Suchergebnisse

This anthology brings together studies of post-colonial, post-Cold War Central Eurasia. This part of the world is in transition from Soviet institutions to independent statehood, nation building, resistance against state expansion, cultural change and the release of market forces. The theoretical framework of the study is called 'critical geo-politics.' The objective of the work is to better comprehend the nature of the post-colonial 'Great Game'. Part I studies US power projection activity in the region. America is extending its World War II trans-oceanic 'defense perimeter into the fossile fuel rich area between integrating Europe, recovering Russia and industrializing China. Part II details various aspects of state-nation building and soci-cultural and economic change in the region. Part III studies interactions between outsiders, neighbors and Central Asian Republics. Conflict and cooperation in the Caspian region is studied in part IV, with Aral Sea and Azerbijan as cases. Revised edition of the book published under the same title in 2004 (ISBN 90 04 12809 3)

Traditional functionalist schools of thought assign an international-level system-maintaining & -rejuvenating function to world wars. Here, an alternative approach is presented that ignores the meaning behind warfare & stresses the importance of dyadic power transitions at the systemic level. Analysis of unequal dyads, equal dyads, & dyads with overtaking (ie, with one dyad partner surpassing the other), & the timing of war outbreaks over 20-year periods 1816-1975 suggests that changes in a nation's capability, either modernization or decline, are a necessary condition for war, & that wars are significantly correlated with power transitions in dyads of major powers. Methodological limitations of the study include establishment of time frames & lack of analysis of the impact of intervening variables, eg, motivation, on the outbreak of war. 5 Tables, 25 References. D. Generoli

Recently two putative causes of great power war - power transitions (as identified by Houweling and Siccama 1988) and critical points (as identified by Doran 1989) - have confronted each other. In subsequent publications Doran changed the dating of several of his critical points. The authors will demonstrate that these changes have the effect of increasing the positive association between nations passing through a critical point interval on their relative capability trajectory and their involvement in war. Doran correctly observes that power transitions in dyads do not increase the probability of fighting in these dyads when none of their members is simultaneously passing through a critical point interval. However, the authors show that the association between a major power passing through a critical point interval and its war involvement is much stronger in transition dyads than in nontransition dyads. A power transition in a dyad, in which at least one of its members is also passing through a critical point is a sufficient condition of war in that dyad. On the other hand, the mere occurrence of a critical point is but a necessary condition of war involvement.

This article draws attention to the danger that deliberate escalation will transform into compulsory escalation. According to Clausewitz' philosophy, the use of violence is an instrument of policy. Nuclear deterrence would have brought an end to that philosophy, since the costs of nuclear war always exceed the benefits. However, Clausewitz also suggests the possibility that a war may escalate beyond the break-even point (where cost is equal to benefit) if a nation expects to lose unilaterally. In the nuclear era, the limited use of nuclear weapons may very easily escalate into absolute war because the target feels that its survival is at stake. This argument closely resembles Riezler's theory of bluff developed on the eve of World War I and the possibility that escalation may become uncontrollable in a Krieg aus Not (war from necessity). Just as in 1914, a third world war might break out not on the basis of a calculation that the benefits of warfare are greater than the costs, but as a consequence of compulsory escalation of a crisis or a limited war in which one side perceives that its existence is threatened. Since planning for limited nuclear war and deliberate escalation enhances the probability of compulsory escalation, a nuclear posture of minimum deterrence should be preferred.

Based on conference paper. Analyzes cold war model of international relations proposed by Erich Weede.

Quantitative research into the causes of war is influenced by the choice that has to be made between time-series designs on the one hand and cross-sectional designs on the other. The assumption of independence is important for both of them. The present article investigates whether warfare is clustered in time and in space. Using a method of analysis proposed by epidemiologists, significant evidence is found for time-space interaction not only in participation in war but also in outbreaks of war.