Suchergebnisse

This paper develops a simple model of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The world economy consists of many open economies, each with its own banking system and its own central bank which uses its reserves to manage a pegged exchange rate. The fragility of the banking system and the limited ability of a domestic central bank to provide international liquidity together can cause currency and banking crises. An international interbank market can help an economy with the needed international liquidity, but this risk‐sharing also comes with potential costs of international financial contagion. Such contagious risk is much higher when there is an international interbank market than otherwise. An ILOLR can play a useful role in providing international liquidity and reducing international contagion.

Panel T06 - Special Topic: abstract no. T06-08 ; Corruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Nye 1967), undermines the economy, public trust in government, and regime legitimacy (Seligson 2002; Villoria, Ryzin, and Lavena 2013). Governments sometimes, to combat corruption, launch intensive campaigns (e.g. Manion 2004; Quah 1999), which involve extraordinary mobilization of administrative resources under strong political sponsorship (Liu, Lo, Zhan, and Wang 2015). In addition to strengthening regulatory enforcement, governments during anticorruption campaigns also aim to signal commitment against corruption and boost pubic support. While existing literature often focuses on evaluating the campaign effectiveness in terms of increasing policy compliance (e.g. Wedeman 2005), not much research has studied how well intensive anticorruption campaigns can help government win popular support. We attempt to fill . ; postprint

This paper provides a unified analysis for the onset of the 1998 financial crisis and the strong economic recovery afterward in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries. Before the crisis a banking failure arose owing to the coexistence of a lemons credit market and high government borrowing. In a lemons credit market low credit risk firms switched from bank to nonbank finance, including trade credits and barter trade, generating an externality on banks' interest rates. The collapse of the treasury bills market in the financial crisis triggered a change in banks' lending behavior, providing initial conditions for banking development. ; published_or_final_version

Understanding the changing role of central banks and the novel policies they have pursued recently is absolutely essential for analysing many economic, financial and political issues, ranging from financial regulation and crisis, to exchange rate dynamics and regime changes, and QE and prolonged low interest rates. This book features contributions by many of the world's leading experts on central banking, providing in accessible essays a fascinating review of today's key policy and research issues for central banks. Luminaries including Stephen Cecchetti, Takatoshi Ito, Anil Kashyap, Mervyn King, Donald Kohn, Otmar Issing, Hyun Shin and William White are joined by Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics, whose many achievements in the field of central banking are honoured as the inspiration for this book. The Changing Fortunes of Central Banking discusses the developing role of central banks and the policies they pursue in seeking monetary and financial stabilisation, while also giving suggestions for model strategies. This comprehensive review will appeal to central bankers, financial supervisors, academics and economists working in think tanks.