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We live in a digital world. This fact has significant consequences for warfare. Two technologies in particular, cyber and drones, feature in military and intelligence operations and in scholarship. In addition, a new vein of scholarship is examining how advances in artificial intelligence have the potential to shape the future of warfare. While scholars disagree about the consequences of these technologies for international politics, they tend to agree that their consequences are mediated by the ability of military organizations, whether state or nonstate actors, to use them effectively in relevant military scenarios and in the pursuit of political ends. Studying newer military technologies, with less empirical evidence than is available for technologies that have been around for decades, also generates methodological challenges for research.

The possibility that today's drones could become tomorrow's killer robots has attracted the attention of people around the world. Scientists and business leaders, from Stephen Hawking to Elon Musk, recently signed a letter urging the world to ban autonomous weapons. Part of the argument against these systems is that they violate the public conscience provision of the Martens Clause due to public opposition, making them illegal under international law. What, however, does the US public think of these systems? Existing research suggests widespread US public opposition, but focused on support for autonomous weapons in a vacuum. This paper uses two survey experiments to test the conditions in which public opposition rises and falls. The results demonstrate that public opposition to autonomous weapons is contextual. Fear of other countries or non-state actors developing these weapons makes the public significantly more supportive of developing them. The public also becomes much more willing to actually use autonomous weapons when their use would protect US forces. Beyond contributing to ongoing academic debates about casualty aversion, the microfoundations of foreign policy, and weapon systems, these results suggest the need for modesty when making claims about how the public views new, unknown technologies such as autonomous weapons.

This article reviews the existing literature, mostly from political science, on suicide bombing. A prominent weapon in the toolkit of violent nonstate actors for a generation, suicide bombing generates a significantly larger number of casualties per attack than other uses of force by terrorist groups, insurgents, and others. Scholars tend to agree that no single reason leads individuals to become suicide bombers. Moreover, groups use suicide bombing for strategic reasons—although whether suicide bombing campaigns make groups more likely to achieve their goals is unclear. Scholars continue to disagree about what drives groups to adopt or eschew suicide bombing, including the role of religion. Although groups that are more religious are significantly more likely to adopt suicide bombing, the underlying cause and its relationship to particular religious ideologies (such as Salafi Jihadi movements) versus the structure of religious groups remain matters of contention.

This article reviews the existing literature, mostly from political science, on suicide bombing. A prominent weapon in the toolkit of violent nonstate actors for a generation, suicide bombing generates a significantly larger number of casualties per attack than other uses of force by terrorist groups, insurgents, and others. Scholars tend to agree that no single reason leads individuals to become suicide bombers. Moreover, groups use suicide bombing for strategic reasons-although whether suicide bombing campaigns make groups more likely to achieve their goals is unclear. Scholars continue to disagree about what drives groups to adopt or eschew suicide bombing, including the role of religion. Although groups that are more religious are significantly more likely to adopt suicide bombing, the underlying cause and its relationship to particular religious ideologies (such as Salafi Jihadi movements) versus the structure of religious groups remain matters of contention. Adapted from the source document.