Suchergebnisse

It is stated that "the degeneration of orderly relationships between city gov's & their employees seriously complicates the nature of gov & democracy in Ur America." Most city gov's suffer from seemingly chronic conditions, eg, inadequate revenues & spiraling costs, which can easily serve as catalysts for municipal labor crises. In an examination of the following aspects, the redistribution of influence over labor relations in US cities is analyzed: org'al growth of city employee unions; rule changes; & mayoral leadership. It is felt that the new distribution of influence over labor relations (caused by increased union strength & skilled union leadership, changes in rules which benefitted city employee unions, & mayoral support of labor) as indicated by data on New York City has produced decisions diff in scope & kind from earlier ones. The main impact is still in the areas of salaries & fringe benefits, but the resolution of important policy & managerial issues has fallen increasingly within the gambit of collective bargaining. The evidence for New York City strongly suggests that collective bargaining can produce decisional consequences which deviate considerably from the basic assumption that collective bargaining is a process from which participants receive benefits of roughly corresponding utility, ie, labor relations in New York City show distinct & easily identifiable winners & losers, in keeping with the distribution of influence over the process. Budgetary impacts & policy impacts are assessed, & a critical examination of the labor relations process is made. If a new policy framework is to be achieved, some popular misconceptions about municipal labor relations must be abandoned, eg, the assumption that private & public collective bargaining are analogous, or the belief that strikes in the public sector are necessarily undesirable. A city gov could accept & win a strike. M. Maxfield.