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Referendums provide citizen control over policy outcomes under various institutional provisions. This article offers a theoretical model covering four types of referendums, which differ with respect to their likelihood of occurring and their policy consequences. Implications derived from this model suggest that provisions that allow an opposition group to propose policies to be adopted by referendum should lead to more popular votes. Under these provisions, policies adopted should also more closely reflect the policy preferences of the median voter. Support for these implications appears in data on American states and countries around the world.

Referendums provide citizen control over policy outcomes under various institutional provisions. This article offers a theoretical model covering four types of referendums, which differ with respect to their likelihood of occurring & their policy consequences. Implications derived from this model suggest that provisions that allow an opposition group to propose policies to be adopted by referendum should lead to more popular votes. Under these provisions, policies adopted should also more closely reflect the policy preferences of the median voter. Support for these implications appears in data on American states & countries around the world. 3 Tables, 6 Figures, 1 Appendix, 54 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2004.]

`[C]onstitutions are unlikely to work as intended unless they employ the engines of Bentham, i.e., punishments and rewards.' (Sartori, 1994: ix) `The transition to democracy consists of the design and manipulation of institutions... that render certain actions and the pursuit of certain outcomes in people's self-interest.' (Ordeshook, 1997: 111)

Selection bias is an important but often neglected problem in comparative research. While comparative case studies pay some attention to this problem, this is less the case in broader cross-national studies, where this problem may appear through the way the data used are generated. The article discusses three examples: studies of the success of newly formed political parties, research on protest events, and recent work on ethnic conflict. In all cases the data at hand are likely to be afflicted by selection bias. Failing to take into consideration this problem leads to serious biases in the estimation of simple relationships. Empirical examples illustrate a possible solution (a variation of a Tobit model) to the problems in these cases. The article also discusses results of Monte Carlo simulations, illustrating under what conditions the proposed estimation procedures lead to improved results.

The interplay among intergovernmental and supranational actors is a defining feature of the institutional life of the European Union (EU). Too often, however, these actors are considered independent of each other, and their autonomy is assessed in a vacuum. This is problematic because if there is such a thing as "endogenous preferences" in the EU, it appears exactly through this interdependence of intergovernmental and supranational actors. None of the institutionalist approaches to the EU has come to grips with this fact yet. Based on some very simple gametheoretic ideas, I offer in this article a rationale for "endogenous preferences" and discuss their impact on issues of delegations. Some cursory empirical evidence supports the claims that the preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint them. Similarly, the analyses presented here suggest that preferences over delegation to supranational actors are influenced by differences in policy views between principals and agents.