Föderalismusreform: Gemeindefinanzreform: Problemlage und Lösungsansätze
In: Arbeitspapier 104/2003
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In: Arbeitspapier 104/2003
In: Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik 257 = 2000,3
In: Europäische Hochschulschriften
In: Reihe 5, Volks- und Betriebswirtschaft 1345
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Heft B 24, S. 22-30
ISSN: 0479-611X
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Band 47, Heft 24, S. 22-30
ISSN: 0479-611X
In: Studies in contemporary economics
In: Schriften zur öffentlichen Verwaltung und öffentlichen Wirtschaft 68
In: Österreichischer Milizverlag 73
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 55, Heft 5, S. 543-560
ISSN: 1467-9485
ABSTRACTThis paper considers a government that chooses its tax and borrowing policy in order to minimize the present value of the excess burden caused by taxation. In doing so, the government uses hyperbolic discounting. It turns out that public deficits are positive even if public expenditures are constant over time. With cyclical expenditures, the government chooses an asymmetric debt policy, i.e., in bad times it borrows more than it repays in good times. In contrast to tax smoothing and political economy theories of public debt, the welfare effects of a balanced budget rule are ambiguous.
In: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften: ZSE ; der öffentliche Sektor im internationalen Vergleich = Journal for comparative government and European policy, Band 3, Heft 4
ISSN: 1612-7013
In: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften: ZSE ; der öffentliche Sektor im internationalen Vergleich = Journal for comparative government and european policy, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 573-593
ISSN: 1610-7780
World Affairs Online
Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions.
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In: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften: ZSE ; der öffentliche Sektor im internationalen Vergleich = Journal for comparative government and european policy, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 573-593
ISSN: 1610-7780
This paper provides an economic explanation for the increasing reliance of the state on revenue from user charges on excludable public goods. We develop a model with many identical countries. The government of each country levies a capital tax on the domestic production sector and supplies an excludable public good to heterogeneous households. Under immobile capital, the price on the public good is zero. Under mobile capital, in contrast, the countries engage in tax competition and each country chooses a strictly positive price on the public good. With quasi-linear preferences, the reliance on user charges is shown to increase as tax competition becomes more intensive.
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