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A central concern in economics is to understand the interplay between institutions and labor markets. In this paper we argue that laboratory experiments are a powerful tool for studying labor market institutions. One of the most important advantages is the ability to implement truly exogenous institutional change, in order to make clear causal inferences. We exemplify the usefulness of lab experiments by surveying evidence from three studies, each of which investigates a different, crucial labor market institution: minimum wage laws, employment protection legislation and workfare

Among the many sorting functions provided by institutions of higher education, there is a geographic dimension. During the years spent as students and residents of local communities, students develop specific networks and contacts, and perhaps their tastes change as well. After graduation, these students may be more likely to reside in the locality or region in which they have been educated. This paper presents evidence which suggests that the university is important in attracting human capital to the local area and in stimulating entrepreneurial talent in the region. We also measure the strength of the impact of the university on geographical location in one specific instance. For post-graduate professional business and engineering students at Berkeley, we compare the spatial distribution of residences before attending the university and again after graduation. The results are suggestive of the importance of academic institutions in the geographic pattern of agglomerations of footloose scientific firms, such as those in the Silicon Valley just south of San Francisco. The results also reinforce the self-interested reasons for government investment in high-quality educational institutions, as measured by the return on the augmented human capital stock in the region.

A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using reduced form and structural methods we find that (i) managers make over-confident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomena are linked at an individual level. Our results are consistent with models of motivated beliefs in which individuals are motivated to distort memories of feedback and preserve unrealistic expectations. (JEL D82, D83, J33, L25, L81, M52, M54)