Suchergebnisse

Part I. Consciousness and the self -- 1. Consciousness and the self -- 2. The narrative self and the minimal self -- Part II. Varieties of the phenomenological unconscious -- 3. The unconscious in psychoanalysis and phenomenology -- 4. Body memory and the unconscious -- Part III. Psychopathology and the minimal self -- 5. Phenomenological psychiatry of schizophrenia -- Part IV. The unconscious and the minimal self -- 6. Time-consciousness and affective identity -- 7. The affective core self and affective identity -- 8. Summary and conclusions.

A new interest in space emerged in contemporary studies of body memory. According to Merleau-Ponty, the lived body constitutes a close connection between place and memory. The real or even imagined movements of the body contribute to the recollection of places. Recently, Edward S. Casey and Thomas Fuchs highlighted the constitutive role of the body in remembering. First, the paper intends to show the intertwined relation between body memory and place memory. For instance, Casey regards Proust's madeleine experience as an instance of place memory, and he argues that the body can sustain and recollect place memories. According to Casey, modern philosophy neglected the concept of place, in which the lived body is dwelling, and introduced the concept of site; that is, the geometrical extension of a homogeneous and isotropic space. Second, the paper examines the psychological and emotional aspects of place memories. According to Fuchs, body and place memory constitute a horizontal unconscious that consists of the zones of attraction and avoidance of the lived space. Finally, the paper argues that place memory has much to offer to the phenomenological investigation of the self. Place memory eventuates the recollection of distant memories in an affectively charged form. This type of memory establishes an affective connection with the past and contributes to the preservation of personal identity.

The aim of the paper is, on the one hand, to examine the ipseity-hiperreflexivity model ofschizophrenia popularized in contemporary phenomenological psychiatry. On the other hand, itaims to compare the model with R. D. Laing's earlier observations about the self. Owning to theworks of the co-authors, Sass and Parnas, the divergent symptoms of schizophrenia spectrumdisorder can be reduced to the minimal self that is a simpler notion than the person. The paperseeks to give and answer to the question of the relation between the lifeworld and the minimalself. Sass and Parnas argues, in the prodromal phase of schizophrenia an endogenous selfdisorder can emerge and its recognition could initiate therapeutic interventions prior to thefull-blown psychotic breakdown. Other authors emphasize the primacy of the lifeworld andidentity disorders determined by life circumstances contrary to or besides the role of minimalself-awareness.