Suchergebnisse

Das Staatliche Büro für Statistik in der Volksrepublik China unterscheidet sich von seinem Pendant in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion, dem Zentralen Amt für Statistik, vor allem durch sein geringeres politisches Gewicht und seine operationale und administrative Abhängigkeit von Provinzregierungen. Die Ursache für die unterschiedliche Position der statistischen Ämter in beiden Staaten sieht der Verfasser in der unterschiedlichen Orientierung des sowjetischen und des chinesischen Planungssystems. Während die chinesischen Wirtschaft nach dem Territorialsystem organisiert ist, war die sowjetische Wirtschaft nach ministeriellen Zuständigkeiten organisiert. Der geringere Informationsbedarf eines territorialen Planungssystems erklärt den niedrigeren Stellenwert des statistischen Amtes in China. Dieser geringere Stellenwert schwächte wiederum die Option einer planwirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsalternative und öffnete so den Weg zur wirtschaftlichen Reformpolitik der achtziger Jahre. (BIOst-Wpt)

During the reform era, there have been two important developments in China's administrative system. First, there has been a moderate degree of administrative decentralization in the area of cadre appointment. Secondly, the centre has sought to regulate the appointment decisions that it no longer control directly and to monitor officials' performance and conduct. The author examines administrative monitoring. (DÜI-Sen)

The article focuses on the two major actors in the Chinese economic system - the local economic supervisory bureaucracies, such as tax and industrial bureaus, and their subordinate enterprises. It then goes on to describe the reasons for and the specific forms of their behavioural patterns. It also speculates on the possible effects of these behavioural patterns on the future course of reforms. (DÜI-Sen)

One possible political determinant of macroeconomic instability scholars have explored at length is decentralization, but cross-national research measuring political decentralization in terms of constitutional federalism has produced mixed evidence regarding its effects on inflation. Conceptualizing political decentralization in terms of governing political party decentralization but acknowledging the challenges of cross-national data collection, the authors suggest the utility of a sub-national approach by studying one country under single-party rule. Drawing on provincial-level cross-section time-series data, they find that political decentralization measured as the inverse of central government political control, via the ruling party, over the different provincial governments is positively correlated with provincial inflation in China during 1978-97. The finding is robust to alternative specifications,expanded year coverage and Granger causality tests. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)