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The predictive power of experts, operations analysis, and the value of information are interwoven subjects that are hard to winnow down to an essence. Prediction is a big subject, so I have limited this article to what I know best: the operational and tactical domains of conventional warfare.

The article of record as published may be found at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/8 ; The predictive power of experts, operations analysis, and the value of information are interwoven subjects that are hard to winnow down to an essence. Prediction is a big subject, so I have limited this article to what I know best: the operational and tactical domains of conventional warfare. First you will read three examples of limitations of predictions when they are formed on the basis of information alone. Next I will demonstrate that even a modest amount of quantitative analysis, even with incomplete information, can help a decision maker execute a military campaign without making explicit predictions about the coming battles or operations. Analysts cannot eliminate wartime surprises, but they can help to avoid the worst mistakes and steer military leaders toward better decisions. I will conclude by advocating what is too rarely done: the comparison of quantitative campaign analysis done before a war with what actually transpired in the war, to show that useful—even critically important—advice can be formulated very quickly to help decision makers. On one hand, intense thinking about the war is necessary; on the other hand, expert judgment alone should be augmented with simple, transparent, timely—even if incomplete—quantitative analysis.

A "bimodal" national military strategy would have two, and only two, objectives: first, the capabilities to deal with a peer competitor, and second, the means to conduct several small operations concurrently. What capabilities would the naval forces need? Would they cost no more than our present capabilities? Would this bimodal force be capable of dealing with other situations?

To approach teh sea side of maneuver warfare, one ought first to understand its nature and content in general. Contemporary American military reformers seem to claim that maneuver warfare is everything good: outwitting the enemy, creating and exploiting an information advantage, moving faster and more adroitly, and shooting more precisely and effectively. In the rhetoric, maneuver warfare is "rapid, violent, coordinated attack." But who would espouse the opposite, a "slow, feeble, disorganized attack"? If maneuver warfare is nothing more than fighting intelligently, then its antithesis is "stupid" warfare.

Teddy Roosevelt was a leader who spoke and wrote with rare clarity. He believed that good ideas that do not lead to action are hollow and that the purpose of words is to foster nobler beliefs and deeds. The pen is mightier than the sword only when education occurs, beliefs change, and actions ensue. The first President Roosevelt is remembered for his forcefulness and resolution. He sponsored reform through legislation--and laws, as we shall see, are an especially obligatory form of doctrine. A man wise in the ways of the world, he plainly understood that good Jaws are enforceable Jaws and that the best laws are those that serve the common weal.

A view point almost taken for granted among Defense officials is that national policy determines military strategy, which in turn determines the quantities and allocations of forces. Let me offer a contrasting position: "What actually halts the aggressor's action is the fear of defeat by the defender's forces, [even though] he is not likely to concede this, at least not openly.

Adapted and extended from an address to the Military Applications Society of INFORMS delivered in Monterey CA on 27 March 2012.

For Military Operations Research Society Symposium (73rd) Held in West Point, NY on 21-23 June 2005 ; This presentation is believed to be: UNCLASSIFIED AND APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

A methodology is introduced with which to compare the military worth of warship capabilities. It is based on a simple salvo model for exploratory analysis of modern combat characteristics. The "fractional exchange ratio" is suggested as a robust way to compare equal‐cost configurations of naval forces, because we cannot know in advance how and where the warships will fight. To aid in exposition, definitions of all terms are included in Appendix A. The methodology is illustrated with important conclusions from parametric analysis, among which are 1 Unstable circumstances arise as the combat power of the forces grows relative to their survivability. (Stable means the persistence of victory by the side with the greater combat potential.) 2 Weak staying power is likely to be the root cause when instability is observed. 3 Staying power is the ship design element least affected by the particulars of a battle, including poor tactics. 4 Numerical superiority is the force attribute that is consistently most advantageous. For example, if A's unit striking power, staying power, and defensive power are all twice that of B, nevertheless B will achieve parity of outcome if it has twice as many units as A.

The article of record as published may be found at https://www.jstor.org/stable/43962142

A methodology is introduce with which to compare the military worth of warship combat capabilities. It is based on two principles. First, a simple salvo model is necessary for exploratory analysis of modern characteristics. Second, the fractional exchange ratio is a robust way to compare equal-cost configurations of naval forces, even though we cannot know in advance how and where the warships will be fought. Survivability, Vulnerability, Sustainability, Warship, Combat Power, Striking Power ; NSWC, Carderock Division ; http://archive.org/details/valueofwarshipat00hugh ; NSWC, Carderock Division ; NA

The Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School has long been recognized as preeminent world wide in Military Operations Research. Two of its past chairmen, Jack Borsting and Dave Schrady, have been President of MORS. The current MORS President, Charlie Woods, and Executive Secretary, Ed Napier, re alumni. In addition, the Department faculty enjoys a reputation as on of the three or four strongest in OR throughout the country.

The article of record as published may be found at http://cimsec.org/leading-military-innovation-past-and-present/37073 ; Recently, senior decision makers and leaders, including the CNO, CMC, and SecNav, have expressed a belief in the centrality of military innovation and adaptation, and many commentators in think tanks and the press are promoting more military innovation for future readiness. Implicitly or explicitly, enthusiasms for innovation usually take one of the three following forms: emphasizing the nature of innovative thinking, the achievement of new innovations in military organizations, and establishing a culture of innovation.

A war-at-sea strategy, by confining conflict to the sea without land invasion or strike, would provide U.S. political leadership less intrusive ways to deter war, resolve crises with less threat of escalation, and in peacetime inspire allied engagement.