Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Maps, Tables, Photographs -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Prologue -- Part 1: The Setting -- 1 A Localized Regime, National Image, and Territorial Fragmentation -- 2 Professed Frontier Policy, Policy Planners, and Imagined Sovereignty -- Part 2: The Prewar Decade, 1928-37 -- 3 The Unquiet Southwestern Borderlands -- 4 The Mission to Tibet -- 5 "Commissioner" Politics -- Part 3: The Wartime Period, 1938-45 -- 6 Building a Nationalist-Controlled State in Southwest China -- 7 The Issue of the China-India Roadway via Tibet -- 8 Rhetoric, Reality, and Wartime China's Tibetan Concerns -- Part 4: The Postwar Period, 1945-49 -- 9 Postwar Frontier Planning vis-à-vis non-Han Separatist Movements -- 10 The Sera Monastery Incident -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Glossary of Names and Terms -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W -- X -- Y -- Z -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W -- X -- Y -- Z.

Early years and early strategies -- Frontier politics in metropolitan China -- In search of a new territorial base -- War and new frontier designs -- War and opportunities -- Reconfiguring ethnic frontier territoriality epilogue : the end of the journey

This article examines how China's war with Japan served as a crucial factor that shaped modern China's ethnopolitics. It argues that the Japanese invasion of China in 1941-1945 provided the Nationalists with an unprecedented opportunity to push their authority further westward into the Central Asian heartlands. The Nationalists' marching westward as a result of the Japanese invasion also urged them to factor frontier and ethnopolitics into their wartime strategic thinking and institutional reforms. To a great extent, the war and its repercussions caused a redefinition of modern China's border security and defense in both northwestern and southwestern China. The war with Japan turned the Nationalists westward, a new perspective which shifted the power relationship between the Nationalists and China's frontier regional leaders. This historical phenomenon resulted in the extension of Nationalist power to, and the building of, new institutions and infrastructures, in China's remotest ethnic frontier. It also contributed to modern China's first contact with the Middle East. The westward expansion during wartime also transformed modern China from a maritime economy rooted in East Asian trade to a continental one based on overland trade routes through the heartland of Asia. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

This article re-evaluates an important yet usually ignored episode in modern Chinese ethnopolitical history. It seeks to argue that, in the midst of the Second World War, Chiang Kai-shek manoeuvred towards a possible war with Tibet in order to serve other military, strategic and political purposes, namely, to insert his direct control into China's south-western border provinces that were still in the firm grip of obstinate warlords. Chiang Kai-shek's careful manipulation of the Sino-Tibetan border crisis in 1942–43 also reveals how he and his top military advisors perceived wartime China's territoriality and border defence in south-west China. With considerations of regime security and national survival foremost in their minds, top KMT leaders took a pragmatic stance towards the intractable issue of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In addition, at the diplomatic level, the Sino-Tibetan border crisis brought discord among the Allied Nations. The Chinese regarded Tibet as part of China whereas the British had long considered it within their sphere of influence. Eventually the Chinese won the sympathy of the US government. Facing Sino-British disagreement over Tibet's political status, the State Department continued to recognize Nationalist Chinese authority in Tibet, however fictitious that authority was. In retrospect, this episode, along with the US government's official stance towards China's sovereignty over Tibet, although a only a minor disagreement between the Allied Nations during the war, led to the problematic Tibetan issue that still haunts the international community today.

AbstractThis article revisits the issue of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War. Benefitting from archival materials only recently made available, specifically Chiang Kai-shek's personal diaries, CIA declassified materials, Taiwanese Foreign Ministry files, and rare publications from the Contemporary Taiwan Collection at the Library of the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, this research examines the cloud of suspicion surrounding the secret contacts between Taipei and Beijing leading up to and during the 1958 offshore islands crisis, elucidating how such a political tête-à-tête, and the resultant tacit consensus over the status of the islands, gradually brought about an end to the conflict between Taiwan and Communist China. In hindsight, the crises over the offshore islands along China's southeast coast momentarily brought the United States closer to war with Communist China, while putting the relationship between Taipei and Washington to a serious test. The end result, however, was that, while these isles were technically embedded in the unfinished civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, they provided, ironically, an opportunity for secret communications and, ultimately, a kind of détente between the two supposedly deadly enemies across the Taiwan Strait. A close examination of the details of these crises, along with their attendant military, political, and diplomatic complexities, reveals an amazing amount of political intrigue at both the local and international levels that has not been fully realized until now.

Abstract
This article examines Lauchlin Currie's land tax policy suggestion during wartime China and its political economy. Our study, based on unpublished archival materials, aims to clarify the reasons for and outcomes of Currie's first visit to China in 1942. It is argued that Currie, acting as a sincere adviser, based his policy recommendation on extensive surveys of the political and economic conditions of wartime China. In his efforts to persuade the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek to implement financial reform, Currie drew on the authority of Sun Yat-sen's economic thought and the leadership analogies of Franklin Roosevelt and New Deal policies.