Suchergebnisse

Human rhinoviruses (HRV) are known to cause common cold as well as more complicated respiratory infections. HRV species -A, -B and -C have all been associated with lower respiratory infections and exacerbations of asthma. However, the type distribution of strains connected to different kinds of lower respiratory conditions is not clearly known. We have analysed the presence of HRV in sputum specimens derived from military recruits with and without pre-diagnosed asthma at times of acute respiratory infection (CIAS Study, 2004–2005). The analysis was performed with HRV and HEV real-time RT-PCR assays. Subsequently we studied type distribution of HRV strains by genetic typing in the VP4/VP2 genomic region. In total 146 (38.8%) specimens were HRV-positive and 36 (9.3%) HEV-positive. No difference was found in HRV detection between the asthmatic vs. non-asthmatic patients. Most of the genetically typed strains, 18 (62.1%), belonged to HRV-A, while HRV-B strains constituted five (17.2%) of the HRV-positive strains. HRV-C strain was typed four times from the HRV-positive cases and a HEV-D strain twice. We further typed six HEV positive strains in the partial VP1 region. Three of these belonged to HRV-A and three to HEV-D. HRV-A strains were discovered throughout the study period, while HRV-C strains originated from winter and spring specimens. Interestingly, four out of five typed HRV-B strains originated from the summer season specimens.

The goal of the World Health Organization is to stop routine use of oral poliovirus vaccine shortly after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. A key component of this goal is to minimize the risk of reintroduction by destruction of polioviruses except in an absolute minimum number of facilities that serve essential functions and implement effective containment. Effective containment begins with a complete facility risk assessment. This article focuses on characterizing the risks of exposure to polioviruses from the essential vaccine production, quality control, and international reference and research facilities that remain. We consider the potential exposure pathways that might lead to a poliovirus reintroduction, including para‐occupational exposures and releases to the environment, and review the literature to provide available estimates and a qualitative assessment of containment risks. Minimizing the risk of poliovirus transmission from a poliovirus facility to increasingly susceptible communities is a crucial and ongoing effort requiring understanding and actively managing the potential exposure pathways.

With the intensifying global efforts to eradicate wild polioviruses, policymakers face complex decisions related to achieving eradication and managing posteradication risks. These decisions and the expanding use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) trigger renewed interest in poliovirus immunity, particularly the role of mucosal immunity in the transmission of polioviruses. Sustained high population immunity to poliovirus transmission represents a key prerequisite to eradication, but poliovirus immunity and transmission remain poorly understood despite decades of studies. In April 2010, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened an international group of experts on poliovirus immunology and virology to review the literature relevant for modeling poliovirus transmission, develop a consensus about related uncertainties, and identify research needs. This article synthesizes the quantitative assessments and research needs identified during the process. Limitations in the evidence from oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) challenge studies and other relevant data led to differences in expert assessments, indicating the need for additional data, particularly in several priority areas for research: (1) the ability of IPV‐induced immunity to prevent or reduce excretion and affect transmission, (2) the impact of waning immunity on the probability and extent of poliovirus excretion, (3) the relationship between the concentration of poliovirus excreted and infectiousness to others in different settings, and (4) the relative role of fecal‐oral versus oropharyngeal transmission. This assessment of current knowledge supports the immediate conduct of additional studies to address the gaps.

Successfully managing risks to achieve wild polioviruses (WPVs) eradication and address the complexities of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to stop all cases of paralytic poliomyelitis depends strongly on our collective understanding of poliovirus immunity and transmission. With increased shifting from OPV to inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV), numerous risk management choices motivate the need to understand the tradeoffs and uncertainties and to develop models to help inform decisions. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention hosted a meeting of international experts in April 2010 to review the available literature relevant to poliovirus immunity and transmission. This expert review evaluates 66 OPV challenge studies and other evidence to support the development of quantitative models of poliovirus transmission and potential outbreaks. This review focuses on characterization of immunity as a function of exposure history in terms of susceptibility to excretion, duration of excretion, and concentration of excreted virus. We also discuss the evidence of waning of host immunity to poliovirus transmission, the relationship between the concentration of poliovirus excreted and infectiousness, the importance of different transmission routes, and the differences in transmissibility between OPV and WPV. We discuss the limitations of the available evidence for use in polio risk models, and conclude that despite the relatively large number of studies on immunity, very limited data exist to directly support quantification of model inputs related to transmission. Given the limitations in the evidence, we identify the need for expert input to derive quantitative model inputs from the existing data.