Suchergebnisse

Two years after his accession to power, Kim Jong Un continues to pursue his country's foreign policy with the familiar pattern of bellicose rhetoric, cut with the occasional conciliatory gestures. More substantial changes can be seen in the way power is exercised within the top leadership. The country is now increasingly run by a circle of 'family and friends' within a revived Party structure. There are also signs of emerging economic pragmatism, a decrease in the influence of the military within the Central Committee and a revival of the stalled 2002 economic reforms. However, the continued development of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes ensures that security issues continue to dominate the country's relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours and the United States.This leaves substantial scope for the greater involvement of the European Union (EU). Geographically distant, with no direct security interests and perceived as more independent by Pyongyang, the EU is well placed to engage in a dialogue with the regime when other international actors cannot. As the North Korean leadership begins to slowly reform the economy and attempts to diversify its sources of trade, the EU could use its humanitarian and development assistance in a more strategic way, using it to encourage continued economic reform and (limited) dialogue on human rights. Such a policy would represent a 'carrot' that can run parallel to the 'stick' of international condemnation and sanctions that will continue to be implemented through the UN and by regional powers. ; ISSN: 2294-7828 ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

How can small states contribute to the overall normative power of the European Union (EU)? In this article we assess how much Slovenia, a small EU Member State with limited financial and human resources, contributes to this normative power. We do this by analysing its foreign policy, which consists of three main guiding principles: internationalism, the desire to solve all outstanding issues with its neighbour Croatia, and an attempt to present itself as a bridge between the EU and the Western Balkans. We discover that, while these principles exist on paper, they are often not consistently carried out in practice, which is a symptom of the stillongoing reorientation of the country's foreign policy, after successfully joining the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. Slovenian decision makers all too often remain reactive, and prefer to support the initiatives of others. When the country does act on its own initiative, its actions can be seen as too individualistic and uncoordinated, both within its own borders, and with its EU partners, as was the case when Slovenia launched the socalled Brdo Process, aimed at promoting cooperation between countries of former Yugoslavia. The conduct of Slovenian foreign policy is, all too often left, to the initiative and ingenuity of individuals, and such an uncoordinated approach hinders Slovenian efforts to become a normative power and to increase its influence in the Western Balkans. Finally, we argue that Slovenia's Presidency of the EU Council in 2008 was a unique opportunity to contribute to the EU's normative power. Slovenia managed to accomplish this only in part; despite the fact that the Presidency was an organisational success, most of its goals was too broadly defined and lacked ambition. Keywords: Slovenia, normative power, small state, Presidency, foreign policy, Western Balkans, Croatia, Hungary. (Romanian Journal of European Affairs / SWP)