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This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1991.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. The Goals of Constitutional Processes -- 2. Knowledge, History, and Visibility -- 3. Starting Conditions -- 4. The Forum and the Method -- 5. Inclusion and Consensus -- 6. Consensus, Compromise, Clarity, and Coherence -- 7. External Advice and the Participation Imperative -- 8. Consensus and Defection -- 9. Shaping a Process -- 10. Processes, Good and Not So Good -- Index

From one of our leading scholars of comparative constitutionalism, advice for everyone involved in the surprisingly common practice of constitution-writing Enhancing prospects for democracy is an important objective in the process of creating a new constitution. Donald L. Horowitz argues that constitutional processes ought to be geared to securing commitment to democracy by those who participate in constitutional processes. Using evidence from numerous constitutional processes, he makes a strong case for a process intended to increase the likelihood of a democratic outcome. He also assesses tr.

Donald L. Horowitz's comprehensive consideration of the structure and dynamics of ethnic violence is the first full-scale, comparative study of what the author terms the deadly ethnic riot--an intense, sudden, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group. Serious, frequent, and destabilizing, these events result in large numbers of casualties. Horowitz examines approximately 150 such riots in about fifty countries, mainly in Asia, Africa, and the former Soviet Union, as well as fifty control cases. With its deep and thorough scholarship, incisive analysis, and profound insights, The Deadly Ethnic Riot will become the definitive work on its subject. Furious and sadistic, the riot is nevertheless directed against a precisely specified class of targets and conducted with considerable circumspection. Horowitz scrutinizes target choices, participants and organization, the timing and supporting conditions for the violence, the nature of the events that precede the riot, the prevalence of atrocities during the violence, the location and diffusion of riots, and the aims and effects of riot behavior. He finds that the deadly ethnic riot is a highly patterned but emotional event that tends to occur during times of political uncertainty. He also discusses the crucial role of rumor in triggering riots, the surprisingly limited role of deliberate organization, and the striking lack of remorse exhibited by participants. Horowitz writes clearly and eloquently without compromising the complexity of his subject. With impressive analytical skill, he takes up the important challenge of explaining phenomena that are at once passionate and calculative

"After the fall of its authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia pursued an unusual course of democratization. It was insider-dominated and gradualist, and it involved free elections before a lengthy process of constitutional reform. At the end of the process, Indonesia, Ŵs amended constitution was essentially a new and thoroughly democratic document. By proceeding as they did, the Indonesians averted the conflict that would have arisen between adherents of the old constitution and proponents of radical, immediate reform. Gradual reform also made possible the adoption of institutions that preserved pluralism and pushed politics toward the center. The resulting democracy has a number of prominent flaws, largely attributable to the process chosen, but is a better outcome than the most likely alternatives. Donald L. Horowitz documents the decisions that gave rise to this distinctive constitutional process. He then traces the effects of the new institutions on Indonesian politics and discusses their shortcomings as well as their achievements in steering Indonesia away from the dangers of polarization and violence, all the while placing the Indonesian story in the context of comparative experience with constitutional design and intergroup conflict"--

How did democracy became entrenched in the world's largest Muslim-majority country? After the fall of its authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia pursued an unusual course of democratization. It was insider-dominated and gradualist and it involved free elections before a lengthy process of constitutional reform. At the end of the process, Indonesia's amended constitution was essentially a new and thoroughly democratic document. By proceeding as they did, the Indonesians averted the conflict that would have arisen between adherents of the old constitution and proponents of radical, immediate reform. Donald L. Horowitz documents the decisions that gave rise to this distinctive constitutional process. He then traces the effects of the new institutions on Indonesian politics and discusses their shortcomings and their achievements in steering Indonesia away from the dangers of polarization and violence. He also examines the Indonesian story in the context of comparative experience with constitutional design and intergroup conflict

I met Walker Connor in 1972 at the Glazer and Moynihan conference on ethnicity held at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Glazer and Moynihan 1975). We thought we would be intimidated by the company at the conference: Talcott Parsons, Daniel Bell, Andy Greeley, Orlando Patterson, Bill Petersen, and Lucian Pye – a good sample of the elders of social theory. By then Walker had published three articles in World Politics in five years – perhaps a record – including one containing his splendid deconstruction of the theories of Karl Deutsch. But I think we acquitted ourselves well enough – especially Walker did. He was the star of the show, with numerous observations on boiling or incipient conflicts across the globe that many of the elders did not know about (or did not know existed). Unfortunately, he did not submit an essay for the volume that came out of the conference (Glazer and Moynihan 1975).

In societies severely divided by ethnicity, race, religion, language, or any other form of ascriptive affiliation, ethnic divisions make democracy difficult, because they tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Two commonly proposed methods of amelioration are called consociational and centripetal . Three problems derive from these proposals: The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either be adopted? The second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalition. The third derives from a common consequence of the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce. By examining these three problems, we can uncover some of the frailties inherent in both of the common prescriptions.