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"Engaging and thought-provoking, this book examines how we see and treat animals and argues that we should extend equal rights to all species, human and non-human alike. Our world is plighted by 'isms' - racism, sexism and ageism to name a few - but we have one more to add: speciesism. Speciesism is a form of discrimination against those who don't belong to a certain species and it is a concept which raises controversial questions over humanity's very complicated relationship with animals. Forgetting that humans are animals too, this mindset allows us to see animals as objects, rather than individuals with their own interests and with the ability to feel and suffer. This book questions all of these assumptions. Human feelings of superiority have allowed us to feel entitled to own animals as pets, to eat them, to use them for entertainment and to treat them with unkindness and cruelty. Looking at both the use of animals for the production of food, as well as the suffering of wild animals, this book advocates for society to seriously take into account the interests of all animals and argues that we have a duty to treat animals with much greater care, consideration and respect. For all who care about the rights and welfare of animals, this book is essential reading"--

I argue that despite Ng's claim that we should postpone the defense of those animals that live in the wild, we do have reasons to start spreading concern for them now. We can do it by (i) changing public attitude by heightening awareness of speciesism, by which we will also challenge animal exploitation; and (ii) by disseminating information about the situation of animals in the wild.

Abstract
In standard cases of discrimination the interests of the discriminatees are considered comparatively worse than those of others. Accordingly, discrimination is often defined as some form of differential consideration or treatment which, among other features, entails a disadvantage for discriminatees. There are some apparent forms of nonstandard discrimination, however, in which it seems that this need not occur. This paper examines three of them: epistemic discrimination, discrimination against entities unable to be harmed by it and nonhierarchical segregation. If, as it seems, these really are forms of discrimination that means standard definitions may fail or must be reinterpreted. There is a way to account for the mentioned nonstandard forms of discrimination by claiming that all forms of worse consideration or treatment can be considered discriminatory. This, however, entails interpreting the term "worse" in a very broad manner, and some may not find this solution intuitive. Despite this, the paper will argue that alternative accounts entail more serious problems.

AbstractThis article examines and rejects the view that nonhuman animals cannot be recipients of justice, and argues that the main reasons in favor of universal human rights and global justice also apply in the case of the international protection of the interests of nonhuman animals. In any plausible theory of wellbeing, sentience matters; mere species membership or the place where an animal is born does not. This does not merely entail that regulations of the use of animals aimed at reducing their suffering should be implemented. It actually supports the end of such use, as well as other positive steps to provide help and to promote what is good not only for domesticated animals, but also for those living in the wild. Another reason to bring the protection of animals' interests into the international arena is that it is at this level that numerous animal exploitation industries enjoy the protection of different agreements and institutions. It does not follow from this that changing international law should be animal advocates' first priority, but it does follow that they should conduct their work internationally and not limit it to their own countries.