persistence of climate skepticism, as well as a failure for nonskeptics to translate their concern about climate change into meaningful action. The goal of this article is to describe and synthesize research on how to understand (and reduce) this public inaction on climate change. In the first half of the article, we examine the question of how to understand (and overcome) climate change skepticism. We review international evidence regarding the role of demographics, ideologies, and conspiracist worldviews in shaping people's willingness to believe in the reality of human‐caused climate change. We then review theory and research on how to successfully capture the attention of—and change the behavior of—people who traditionally resist climate change messages, such as those high in conservatism and free‐market beliefs. In the second half of the article, we examine how to promote more climate‐friendly behaviors among people who believe in the reality of climate change. Evidence will be reviewed suggesting that many people agree that climate change is caused by humans, but are not yet willing to make the necessary investments and sacrifices to respond to this threat. We then draw on relevant literatures to critically discuss three strategies for promoting proenvironmental behavior: (i) optimistic versus pessimistic messages; (ii) in‐group versus out‐group messenger effects; and (c) the use of descriptive and injunctive norms.
People have a tendency to view media reports of intergroup conflicts as biased against their own group (hostile media perception). However, limited research has been conducted investigating how group membership of the perceiver and group membership of the media source combine to influence perceptions of bias. Muslims and Christians in Indonesia (N = 212) read an article describing inter-religious conflict. The article was attributed either to a Muslim newspaper, a Christian newspaper, or an unidentified newspaper. Results indicated the hostile media perception only among high identifiers. There was also some evidence for the predicted role of newspaper religion in influencing perceptions of bias: the article was seen to be biased in favor of Muslims when attributed to a Muslim newspaper, biased in favor of Christians when attributed to a Christian newspaper, and intermediate when the newspaper was not identified. The effect of newspaper religion was mediated by prior beliefs of bias. Results are discussed in terms of heuristic explanations of bias perceptions in the media.
International audience ; We examined how rhetorical style affects evaluations of group advocates, and how these evaluations are moderated by group identification. University students were given a letter to the editor defending student welfare. The argument was either constructed using personal language ('I believe') or collective language ('we believe'). Furthermore, the letter was either attributed to an official advocate (president of the student union) or an unofficial advocate (a rank-and-file member of the student body). Consistent with the social identity perspective, participants who showed strong identification as a university student thought that the group would feel better represented by official advocates using collective rather than personal language. Low identifiers, however, did not rate the rhetorical styles differently on representativeness. Furthermore, low identifiers (but not high identifiers) rated official advocates as more likable and more effective when they used personal rather than collective language. The discussion focuses on the conflict low identifiers might feel between (a) needing to homogenize with other group members in order to maximize the influence and political effectiveness of their message at the collective level, and (b) protecting themselves against categorization threat.
We examined how rhetorical style affects evaluations of group advocates, and how these evaluations are moderated by group identification. University students were given a letter to the editor defending student welfare. The argument was either constructed using personal language ('I believe') or collective language ('we believe'). Furthermore, the letter was either attributed to an official advocate (president of the student union) or an unofficial advocate (a rank-and-file member of the student body). Consistent with the social identity perspective, participants who showed strong identification as a university student thought that the group would feel better represented by official advocates using collective rather than personal language. Low identifiers, however, did not rate the rhetorical styles differently on representativeness. Furthermore, low identifiers (but not high identifiers) rated official advocates as more likable and more effective when they used personal rather than collective language. The discussion focuses on the conflict low identifiers might feel between (a) needing to homogenize with other group members in order to maximize the influence and political effectiveness of their message at the collective level, and (b) protecting themselves against categorization threat.
In: Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly: journal of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, Band 50, Heft 6, S. 1274-1303
Trust is assumed to be important for charitable giving. However, disparate associations have been found, and recent theoretical approaches emphasize motives for giving that do not rely on trust. To resolve this tension, we conducted a systematic review of evidence generated between 1988 and 2020. A meta-analysis of 69 effect sizes from 42 studies sampling 81,604 people in 31 countries confirmed a positive association between trust and giving across diverse measures, r = .22. Meta-regressions showed that organizational ( r = .35) and sectoral trust ( r = .27) were more strongly associated with giving than were generalized ( r = .11) or institutional trust ( r = .14). The relationship was also stronger in non-western (vs Western) countries and in nonrepresentative (vs nationally representative) samples. All evidence was correlational, and few studies measured actual behavior. We discuss implications for theories of trust and for fundraising practice, and highlight critical gaps in evidence.
In: Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly: journal of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 441-457
Recent high-profile scandals suggest the potential for a crisis of trust in charities, which could have negative consequences for the nonprofit sector as a whole. Although widespread, this crisis narrative has not yet been subjected to empirical examination. To assess the extent to which public trust has changed over time, we examined trust in nongovernmental organizations within 31 countries over nine consecutive years using data from the Edelman Trust Barometer ( N = 294,176). Multilevel analysis revealed that, after allowing for differences in absolute levels of trust and trends across countries, there was actually a small increase in global trust in the nonprofit sector. This increase was sharper among men, people aged below 40 years, and people with higher education, income, and media consumption. Overall, we find no evidence of a crisis of trust in nonprofits; scandals within individual organizations have not affected sectoral trust.
When are current generations held accountable for transgressions committed by previous generations? In two studies, we test the prediction that current generations will only be assigned guilt for past atrocities when victim group members perceive high levels of cultural continuity between historical perpetrators and the current generation within the perpetrator group. Japanese participants were presented with information describing the current generation of Americans as either similar or dissimilar in personality to the Americans who were implicated in dropping the atomic bomb on Japan during World War II. The results of both studies revealed that victim group members assigned more guilt to current Americans when they perceived high (compared to low) outgroup continuity, and they did so relatively independently of the transgressor group's guilt expressions.
The world has entered into an "age of apology," in which governments, armies, and corporations have increasingly begun apologizing for their role in committing historical and contemporary harms. Although it is widely assumed that such apologies help promote intergroup forgiveness, this assumption has not been subjected to a great deal of empirical investigation, and the little research that exists presents a mixed picture. In this article, we present some of the political and ideological arguments for and against providing intergroup apologies. We then critically review the research on the outcomes of apologies, with an eye to developing concrete strategies for maximizing apology effectiveness. Drawing on these discussions, a staircase model for effective intergroup apologies is offered that has implications for social policy. Although we present some pessimism regarding the outcome of intergroup apologies, this article provides arguments for the necessity of formal intergroup apologies and for policy that maximizes their positive effects.
Despite a general consensus that cohesiveness promotes positive outcomes in group psychotherapy, the empirical evidence for this notion is limited. In this article the literature on group cohesiveness and its relation to clinical outcomes is reviewed. Three interrelated problems with this literature are highlighted: A lack of consensus as to how to conceptualize cohesiveness, inconsistent measurements of cohesiveness, and lack of attention to possible mediators of the cohesiveness-outcome relationship. The authors argue that the term cohesiveness is too vague and amorphous to be useful as a unitary construct and that the field could benefit by identifying more specific group processes that facilitate—or impede—clinical outcomes. They review social psychological research on group processes, and discuss how three constructs— group identification, independence, and homogeneity—might be applied to the clinical literature. Furthermore, in an attempt to stimulate a closer examination of mediational paths in the literature on group psychotherapy, they discuss possible mechanisms through which group processes affect clinical outcomes.