Suchergebnisse

Why do some countries emerge from civil war more democratic than when they entered into it, while others remain staunchly autocratic? Observers widely depict internal conflict as a pathway to autocracy or state failure, but in fact there is variation in post-civil war regimes. Conventional accounts focus on war outcomes and international peacebuilding, but Huang suggests that postwar regimes have wartime origins, notably in how rebel groups interact with ordinary people as part of war-making. War can have mobilizing effects when rebels engage extensively with civilian populations, catalyzing a bottom-up force for change toward greater political rights. Politics after civil war does not emerge from a blank slate, but reflects the war's institutional and social legacies. The Wartime Origins of Democratization explores these ideas through an original dataset of rebel governance and rigorous comparative case analysis. The findings have far-reaching implications for understanding wartime political orders, statebuilding, and international peacebuilding.

Abstract
In the midst of civil war, rebel groups often expend significant resources opening offices in foreign capitals, meeting with heads of state, expanding their overseas networks, appealing to international organizations, and contacting foreign media. Existing scholarship has generally neglected international diplomacy as an aspect of violent rebellion, focusing instead on rebel efforts at domestic organization. A systematic documentation of rebel diplomacy in post–1950 civil wars using new quantitative and qualitative data shows that rebel diplomacy is commonplace and that many groups demonstrate as much concern for overseas political campaigns as they do for domestic and local mobilization. Diplomacy, furthermore, is not a weapon of the militarily weak, but a tactical choice for rebel groups seeking political capital within an international system that places formidable barriers to entry on nonstate entities. An original analysis of the diplomacy of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in the Angolan civil war using archival sources further demonstrates why rebels may become active diplomats in one phase of a conflict but eschew diplomacy in another. More broadly, the international relations of rebel groups promise to be an important new research agenda in understanding violent politics.

Why do some countries emerge from civil war more democratic than when they entered into it, while others remain staunchly autocratic? Observers widely depict internal conflict as a pathway to autocracy or state failure, but in fact there is variation in post-civil war regimes. Conventional accounts focus on war outcomes and international peacebuilding, but Huang suggests that postwar regimes have wartime origins, notably in how rebel groups interact with ordinary people as part of war-making. War can have mobilizing effects when rebels engage extensively with civilian populations, catalyzing a bottom-up force for change toward greater political rights. Politics after civil war does not emerge from a blank slate, but reflects the war's institutional and social legacies. The Wartime Origins of Democratization explores these ideas through an original dataset of rebel governance and rigorous comparative case analysis. The findings have far-reaching implications for understanding wartime political orders, statebuilding, and international peacebuilding.

The global fame—or ignominy—of rebel leaders is often determined by the degree of violence and upheaval they and their armed organizations generate. Names like Joseph Kony, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Jonas Savimbi are inseparable from the violent political projects of the Lord's Resistance Army, the Islamic State, and UNITA, which these individuals led, respectively. But are these men representative of rebel leaders as a class of political actors in international politics? Though civil wars are the most common form of warfare today, we have little systematic information on the leaders of rebel organizations. This article reveals a new research tool that helps fill that gap and also describes why the information is important.

What is the role of religious identity in states' decisions to intervene in foreign conflicts? Existing scholarship on external interventions in armed conflict pays little attention to religion, while many studies on religion and conflict give intrinsic importance to actors' religious beliefs. In this article, we draw on insights from the comparative study of ethnic identity to explain foreign intervention decisions. Ethnic constructivism has been developed to explain domestic and group identity politics, but we demonstrate its utility for explaining state behavior in international politics. Based on the core premise of ethnic constructivism, we argue that coreligionism and coethnicity are poor predictors of states' foreign policies. Rather, states create narratives of ethnic affinity in the service of political objectives. We use archival and other primary sources to test the theory's expectations through a structured within-case comparative analysis of Iran and its response to violent conflicts in Lebanon, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. Our findings offer robust support for our theory while providing theoretical and methodological implications for the study of "religious" and other identity-based conflicts in international politics.

'Capacity building' has become a ubiquitous term in the international peacebuilding community. While the need for capacity building in post-conflict contexts is widely accepted, discussions rarely venture into what it is in practical and operational terms, and how it ought to be done. This article 1 examines a major capacity building project in East Timor, focusing on capacity building as it occurs day to day and on the ground. Following a brief overview of the concept of capacity building, it identifies a number of key challenges that arise in initiatives in which internationals work directly with local actors to build their capacity. It then offers a set of concrete proposals, targeted at capacity builders and their managing institutions, for improved practice.

'Capacity building' has become a ubiquitous term in the international peacebuilding community. While the need for capacity building in post-conflict contexts is widely accepted, discussions rarely venture into what it is in practical & operational terms, & how it ought to be done. This article1 examines a major capacity building project in East Timor, focusing on capacity building as it occurs day to day & on the ground. Following a brief overview of the concept of capacity building, it identifies a number of key challenges that arise in initiatives in which internationals work directly with local actors to build their capacity. It then offers a set of concrete proposals, targeted at capacity builders & their managing institutions, for improved practice. References. Adapted from the source document.

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels' need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels' incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels' resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories.

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels' need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels' incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels' resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories.

AbstractWhat is the role of religious identity in states' decisions to intervene in foreign conflicts? Existing scholarship on external interventions in armed conflict pays little attention to religion, while many studies on religion and conflict give intrinsic importance to actors' religious beliefs. In this article, we draw on insights from the comparative study of ethnic identity to explain foreign intervention decisions. Ethnic constructivism has been developed to explain domestic and group identity politics, but we demonstrate its utility for explaining state behavior in international politics. Based on the core premise of ethnic constructivism, we argue that coreligionism and coethnicity are poor predictors of states' foreign policies. Rather, states create narratives of ethnic affinity in the service of political objectives. We use archival and other primary sources to test the theory's expectations through a structured within-case comparative analysis of Iran and its response to violent conflicts in Lebanon, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. Our findings offer robust support for our theory while providing theoretical and methodological implications for the study of "religious" and other identity-based conflicts in international politics.

How does foreign support for rebel groups affect rebel governance of civilians during armed conflict? Existing studies primarily examine the local and domestic politics of rebel rule, leaving the effects of foreign intervention on rebel governance underexplored. Focusing on rebel provision of social services, this study considers two competing arguments. The first suggests that foreign sponsorship reduces rebels' need to rely on local civilians for resources and hence decreases rebels' incentives to provide services. The second anticipates that by augmenting rebels' resources and military capabilities, foreign support increases their capacity to provide welfare services. These competing logics suggest that different types of foreign support have divergent effects on rebel social service provision. The article tests this theory using cross-sectional time-series data on external support for rebel groups and rebel governance for the post-1945 period. It finds that rebel groups that receive external funding, weapons or training are significantly more likely to provide education and health services to civilians. In contrast, direct military intervention to assist insurgent forces has no effect on rebel service provision. This article is among the first to systematically study the impact of external support and third-party intervention on rebel social service provision during civil war and holds implications for civilian welfare in contested territories.