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AbstractUsing data from the Midlife Development in the USA (MIDUS) sample (3070 men and 3182 women) and the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS; 2240 men and 2346 women), we aimed to investigate whether religious, ethnic and racial in-group preferences as well as religious homogamy are associated with reproductive outcome in terms of number of children. Using data from the MIDUS twin sample, we further estimated the inherited genetic component of in-group attitudes. Additionally, we analyzed the association of ∼50 polygenic scores (PGSs) recently published for the WLS study and in-group attitudes as an indicator of potential pleiotropic effects. We found in both samples that, with one exception, religious though not other in-group attitudes are associated with a higher reproductive outcome. Also, religious homogamy is associated with higher average number of children. The inherited component of all in-group attitudes ranges from ∼21% to 45% (MIDUS twin sample). PGSs associated with religious behavior are significantly positively associated with religious in-group attitudes as well as family attitudes. Further associations are found with PGS on life satisfaction (work) and, negatively, with PGS for any sort of addiction (smoking, alcohol and cannabis use), indicating pleiotropy. We conclude that the positive association between religious in-group attitudes as well as religious homogamy and reproductive outcome may indicate selective forces on religious in-group behavior. As all investigated in-group attitudes, however, have a substantial inherited component, we further speculate that potential previous reproductive benefits of racial and ethnic in-group preferences, if they ever existed, might have been substituted by religious in-group preferences.

Abstract
In the following review article, we aim to summarize the current research progress in the field of evolutionary and behavior genetics studies on human religiousness and religious behavior. First, we provide a brief (and thus incomplete) overview of the historical discussions and explain the genetic basis of behavior in general and religious behavior in particular, from twin studies to molecular data analysis. In the second part of the paper, we discuss the potential evolutionary forces leading to human religiousness and human religious behavior, emphasizing the emergence of "axial age" and the so called "big gods" in the relatively recent history of humans.

There is growing evidence that human ideology as well as social and political attitudes also have a genetic basis. In case of some genetic predisposition of political attitude, an association with fertility would be a hint of potential selection on political ideology. We therefore investigated on the basis of men and women that have completed, respectively, almost completed reproduction, of three different data sets (the World Value Survey 1981–2014 covering a wide range of countries and developmental levels, n = 152,380, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe of 2005, n = 65,912, and the General Social Survey of the United States 1972–2014, n ∼ 6200) whether political attitude is associated with number of children. Overall, in the world wide survey, both extreme political attitudes, albeit more pronounced for right/conservative than for left/liberal attitude, are associated with higher average offspring number compared to intermediate attitudes. If countries are analyzed separately, however, the picture is inconsistent, and in most countries, the association is non-significant. In the European and the US-survey, only the political right is associated with above average number of children. The time series of US data from 1972 to 2014 shows that at least in the US-sample, this pattern emerged during the 1990s: in the 1970s and 1980s, also in the US-sample both political extremes had a reproductive advantage, which vanished for left wing individuals during the 1990s. From an evolutionary perspective, we are not able to draw final conclusions as the association between political attitude and reproduction varies across countries and time. Nonetheless, the overall pattern suggests that in human evolutionary history, both left and right political attitudes may have conveyed fitness benefits so that both attitudes have been kept in the population.

AbstractSocial cohesion – particularly with regard to the integration of migrants – is primarily measured in terms of education, labour market participation, unemployment, income levels and poverty. When seen from a historical long-term perspective (considering the migrations of Homo sapiens in the past 300,000 years) admixture merged members of diverse groups and forged – in addition to social ties – 'strong biological ties' of kinship, proposing that religious heterogamy is a long-term layer of social cohesion. Accordingly, this study investigated, on the basis of more than 600,000 men and women aged 26–35 years from Austria 2001, Germany (West) 1987, Ireland 2011, Portugal 2011, Romania 2011 and Switzerland 2000, which demographic characteristics foster religious heterogamy, controlling for various confounding factors using linear mixed modelling. By far the most important factor explaining religious heterogamy was the share of adherents to an individual's religious group in their area of residence. It can be concluded that the rate of intermarriage declines with the increasing size of an individual's religious group in their area of residence. From a long-term perspective the lack of familial ties (and conjoint offspring) between religious groups could lead to a lack of social cohesion.

AbstractTwo experiments were conducted to investigate children's and adults' knowledge of time and speed in action and judgment tasks. Participants had to set the speed of a moving car to a new speed so that it would reach a target line at the same time as a reference car moving at a higher speed and disappearing in a tunnel at the midway point. In Experiment 1 (24 10‐year‐olds, 24 adults), children's and adults' speed adjustments followed the normative pattern when responses had to be graded linearly as a function of the car's initial speed. In a non‐linear condition, only adults' action responses corresponded with the normative function. Simplifying the task by shortening the tunnel systematically in Experiment 2 (24 10‐year‐olds, 24 adults) enabled children to grade the speeds adequately in the action conditions only. Adults now produced normative response patterns in both judgment and action. Whether people show linearization biases was thus shown to depend on the interaction of age, task demands and response mode.

SummaryThis study compares the effects of two distinct forms of human capital – income and education – on marital status and childlessness separately by sex in six different countries. Nearly 10 million individual records on individuals aged 16 to 50 were used from censuses from Brazil, Mexico, Panama, South Africa, USA and Venezuela dating from 2000 or later, to analyse the relationship between education, income and marital status and childlessness in men and women. Regarding income, the findings for both outcome variables are strongly consistent across all six countries. Highest-income males and lower-income females have the highest proportion of ever-married and the lowest proportion of childlessness (using a proxy for childlessness: own children in the household or not). There is no corresponding consistency of findings as regards education either between the sexes or among the countries. To conclude, a lower percentage of low-income men are selected by females, because for women male status and resources provided by men are important criteria in mate selection. Therefore a higher proportion of low-income men remain unmarried and childless. Thus selection seems to play a role in modern societies.

SummaryFor modern Western societies with a regime of monogamy, it has recently been demonstrated that the socioeconomic status of men is positively associated with being or having been married. This study aims to compare marriage patterns (if a person has been married at least once) for cultures with a tradition of monogamy and polygyny. As no worldwide data on polygyny exist, religion was used as a proxy for monogamy (Christians) vs polygyny (Muslims). The analyses were based on 2000–2011 census data from 39 countries worldwide for 52,339,594 men and women, controlling for sex, sex ratio, age, education, migration within the last 5 years and employment. Overall, a higher proportion of Muslims were married compared with Christians, but the difference in the fraction of married men compared with married women at a certain age (the 'marriage gap') was much more pronounced in Muslims than in Christians, i.e. compared with Christians, a substantially higher proportion of Muslim women than men were married up to the age of approximately 31 years. As expected for a tradition of polygyny, the results indicate that the socioeconomic threshold for entering marriage is higher for Muslim than Christian men, and Muslim women in particular face a negative effect of socioeconomic status on the probability of ever being married. The large 'marriage gap' at a certain age in Muslim societies leads to high numbers of married women and unmarried young men, and may put such polygenic societies under pressure.