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Since the early 1960s, scholarly thinking on the power of U.S. presidents has rested on these words: ""Presidential power is the power to persuade."" Power, in this formulation, is strictly about bargaining and convincing other political actors to do things the president cannot accomplish alone. Power without Persuasion argues otherwise. Focusing on presidents' ability to act unilaterally, William Howell provides the most theoretically substantial and far-reaching reevaluation of presidential power in many years. He argues that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by

"Examines school board politics in U.S. cities at the end of the twentieth century, focusing on site-based management reforms, mayoral takeover, parental choice and competition, and standards and accountability initiatives, as well as the role of teacher unions, and assesses the promise of various governance reforms"--Provided by publisher

Since the early 1960s, scholarly thinking on the power of U.S. presidents has rested on these words: ""Presidential power is the power to persuade."" Power, in this formulation, is strictly about bargaining and convincing other political actors to do things the president cannot accomplish alone. Power without Persuasion argues otherwise. Focusing on presidents' ability to act unilaterally, William Howell provides the most theoretically substantial and far-reaching reevaluation of presidential power in many years. He argues that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by.

This review critically evaluates the largely consensual view that wars naturally and reflexively augment presidential power. After summarizing in the key arguments advanced by presidency scholars in the aftermath of World War II, this article canvasses the existing empirical basis for their claims and the theoretical microfoundations upon which they are offered. Both appear wanting. Few systematic studies yield unambiguous evidence that the adjoining branches of government reliably support elements of the president's domestic or foreign policy agendas during war that they otherwise would oppose. And no one, to date, has offered a clear theory explaining why either Congress or the courts would behave in this way. The article therefore calls for continued empirical research on the causal effects of war on presidential power, and for renewed investments in theories that might account for the way, in which war figures into congressional and judicial voting. Adapted from the source document.