Why and when does China exercise restraint-and how does this aspect of Chinese statecraft challenge the assumptions of international relations theory? Chin-Hao Huang argues that a rising power's aspirations for acceptance provide a key rationale for refraining from coercive measures.
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This article argues that strong-state restraint is more likely to occur when lesser powers articulate their security preferences with a strong consensus. Why? Adherence to the consensus clarifies the dominant state's cooperative intentions, institutionalizes defensive military postures to mitigate security dilemma, and provides the concomitant benefit of recognition as a credible leader. If external validation matters in identity formation, then the acceptance of strong group consensus becomes an incentivizing legitimation strategy. This observation is evident in the interactions and authority relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South China Sea. ASEAN members' ability to develop security norms aimed at defusing tension shows that they are not as vulnerable as many believe. The finding draws on empirical evidence to show how small states induce change in a large power's behavior, and thus a positive theoretical advance with a testable argument about the causes for strong-state restraint.
Over the last two decades, Chinese armed forces have been increasingly exposed to the global norms of UN peacekeeping, not least through expanded participation in international peacekeeping operations. As the largest Security Council permanent member troop contributor, more than four fifths of Chinese troops in UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in Africa. As such, China is increasingly in a position to strengthen peacekeeping operations, contribute to stability, security, and security sector reform in Africa, and expand its regional multilateral military cooperation, all of which raises the prospects for China to become more integrated in the international community and a responsible, and responsive, major power. Given these important developments and their implications for the future of peacekeeping in Africa, this paper seeks to: identify the key determinants that undergird China's evolving foreign policy approach toward peacekeeping principles and praxis in Africa; ascertain the degree and trace the process in which increasing interactions between China, the African Union, and the broader international community have led Chinese policy elites to consider greater flexibility in their views toward sovereignty and the changing nature of peacekeeping; assess how a rising China may exert its influence through its expanding role in peacekeeping; and analyze the strategic implications of these security developments for Africa.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is often seen as a rivalry confined to the two great powers alone, in which secondary states such as those in Southeast Asia have little influence and will inevitably end up "choosing sides". However, this assumption overlooks how the domestic politics of Southeast Asian states shape their foreign policies. Furthermore, if the United States or China is to attain a leadership role and legitimacy in the region, it requires the validation, support, and deference of smaller states, none of which can be achieved without consideration of domestic politics. Thus, this Special Issue—including case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Thailand and the Philippines—underscores the domestic determinants of the foreign policy of Southeast Asian. (Contemp Southeast Asia / GIGA)
With its emphasis on organizational minimalism, how does ASEAN induce change in its members' policies? This paper examines the impact of consensus within ASEAN on haze mitigation in the Indonesian archipelago. When ASEAN articulates its environmental initiatives with a strong consensus, this clarity in its norms incentivizes emulation. The stronger the consensus within the group, the more compelling it becomes for members to adopt the agreement. Such prosocial behavior reflects nudging. Strong ASEAN consensus is a precursor of nudging that leads to dimmer hotspots. This study draws on discourse analysis of ASEAN summit statements on the haze, R programming to analyze NASA data on the brightness of peatland hotspots, and a case study to illustrate the causal mechanism. The findings identify ASEAN's role in environmental governance, particularly with respect to when consensus-based nudging is more or less likely to incentivize member states to curb transboundary haze.