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United Nations peacekeeping has proven remarkably effective at reducing the death and destruction of civil wars. But how peacekeepers achieve their ends remains under-explored. This book presents a typological theory of how peacekeepers exercise power. If power is the ability of A to get B to behave differently, peacekeepers convince the peacekept to stop fighting in three basic ways: they persuade verbally, induce financially, and coerce through deterrence, surveillance and arrest. Based on more than two decades of study, interviews with peacekeepers, unpublished records on Namibia, and ethnographic observation of peacekeepers in Lebanon, DR Congo, and the Central African Republic, this book explains how peacekeepers achieve their goals, and differentiates peacekeeping from its less effective cousin, counterinsurgency. It recommends a new international division of labor, whereby actual military forces hone their effective use of compulsion, while UN peacekeepers build on their strengths of persuasion, inducement, and coercion short of offensive force.

Why do some states transition, with foreign assistance, from "fragile" to "robust"? Scholars in state-building have argued that neotrusteeship is an effective strategy by which external organizations might build postconflict states. This article tests this hypothesis, and two related propositions, in a paired comparison of Kosovo and Timor-Leste. The two states are similar in many respects and both experienced regional peace enforcement operations to end violent conflict, followed by massive neotrusteeship operations. They have had divergent results, however, in postconflict state-building: while the state and economy are gradually becoming stronger in Timor-Leste, the same cannot be said of Kosovo, which continues to be plagued by high unemployment, low growth, corruption, and organized crime. I argue that many of Kosovo's problems can be traced back to the strategy of dividing international responsibility for neotrusteeship operations.

Why do some states, with foreign assistance, transition from 'fragile' to 'robust?' Scholars in state-building have argued that neotrusteeship is an effective strategy by which external organizations might build post-conflict states. This working paper tests this hypothesis, and two related propositions, in a paired comparison between Kosovo and East Timor. The two states are ideal for comparison in that they share many similar characteristics, including, most crucially, the fact that both experienced regional peace enforcement operations to end violent conflict, followed by massive neotrusteeship operations. However, they have had divergent results in post-conflict state-building: While the state and economy are gradually becoming stronger in East Timor, the same cannot be said of Kosovo, which continues to be plagued by high unemployment, low growth, corruption, and organized crime. Many of Kosovo's problems can be traced back to the strategy of dividing international responsibility for the neotrusteeship operations.

This article introduces the term "ethnocracy" as a regime type. In ethnocracies such as Bosnia and Lebanon, political parties are defined primarily along ethnoreligious lines, key state positions are allocated according to ethnic group membership, and educational and other institutions are officially segmented according to ethnic categories. While the introduction of ethnocratic regimes after violent conflict has sometimes coincided with a decrease in violence, it has also introduced new and institutional obstacles that render transition to liberal democracy difficult. This article defines ethnocracy, differentiates it from consociationalism, discusses its problems, addresses the puzzling phenomenon of ethnocracy promotion by liberal powers, and offers alternatives for those seeking to promote liberal democracy in postconflict, multiethnic societies.

Historically, civil wars ended in one-sided victory. With the end of the Cold War, however, the very nature of how civil wars end shifted: wars became two times more likely to terminate in negotiated settlement than in victory. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the proportion of victories has increased, especially for civil wars that include a terrorist group; wars are also ending less frequently. Why would civil war termination vary by time period? The literature on civil wars looks to three basic types of causes: domesticstructural factors, bargaining dynamics, and types of international intervention. Current explanations cannot account for why civil wars would end differently in different time periods because, as Kenneth Waltz might say, they are "reductionist" in nature. Material and ideational factors constitute the international political environment, which varies in different time periods. This environment drives outside actors' normative strategies of viewing victory, negotiation, or stabilization as the appropriate solution to civil war. These norms, in turn, directly affect how civil wars end. A novel, three-part methodological approach using quantitative analysis, case studies, and original content analysis demonstrates that civil wars tend to end the way external actors think they ought to end.