Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Stringent environmental taxes in high-income countries are assumed to drive dirty industries to low-income countries, but the empirical evidence for ``pollution havens" is surprisingly weak. We demonstrate that a government trying to prevent flight by a ``dirty" durable good monopolist can impose an effluent tax that is offset by a lump-sum subsidy so that both firm profits and host-country welfare are increased. The scheme exploits the Coase Conjecture insight: a durable goods monopolist has a time-consistency dilemma that limits its ability to restrict future output. In this environment the effluent tax provides a credible commitment that restricts future supply. We assert that the use of lump-sum subsidies in strategic location competition is consistent with this mechanism, and this paradigm may be an important piece of the ``pollution haven paradox."

While international remittances provide significant disposable income for many households in less-developed countries, there is no consensus on migrants' remittance motivation. Two principal competing explanations for remittances are altruism and risk-sharing. The paper employs previously unanalyzed data to bring new evidence to the debate. The authors develop a simple theoretical model that yields distinct testable predictions for each motivation. Among the model's testable predictions is differential remittance behavior by migrants from households with multiple versus single migrants under altruistic and risk-sharing. (DSE/DÜI)

This paper examines the distributional consequences of a high inflation episode in Suriname during 1990-94 using household survey data. It examines not only the apparent macro-economic correlation between high inflation and income distribution, but also the micro-level characteristics of winning and losing households. (DSE/DÜI)

SUMMARYThis paper explores the nexus between youth‐employment, youth‐crime, and socialization in the context of the child labor debate in economics. The analysis draws upon both economics and sociology and suggests that neglect of the socializing benefits of youth (and perhaps child) employment in the economics literature is a potentially important lacuna. The sociology literature contains evidence that youth‐labor reduces criminal propensity. If this effect extends to the youth who are the subject of the economics child‐labor literature, potentially large private and external benefits of some‐types of child‐labor have been ignored. After presenting evidence of the linkage between youth‐socialization, youth‐employment, and youth‐crime we consider possible implications for child‐labor policies.

Abstract:
We develop a stylized theoretical model showing that countercyclical transfers from a wealthy donor to a poorer recipient generate a signal of altruistic donor motivation. Applying the model to OECD foreign aid (ODA) data we find the signal present in approximately one-sixth of a large set of donor–recipient pairs. We then undertake two out-of-model exercises to validate the signal: a logit regression of signal determinants and the growth effects of ODA from signal-positive pairs are compared to non-signal bearers. The logit indicates our signal meaningfully distinguishes donor–recipient pairs by characteristics typically associated with altruism. The growth exercise shows ODA from signal bearers displays stronger reverse causation and more positive long-run effects. Beyond foreign aid, our signal of altruistic motivation may be applicable to a wide range of voluntary transfers.