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Examine strategic management with the market-leading text that sets the standard for the most intellectually rich, practical analysis of strategic management. Written by respected experts Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson, the 12th edition of STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT is steeped in cutting-edge research featuring more than 500 emerging and leading companies, and reveals trends you can implement immediately to succeed in your field. You'll discover how to integrate the classic industrial organization model with a resource-based view of the firm to give you a complete understanding of how today's businesses use strategic management to establish competitive advantages and create value for stakeholders in the global marketplace. The freshly reimagined MindTap(R) learning solution provides you with real-world activities that will prepare you to excel as a leader and outperform rivals

Incentives for division managers in large firms affect their risk orientation and thus their decisions to invest in R&D. This paper reviews theory and hypothesizes that division managers' incentive compensation that is based on financial performance is negatively related to risk taking as measured by R&D intensity. Results of a study of 184 major U.S. firms suggest that incentives based on short-term (annual) division financial performance are negatively related to total firm R&D intensity after controlling for industry R&D intensity, firm diversification, size and group structure. Furthermore, the results suggest that an emphasis on long-term financial incentives may mitigate the negative relationship between these incentives and R&D intensity, but does not promote risk taking. The results suggest the importance of emphasizing strategic controls [evaluating division managers based on operational understanding of strategies proposed (strategic criteria)] as opposed to the use of financial controls [evaluating division managers based on financial performance (often annual ROI)]. However, the use of financial controls becomes more common as firms diversify. Diversification increases the span of control of corporate executives and the diversity among divisions. In highly diversified firms, corporate executives are no longer able to fully understand the operations of the multiple and diverse divisions. Thus, they must not only decentralize operating authority to divisions, but they also cannot use strategic criteria to evaluate division managers. As a result, they begin to emphasize financial controls. The shift toward risk aversion caused by the use of incentives based on short-term financial outcomes can have important implications for long-term firm performance. The results of this study have implications for long-term competitiveness, especially for firms in R&D intensive industries where R&D expenditures may affect a firm's competitive position.

Herein we argue that different diversification strategies are associated with different sets of economic benefits. Firms that have diversified into related areas can realize benefits from economies of scope, while those that have diversified into unrelated areas can realize benefits from efficient internal governance mechanisms. We hypothesize that distinctly different internal organizational arrangements are required to realize these different benefits. Firms attempting to realize economies of scope need organizational arrangements that stress cooperation between business units. Firms attempting to realize economic benefits from efficient internal governance need organizational arrangements that stress competition between business units. If a diversified firm is to achieve high performance it must establish an appropriate fit between its diversification strategy on the one hand, and its organizational structure and control systems on the other. We test this thesis on 184 Fortune 1000 firms that participated in a survey of organizational arrangements. The results indicate that the appropriate fit between strategy, structure, and control systems is associated with superior performance. Firms attempting to realize economies of scope perform better if their organizational arrangements stress cooperation between business units, while firms attempting to realize economic benefits from efficient internal governance perform better if their organizational arrangements stress competition between business units.

The degree of risk taking by lower level (division) managers is expected to vary depending upon the extent and type of diversification. Limited diversification, when coupled with M-form adoption and decentralization, induces managerial risk taking. Notwithstanding, the control system elaborations (e.g., strategic business unit [SBU] structures) to facilitate information processing as firms increase diversification, extensively diversified firms reach limits such that control loss reduces managerial risk taking. Ultimately, this control loss may result in poor relative performance thereby triggering a threat of takeover. The threat of takeover creates incentives for restructuring and more focused diversification. Firms that reduce their diversified scope through restructuring may induce managerial risk taking. Thus, diversified firms experience periods that induce and other periods that reduce division manager risk taking depending on diversification and associated control system attributes.

The volume presents and discusses a variety of recent developments and achievements in research on entrepreneurship. It aims at taking a systematic analysis of the theory and practice of entrepreneurship, especially in regard to nurturing strategic systems, governance arrangements, and evolutionary paths in organizations. Bringing together the insights of an international recognized array of academics, entrepreneurs, and executives, New Frontiers in Entrepreneurship focuses on two key themes: (1) connecting developments in entrepreneurship to current strategy thinking and practice; and (2) generating new and innovative ways to cultivate and develop entrepreneurial processes in new ventures and established enterprises. Exploring such topics as the integration of entrepreneurial and strategic thinking, corporate governance of new ventures and spin-offs, business-university alliances, IPO performance, the impact of Open Source, the role of science and technology in new firm formation, and the emergence of the entrepreneurial society. In the process, the authors demonstrate how entrepreneurship promotes organizational genesis, growth, and rejuvenation on a practical level, and consider on the research side how entrepreneurship has developed from a peripheral sub-field of management studies into one of the most relevant spheres of strategic management